Since the end of last year, the Ukrainian army, after the failure of the offensive, switched to strategic defense. This means that the construction of large-scale defensive lines comes to the fore. But this is exactly what Kyiv has significant problems with.
“There was nothing, some knee-deep trenches and that’s it,” Nikolay, a Ukrainian Armed Forces serviceman, describes the Ukrainian Air Force and what the engineering and fortification structures looked like on the second line of defense, where his unit recently arrived in the East.
And this situation is not unique. It manifested itself especially clearly in February, when Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat from Avdiivka under pressure from the Russians. According to the fighters themselves, there were no prepared lines outside the city. In particular, this allowed the enemy to rapidly advance to the west by almost 10 km.
The soldiers themselves, military experts, analysts and even politicians are now talking about the inadequacy, unpreparedness, and sometimes poor quality of Ukrainian defense lines. The parliamentary opposition is demanding a report from the prime minister on the "failed fortification programme" and an investigation into it.
Head of Government Denis Shmygal, in turn, announced the allocation of a record 20 billion hryvnia from the beginning of the year to create defensive lines and intensify this work.
After the publicity of information about the deplorable state of Ukrainian fortifications, this process accelerated significantly; almost daily, military units and regional administrations began publishing photo reports of digging trenches and building dugouts, and a “non-public curator” from the authorities began to coordinate this process.
What is this line of defense?
First you need to understand what kind of defensive structures we are talking about. We are talking about long-term and field military fortifications, that is, those that are erected directly near the line of combat contact and at some distance from it.
Typically the defensive line consists of three main lines.
First comes the “forefield,” which may include minefields, barbed wire obstacles, anti-tank ditches and concrete obstacles—“dragon’s teeth.”
Next begins the main line of defense, which consisted of reinforced concrete and granite bunkers (long-term defensive points), bunkers (wood-earth defensive points), trenches, dugouts, dugouts and machine-gun nests.
Behind the main line of defense there is another one - a reserve one, as well as artillery positions.
A classic example of such a three-level construction is the “Surovikin Line”, which the Russians built in the occupied part of the Zaporozhye and Donetsk regions in six months - from October 2022 to spring 2023.
Ukraine has been building its defensive lines since 2015 along the demarcation line in the East. However, they were not so powerful and were not located in the areas where the fighting is currently taking place.
For example, the former chief of staff of the Luhansk operational-tactical group, and now an expert at the Center for Defense Strategies, Viktor Kevlyuk, tells the Ukrainian Air Force that in his area of responsibility, engineering and fortification structures were erected along the Seversky Donets River in the Luhansk region.
“The front line (of defense) ran along the river, the second line of defense was built parallel to the Seversky Donets and perpendicular to today’s front line. Therefore, the question is: what is the benefit of this line today if the direction of military operations is from east to west, and not from south to north?”
There were no defensive lines at all along the state border with the Russian Federation in the Lugansk region. According to Kevlyuk, in some areas only VPs (platoon strongholds) were made, and in others only the concentration of reserves in the rear was done.
Actually, the absence of a defense line on the border allowed Russian troops to quickly occupy most of the Luhansk region and advance deeper into the region at the beginning of the invasion in 2022.
In other sectors of the front, primarily in the south of the Donetsk region, Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat from the first line of defense to the second under enemy pressure, but did not prepare a third line of defense.
An Air Force source in the command of the engineering troops also says that the defensive lines that had been erected since 2015, indeed, turned out to be irrelevant at the beginning of a full-scale war, since the Russian army actually bypassed them and went behind the Ukrainian Armed Forces in many sectors of the front. In fact, the last “old” lines of defense remained Marinka and Avdeevka, which fell earlier this year under pressure from the Russians.
Now Ukraine is rapidly trying to build a new line of defense. First of all, in the most threatening areas - near Zaporozhye, in the west of the Donetsk region, as well as near Kupyansk and along the eastern border with Russia.
Problematic fortifications
True, the question remains open: why didn’t they start building a new powerful defensive line in the first two years of the big war?
Air Force Ukraine interlocutors cite different versions of the reasons. In particular, we can talk about the chaos of the first months of the conflict, the limited financial resources of the state and the offensive rather than defensive plans of the Ukrainian government.
The bulk of the work on the construction of defensive lines near the front is carried out by the engineering troops, which belong to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In early March, President Vladimir Zelensky replaced the commander of the Support Forces. The new leader was the head of the engineering troops, Alexander Yakovets.
According to reserve colonel Viktor Kevlyuk, there is currently a shortage of engineering units in Ukraine. This is not least due to their significant reduction in the early 2000s.
The expert explains: now the commander of the operational command at the front has an operational support regiment of three battalions, but only one of them can be engaged in fortification work - the one that is provided with the necessary equipment and machinery. This is clearly not enough, says Kevlyuk.
“In order to “dig in” for a defensive operation in the operational command, you need to have approximately 5-8 engineering battalions, but there is only 1. Question: why are there not all the rest? Unknown."
Until 2014, Ukraine was reducing its engineering troops and therefore now experiences a shortage of trained personnel and equipment
Another problem is that the process of arranging fortifications took place “bottom-up”, that is, a specific unit was responsible for creating a line of defense only in its sector and, in order to create something more reliable than ordinary trenches, had to constantly contact to the high command for the allocation of wood, concrete or equipment.
