In 2023, dramatic changes took place in the context of Ukraine’s struggle for survival. The external situation deteriorated sharply, and the goals set at the front turned out to be unattainable. A gap arose between the vision of power and reality at both the internal and external levels.
Against the background of the conflict between the political leadership and the military command, internal turbulence is growing.
If trends continue, all this will inevitably entail defeat in the war and the collapse of statehood.
David Arakhamia, in an interview with Natalya Moseychuk, noted that the strategy needs to be changed. However, Zelensky and his entourage have not yet presented a holistic vision. Instead, there are many chaotic steps and mistakes, showing that Bankovaya is frantically looking for options.
I will describe the main plots in which Zelensky will be forced to adapt in order to maintain the chances of successfully completing the war and not end up living in exile.
External conditions
The head of the SVR, Alexander Litvinenko, outlined the framework of the Kremlin’s strategy in a column for Interfax. Putin is strengthening the regime and preparing for a long war. He is carrying out internal mobilization of the authorities and the population, putting Russia on a war footing and is going to actively create problems for the West through third countries. There should be no illusions that the war will end quickly.
Next year is the biggest election year on the planet. The USA, India, Pakistan, the European Union, dozens of countries important for Ukraine will go through election campaigns. The political landscape will be shaken, many states will fall into the domestic agenda.
Signals from the Netherlands, Slovakia, Hungary and the high probability of Trump's victory in the United States show that in a year the situation could be much worse than now. The factor of Israel and other potential sources of concern will act as a risk multiplier.
In order not to lose support, Ukraine must fit into the global agenda with a new set of arguments. Referring to common values and claims bordering on blackmail no longer work. Because Ukraine has nothing to “sell” - there are no successes at the front, but a lot of scandals.
The United States, through hints from Penny Pritzker, has already sent a signal that financial assistance to Ukraine may be seriously cut. You need to look for inner support.
There will definitely be military assistance to some extent, but there are prerequisites for a decrease in dynamics, as can be seen from the statements of partner countries, the size and content of the packages.
For the West we are talking about relatively small budgets. Therefore, the main question for them is why to invest? These theses are outlined in the well-known appeal of the Republicans - “what and why are we doing in Ukraine?”
Zelensky must present a clear vision of a winning scenario. They will believe him only if the strategy is linked to reality and quickly manifests itself through concrete steps that increase the efficiency of everything - the economy, the army, the social sphere, diplomacy, etc.
Among other things, we must talk about an honest assessment of the prospects at the front. So far everything is going according to the “Finnish scenario” of 1939-1940. The authorities must admit that in the current conditions, the liberation of the territories occupied by Russia within the 1991 borders is unrealistic. This is a strategic goal, but you need to prepare to achieve it.
This could take years, if not decades. We need not only to survive, because Russia will not leave us alone, but also to find sources for development.
Therefore, the main content is what will happen on the territory that Ukraine controls. This is what will determine how we fit our interests into the interests of our partners. It is necessary to create the foundation for the strongest possible negotiating position from which to enter into the ceasefire process and obtain security guarantees.
Rebooting power
The first task that Zelensky must solve is to ensure the stability, legitimacy and effectiveness of power. Hard times and unpopular measures lie ahead. Ukraine may be forced into negotiations, the very fact of which will be a shock to many and will be used for internal destabilization. It will be necessary to go through the storm.
Parliament already operates beyond its constitutional mandate. Zelensky himself will find himself in such a situation in the spring of 2024. From this moment on, Russia will intensify attacks with the aim of discrediting the Ukrainian government and imposing the idea of its illegitimacy. In order to attract the dissatisfied to its side, the Kremlin will be echoed by the destructive opposition represented by the Poroshenko group and the like.
Bankovaya has already outlined the contours of tactics in this direction.
Firstly, Arakhamia noted that crucial issues will be carried out through referendums. This can become a safeguard against excessive pressure from partners and insurance against accusations of illegitimacy.
Secondly, Zelensky himself, and then Arakhamia, indicated that there would be no elections in 2024.
