I’ll be honest: launching a public chat bot Army+ on Telegram for military personnel and members of their families is something only the FSB could have come up with.
During the war against Russia, to create an online service for the Ukrainian military on a product completely controlled by Russia - I do not believe in such an advanced phase of mental retardation. More like a completely deliberate sabotage.
I have been talking about the radical harmfulness of the enemy Telegram product for five years now - exactly as long as the young team of fans of this Kremlin social network has been in power. The investigation will later show how free this love is.
But even if someone considers all my hopeless calls to be conspiracy theories, who naively believes in the play “Telegram was blocked in Russia” staged by the Russian intelligence services, or fell for Durov’s stupid scam “Telegram is registered in Dubai” - let’s talk about simpler things, more understandable. A little technical, but bear with me.
So, the Army+ chatbot is not encrypted, and the data is stored on Telegram servers. Well, this is a peculiarity: for the sake of speed and ease of use, they sacrifice security. Because end-to-end encryption slows down the data transfer speed: this is its feature, unfortunately.
All instant messengers are forced to make this difficult choice: speed or user safety. If Signal, Threema, WhatsApp and even the damned Viber decided that security was still more important, then Durov deliberately made a choice not in favor of security. So that the rank and file would mutter “but it’s convenient” and use it as often as possible.
And the lack of encryption in the TG-bot Army+ and data storage on the Cart servers means only one thing: all requests will be read and analyzed by the enemy. Each chatbot user can be identified. Next, you can determine its affiliation with a military unit, geolocation, approximate or exact coordinates. And much more. It’s the same for family members: the enemy will now know who is whose wife, brother, father, child, where they are now, so they can be found, intimidated, blackmailed, destroyed by a “newbie” and the like.
Based on the nature and statistics of the chatbot’s frequent questions, one can determine the pain points of the Ukrainian military system - and hit them with targeted information.
You can also carry out targeted information special operations through an official chatbot: for example, ... although no, I won’t give any hints.
All the intelligence services in the world know about all these features of Telegram’s work and use us effectively – and ours too, by the way.
But to create an official chat bot in Russian Telegram, where you can easily identify Ukrainian military personnel and members of their families - only a conscious enemy of Ukraine could do this. Who occupies a high government position, steals millions of dollars from the Ukrainian budget, helps Russian business in Ukraine, blocks petitions to ban Russian Telegram, and deliberately pursues a destructive government policy in the field of digitalization. And I’m not talking about Katya (she’s essentially a nobody). “Tell me what his name is?”
And fuck him with all these messages in your blogs. These abominations are afraid only of force - just like their leptopod masters. They are afraid that indignant people will come out under the walls of their estates and luxurious offices, as was the case in 2004 and 2014. I wonder where the “last straw level” is now. What will force Ukrainians to throw FSB agents out of power in Ukraine? Publication of lists of military units? Publication of addresses, passports and constituent information for all inconvenient investigative journalists and their loved ones? Announcement of “elections in Dii”? Public burning of inconvenient bloggers at the intersection of Delovaya and Antonovich? None of the above, even combined?
I repeat: the agents of the Kremlin special services are located at the highest levels of power in Ukraine. And the “Arima+ in Telegram” project is direct proof of this.
But for some reason the SBU stubbornly “does not notice” this.