Therefore, in practice, the fortifications erected in each individual area differed significantly from each other and did not create a dense and continuous defensive line. This gave Russian troops the opportunity to push through the Ukrainian defenses in “weak” areas and enter the flank of other units.
“This problem exists, but it is definitely not the fault of the engineering units,” one of the officers serving in the Armed Forces Support Forces Command assures the Air Force.
There is logic in this statement. Having announced the transition to “strategic defense,” in December 2023, the Ukrainian authorities determined that several departments are customers for the purchase of defense goods, works and services for the construction of fortifications. Their list is defined in the Cabinet of Ministers resolution of December 29.
These include the Ministry of Defense, the State Special Transport Service, local administrations and the State Agency for Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development. All these bodies would have to coordinate with each other when constructing defense lines. But often in fact it turns out the other way around, says an interlocutor from the engineering troops.
For example, local administrations in some cases do not provide the necessary assistance to the military, who are forced, in the absence of special equipment and materials, to hastily erect fortifications near the battle line.
The head of the engineering troops, General Alexander Yakovets, was promoted at the beginning of March and became the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Member of the parliamentary committee on national security and defense Sergei Rakhmanin (Golos faction) says that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the legal right to seize the necessary construction equipment for such work, but this must go through local military administrations.
“In fact, it looks a little different - if the military comes to an agreement with the local authorities, then it will give something, but if they don’t agree, then it won’t give. And a very common answer is: “you will lose it anyway, break it or it will explode, and therefore we will not provide it to you.” There are a lot of such cases,” says the deputy in an interview with Radio NV.
In his opinion, this problem is related to low “executive discipline” in Ukraine.
“It turned out that there was no one to slam his fist on the table,” says Rakhmanin.
New curator from the old system
But it seems that the Ukrainian authorities have finally found someone who will “bump with their fist.” Quite unexpectedly, it turned out to be the former deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kirill Tymoshenko. Since March 1, he has been a full-time adviser to Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.
Three sources, in particular from the OP and the Ministry of Defense, confirmed to the Ukrainian Air Force that in his position he is also involved in the construction of fortifications.
The ministry, in response to a request from the Air Force, responded that the “main direction” of Tymoshenko’s work is media and communications, coordinating information policy in the Ministry of Defense and subordinate structures, as well as building a “unified information agenda” in the Defense Forces.
The department ignored the question of the new adviser’s involvement in a large-scale company for the construction of defensive fortifications.
Likewise, Kirill Timoshenko, during a conversation with the BBC, refused to confirm or deny his involvement in the fortification issue. He stated that, indeed, he is present at many meetings of the Ministry of Defense on various issues, but his main function is to be an adviser to the minister on communications policy.
“Thank God that this is being done,” he commented on the issue of a large-scale state program for the construction of defense lines, refusing to explain in more detail his role in this work.
Who is Kirill Timoshenko? During his short time in Ukrainian politics, he earned himself a controversial reputation.
He joined Zelensky’s team during the 2019 presidential campaign. At that time, the 30-year-old media worker was producing advertising and election videos, television programs and was the owner of an advertising agency.
From May 2019 to January 2023, Tymoshenko served as deputy head of the Presidential Office, where he was responsible for regional and media policy.
Before the Russian invasion in 2022, he also oversaw the government’s strategic program “Big Construction”, on which huge sums of money were spent. Therefore, Tymoshenko himself came under criticism regarding their expenses.
Due to corruption violations during the implementation of this large-scale and expensive program, law enforcement agencies opened a number of criminal proceedings. Some of the defendants, in particular the ex-head of the Dnepropetrovsk regional state administration Valentin Reznichenko, were searched.
However, law enforcement officers regarding the “Big Construction” did not have any questions for Tymoshenko. But he later received charges from the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in another case.
According to the NACP, in 2022, a representative of the OP illegally used a valuable Porsche Taycan car, which an acquaintance allegedly provided him with for “free use.” In addition, NAPC accused Tymoshenko of having “stayed for free” three times during 2022 in the Emily Resort hotel complex in the Lviv region, and also helped his subordinate go abroad, allegedly for a business trip. The real purpose of the departure was supposedly private interest - obtaining visas for Tymoshenko and his son.
However, last fall, the court rejected all the arguments of the NAPC and found Tymoshenko not guilty.
Regarding the construction of defense lines, the Ministry of Defense told the Air Force that they are indeed monitoring the construction of fortifications. This is done by the coordination headquarters, which includes representatives of the ministry and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
“The headquarters constantly interacts with construction customers involved in the implementation of activities and regional military administrations in whose area of responsibility the construction is carried out,” says the response to the request.
Defensive work is being carried out in all directions, in all 14 designated areas. The department refused to disclose the percentage of readiness of fortifications, but noted that the construction time frame was set as “as short as possible.”
According to operational data, as of March 5, about 2 billion hryvnia had already been used from the allocated funds. But the Ministry of Defense notes that the allocated funding (we are talking about 20 billion hryvnia) does not cover the total need for the full implementation of construction work.