This is a signal to local government, from which the personal income tax of the military was taken away, and to parliamentarians who were nervous because of the uncertainty.
Earlier, Bankovaya showed the people’s deputies that in case of disobedience, they would be quickly dealt with one by one. Zelensky needs a disciplined Rada, which has begun to falter in recent months. Many deputies in Servant of the People realized that they would not be in the next Rada, so they are trying to monetize what they have today. Because it has become more difficult for the Office to carry out its decisions, they are looking for tools to force obedience. And the corrupt “flights” of people’s deputies are one of these elements.
Zelensky also sent a signal to the military that he will not tolerate games of politics.
The OP seriously considered the possibility of holding presidential elections in the spring. However, the results of social research forced us to abandon this idea. As well as the idea of immediately dismissing Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny. Although I really want to.
According to opinion polls, in the second round of the presidential election, Zelensky is ahead of Zaluzhny with a margin of statistical error. This is a huge risk not only for the authorities, but also for the country. The very pushing of Zaluzhny into politics is fraught with a real split and the scenario of 1917-1920.
Therefore, the elections have been postponed to at least autumn. In the coming months, the OP will bargain with the commander-in-chief, while at the same time playing to reduce his popularity.
Thirdly, the key event will be the reboot of the Cabinet of Ministers.
On the one hand, there is an objective need to transfer the economy to a war footing and increase the overall adequacy of power at all levels. The situation when Ukraine is begging for money, and Kyiv is going to build a metro to Troyeshchyna for 34 billion UAH, looks like complete insanity in the face of mortal danger.
On the other hand, the West wants tighter control over the use of aid.
At the beginning of March 2024, it will be 4 years since Denis Shmygal headed the Cabinet of Ministers. This long-lived prime minister, convenient for Zelensky, certainly cannot become the personification and driver of a breakthrough.
In the political community they are already almost openly saying that the prime minister will be replaced in February - early March. After a winter that promises to be very difficult, and on the eve of the second anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion, a change in government will be a signal for change. Zelensky is using this occasion to cement a new strategy.
The fight for the position of prime minister is already underway. And on two levels.
At the top level, Bankovaya is trying to defend a candidate convenient for itself to the West and at the same time retain assistance. The OP wanted to promote Rostislav Shurma to the role of the new prime minister, but a negative trail is preventing him. The reserve candidate is the head of Naftogaz, Alexei Chernyshov.
At the lower level there is competition between the applicants themselves.
Now the main candidate is the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States Oksana Markarova. Markarova is understandable to the West and has a good reputation, it is ideal from the point of view of control over money and can symbolize a new course. Instead, the current head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dmitry Kuleba, may be sent as ambassador to Washington, and his place will be taken by the deputy head of the OP, Andrei Sibiga. According to my sources, Markarova herself does not want to join the government before February. Because you need to understand what clarity there will be regarding the filling of the budget for 2024. And this clarity can only be given by the Americans, without whose financial support Ukraine will not be able to close the huge budget hole.
The president’s website recently posted an amazing piece of news where Andrei Ermak (after a disastrous visit to Washington) calls Markarova and they discuss something. This is definitely not the format of a presidential website. It looks like a signal to partners that their wishes are not ignored.
Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kubrakov fell out of the list of the president's favorites, although back in the spring he was a key candidate for the post of prime minister. Clouds gathered over him and, even more so, over Mustafa Nayem. A few days ago, NABU temporarily saved both of them from problems on the part of Bankova, highlighting their outstanding role in exposing corrupt officials. Sources in the Cabinet of Ministers say that the “exposure” itself was a form of “cover-up” against the background of accusations of misuse of funds for the construction of concrete fortifications for Ukrainian energy system facilities. What Victor Kurtev recently talked about on my air and what he wrote about on Khvila in the material “Concrete on Blood”.
However, Kubrakov maintains good relations with the US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink, who regularly meets with him. And in general he is in good standing with the Americans.
At the same time, NABU filed charges of multimillion-dollar abuses against the leadership of the State Special Communications Service. The State Special Communications Service is the area of responsibility of Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Fedorov. Through this structure, 40 billion UAH from the budget for drones are spent, and the personal income tax of the military will be transferred to it.
Fedorov has not yet been publicly accused of corruption, but it is in the air. He was also considered as a potential prime minister, but has now become more vulnerable to criticism.
It is important to note that the head of the State Special Communications Service Yuri Shchigol and his deputy were fired by the Cabinet of Ministers a couple of hours before the suspicion was served, i.e., NABU transmitted the information to the government in advance. Thus, we have a whole range of evidence that NABU is actively used to format the political landscape, clearly beyond its powers.
New design for the defense sector
The second area where global changes are needed is defense.
How the balance is built between the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Digital Development and the Ministry of Strategic Industry will be of great importance. There are many pitfalls and subjective aspects here.
The most important role is played by the Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov. He found himself in a very difficult situation.
In mid-August, I examined in detail the logic within which Zelensky was preparing to replace the Minister of Defense.
On the one hand, it was necessary to preserve the international track. At the time of Alexei Reznikov’s resignation, the current task of the Ministry of Defense on the international track was to form an outline of the Ukrainian army of the future (Future Force Concept), to include Ukraine’s needs for creating this army in the defense planning process of partner countries and to adopt long-term support programs.
On the other hand, the new minister had to work out internal political tasks:
- improve defense communications and management;
- cut off the disloyal army from the possibility of monetization;
- clearly define areas of responsibility and channel the negativity from the mistakes of the military onto themselves, invigorate the General Staff and command.
Umerov began his work precisely in this logic and it is already possible to give the first estimates.
Firstly, Umerov took office without his team. This requires additional time for coordination.
Moreover. Ekaterina Chernogorenko, who previously worked with Fedorov on the “Army of Drones,” became Deputy Minister of Defense for Digital Transformation. Fedorov, through his man, controls the most important sector from within the Ministry of Defense. This is a direct conflict of interest, because previously the Ministry of Defense was categorically against a number of initiatives of the Ministry of Digital Development and the State Special Communications Agency. Against the background of the flaring scandal with Shchigol, the situation becomes even more ambiguous.
Secondly, one of the main advantages of the new minister was his contacts in Muslim countries and especially in Turkey. After the Hamas attack on Israel, the context changed. These countries will concentrate on their problems.
As EU chief diplomat Josep Borrell noted, Muslim states express dissatisfaction that the EU treats the needs of Ukraine with more attention than the Palestinians. What will affect political support? That is, the direction where Umerov could provide a quick result will require more effort.
Thirdly, in general, the situation with international contacts through the Ministry of Defense seems incomprehensible.
Umerov has been in office for almost three months, but a deputy for international relations has still not been appointed to his team. This is important because someone must constantly accompany not only the war, but also the preparations for the NATO summit in Washington, and a host of other issues. The inertia will end sooner or later.
At Ramstein in September, Umerov voiced Reznikov’s plans to create a “Coalition of Opportunities” (we are talking about those very long-term support programs). Continuity was preserved, but the situation changed dramatically.
Zelensky and his entourage went to the second Ramstein, which took place in Brussels immediately after the events in Israel. It was the right move to keep Ukraine in focus, but it sidelined Umerov.
Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny and head of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kirill Budanov took part in the November “Ramstein” (online) for the first time.
Umerov, apparently, wanted to emphasize the unity of the military-political leadership in this way. But media resources and speakers from Poroshenko’s orbit distorted what was happening and began to disperse the signal that US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin allegedly demanded that Zaluzhny be allowed in during his visit. This is a familiar game for Poroshenko’s group to pit Zelensky and Zaluzhny against each other. But it was picked up by part of the audience.
In general, the international vector in the Ministry of Defense is still stalled for objective and subjective reasons. That is, Umerov in his ministry de facto has no “digits” and a truncated international standard.
A special area is procurement. There are no clear results here yet. They should appear in December-January, when the new procurement agency begins work. But it was here that Umerov’s first serious crisis arose, about which I already wrote. This crisis could have serious consequences.
Umerov must resolve the issue with the head of the MOU procurement agency, Arsen Zhumadilov , who has visited Crimea several times since 2014, and whose wife has a Russian passport.
Zhumadilov is perceived by the General Staff as an official vulnerable to Russian pressure. Everyone whom Umerov forces to order will begin to declare that the minister is covering up for an odious subordinate and professes double standards.
Minister Umerov will face enormous resistance as he implements the changes. Therefore, he needs full support. However, he himself should not expose himself to blows and weaken his position.
For now, Umerov operates in comfortable conditions. He is actively supported by the media holding of Tomas Fiala and public activists who brought down Reznikov. In a month or two it will become more difficult. The minister must show results, otherwise when the Cabinet changes, the question of his reappointment will arise.
New format for the Ministry of Defense - General Staff
What is already noticeable is a change in the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
For a year and a half of war, ex-minister Alexei Reznikov took upon himself all the negativity for both the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. There was a logical explanation for this. After the clinch of the Taran-Khomchak times, it was necessary to unblock work, and with the beginning of a full-scale invasion it was necessary to rally the population around the army. What has been achieved?
In October–November, Umerov made it clear that priorities had been adjusted.
Over the past two months, Umerov’s specialized deputies – Yuri Dzhigir and Dmitry Klimenkov – have repeatedly highlighted abuses in the ZSU. Fraud with combat and fuel payments, abuse of products, an incomprehensible tender with overpriced folders, etc. And everywhere – millions, if not tens of millions of UAH losses. And this is all the responsibility of the General Staff.
The most revealing episode was the purchase of winter fuel: the Ministry of Defense publicly switched gears to ZSU for the first time in 2 years. Due to the delay in submitting requirements from the ZSU, the Ministry of Defense did not have time to purchase fuel through Prozorro. The department's press service wrote directly from this - the delay is on the side of the military.
My sources in the General Staff commented on it this way. Indeed, the General Staff and the troops have huge problems with planning. Part of it is caused by corruption - when everything is on fire and purchases need to be made at the last moment, it is easier to organize schemes. Another part is the usual carelessness of people who are used to working in peacetime and do not study.
But there is one more element. By submitting applications to the Ministry of Defense with unrealistic deadlines (“for the day before yesterday”) and unrealistic quantities, the General Staff protects itself from claims in case of failures at the front. Like, we asked you - you gave us later and not everything. Therefore, the General Staff always delays and inflates needs, transferring responsibility to the Moscow Region.
Umerov showed that now Zaluzhny will not be allowed to be exclusively the “commander in chief of victories and good news”; he will have to take on some of the negativity and sort out the problems. In particular, with mobilization.
Although military registration and enlistment offices are located within the structure of the Ground Forces, Zaluzhny publicly appointed several new military commissars to positions in the summer, in particular in Odessa. Which immediately gave rise to questions: if he can remove and appoint, why didn’t he do this earlier, when they were shouting about abuses? Didn't know or didn't want to? They directly wrote online: Zaluzhny cannot be responsible only for good military commissars, and Army Commander Alexander Syrsky cannot be responsible only for bad ones. It is not right. Moreover, all military commissars go through the sieve of the Chief of the General Staff Sergei Shaptala.
Corruption in ZSU began to be publicly exposed 1-2 times a week. Over time, this will negatively affect the support of the commander in chief. And here is a very important point.
We are all interested in increasing the efficiency of the army. These are the lives of our people. The outcome of the war depends on this. It is important that working with problems is not perceived in society as an attack on the military command.
Much will depend on whether Umerov and Zaluzhny find a common language. The generals will probably screw up the commander in chief, the media and the soldiers in the trenches. Unconstructive attacks in the style of Maryana Bezugla will also contribute to conflicts.
Here everyone must show wisdom and restraint. The price is too high.
Strategic Defense
In addition to operational issues, there are also conceptual challenges.
The question of transferring the economy to a war footing remains open. After the appointment of Alexander Kamyshin to the Ministry of Strategic Industry, signals were sent about improved dynamics in the production of domestic weapons. The former Ukroboronprom, after the expulsion of the saboteur Yuri Gusev, has finally become more active. However, this is not enough.
The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, recently emphasized that Ukraine must be integrated into the EU's long-term defense programs. That is, the vector that was developed by the Ministry of Defense in the summer remains relevant. The new Cabinet should make it a priority in relations with the EU, USA, Canada, Japan and other countries of the free world.
As for military operations, Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny admitted the obvious: we are facing a positional war. On the agenda is a transition to strategic defense, which will require a revision of a lot of settings.
The question that is on the surface is why the summer-spring campaign did not bring the expected results?
The honest answer is that mistakes were made in planning and assessing the enemy, as well as miscalculations in implementing the command’s plan. For example, when one of the new brigades, trained in the west and armed to the teeth, but with no experience in real combat, failed its task in the south. This broke the plans, which, as The Washington Post writes , were quite specific - to advance 15 kilometers in the Rabotino area in the first 24 hours in order to reach Melitopol in the following days.
Society must accept that not only officials, but also the military can make mistakes. And not only politicians, but also the command must bear responsibility. First of all, this will help talented, proactive officers who simply cannot advance in their careers in conditions of total mutual responsibility and unhealthy corporate ethics, when they cover up Soviet butchers and thieves.
Zelensky must offer an honest position: there was a plan, there were mistakes in it, tasks were not solved for objective and subjective reasons, conclusions were drawn, the strategic goal does not change, but in order to preserve the country, we must change the approach - go on strategic defense.
Changing command in war is not a tragedy. If this measure is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of defense, and not at eliminating a future political competitor. Otherwise it will inevitably cause a riot.
Zaluzhny fears that he will be made guilty, and, perhaps, purely psychologically, he cannot accept criticism after a year and a half of carrying it in his arms. The generals, who want to remain untouchable, egg on the commander in chief. Zelensky must show that there is no goal to politically destroy Zaluzhny, on the contrary, there is a readiness to support him in cleaning and modernizing the army.
The fighting has reached a plateau, the front line is generally stable. This is a convenient time to work on quality. If Zaluzhny leads the changes, he must be supported with all our might. If he puts corporate solidarity above the interests of the country, he needs to be changed. The army, like the state as a whole, must now very quickly adapt to the realities of a long war.
An element of the new quality of defense should be a new information policy within the country and for Western audiences. This should be systematic work designed for long-term effect. We need high-quality products, like the film “Butcha,” the state should be the customer and driver of their creation. There is no need to be afraid to start talking about problems. The telethon has become destructive because it keeps a significant part of the population in an inadequate perception of reality, and this does not allow them to later make decisions that diverge from this perception. Therefore, a sobering agenda is needed to quickly make the right decisions and ensure their implementation.
Rebooting power, the military economy and modernizing defense are the areas of the new course where Zelensky must show his will and demonstrate the first results by the end of winter. This will make it possible to strengthen the negotiating position before Putin’s re-election. We need to hurry up, because in the spring Putin will announce a large-scale mobilization and try to conquer the left bank of the Dnieper. Zelensky received appropriate signals from Western leaders. In 2024, it will be extremely important for Putin to get new victories in Ukraine, because this will hurt the Democrats’ positions in the US presidential elections. Ukraine’s defeats will strengthen the position of Trump and the isolationists, because Putin will not stand up to the price. Everyone in Ukraine needs to understand this very well - 2024 could be much more difficult than this year.
Therefore, Ukraine can no longer wage war in the format it has been for almost two years. It must be assumed that the effectiveness of defense will determine further Western support. Ukraine can no longer afford inefficiency, which is like death. It is necessary to transfer the entire economy to a military footing, cut all costs not related to defense, and focus on radically reducing losses at the front, because people are Ukraine’s key resource. And now every day is worth its weight in gold. You can't waste it mediocrely.
Otherwise, in the spring, Zelensky may find himself in the position of Petliura, who lost his subjectivity, gave up territories and opened the way to agreements on the fate of Ukraine, but without the participation of Ukraine.
Recently, on the 90th anniversary of the Holodomor, we honored the memory of millions of victims. These victims are a direct consequence of the loss of Ukrainian statehood. Politicians, military commanders, and citizens must learn this lesson.
