For many Ukrainians, the result of the 2023 counteroffensive was disappointing, either because it was over-hyped throughout the year, which contributed to inflated expectations, or because of war fatigue.
But in any case, Ukraine’s war against Russia continues. In 2024, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny stated the actual transition to trench warfare. However, problems for the army remain a shortage of ammunition, uncertainty with mobilization, and frozen aid from the United States. Journalists from The Page learned how these problems affect the front and what to do about them from Yevgeny Diky, a military observer and former company commander of the Aidar battalion.
How does shell hunger affect the situation at the front?
Can you explain how the shortage of shells directly affects the situation at the front?
Now our consumption of shells per day is approximately two thousand. This is actually a terrible shell hunger.
Just two or three months ago, before the shell famine, it was enough to identify the coordinates of the target and transmit them to the artillery in time. Now the picture is completely different: data is collected on various targets and officers sit down and decide: “We’re spending shells on this, but let this one go for a walk.” This is actually a very painful choice every time.
Moreover, in some sectors of the front we are now simply withdrawing the best Western artillery. Because there is no point in keeping it as bait for “lancets” (Russian drones) in a situation where they will fire, perhaps, several shots per day.
Actually, Europe gives what it can. France supplies three thousand shells a month. And it is she who has tripled her production in just one year. And why? Because the annual norm of the French army was seven thousand shells. At the peak of our summer offensive, we spent seven to eight thousand a day.
Europe's "bonsai army" is not ready for war
Can we produce more shells in Ukraine and where else could we get them?
Yes, we can produce much more shells in Ukraine, but not immediately. Many people think that the whole problem is money, but, unfortunately, the global military trade, which Putin spoke about during the annexation of Crimea, does not exist.
For example, almost a year ago the European Union promised to supply us with a million shells within a year. By March of this year, perhaps they will reach 600 thousand. All EU enterprises were not able to do so much in a year, despite the fact that the order has already been contracted.
When for 30 years the whole of Europe dismantled, dismantled, and repurposed these enterprises for completely different products, now it is not only necessary to reactivate the old factories, the majority simply do not have them.
A striking example of the Stinger missile. We were given a large number of them, and as a result the American army asked to restore its own supplies. So, they had to find retired grandfathers who once made these Stingers in the 80s, ask them to return to work, teach the young ones. That is, when an entire industry has been in decline for 30 years, then, unfortunately, this cannot be solved simply with money. This can be solved with money, time and a lot of effort.
When will the Europeans be able to reach an adequate number of shells per month for the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
The Europeans hope to reach more or less normal volumes of shell production in about three years. Best case scenario.
Joseph Borel, the EU's chief diplomat, said a year ago that Europe had grown "bonsai armies." This is perhaps the most accurate definition, that is, it looks good, but it is half a meter and that’s all.
And in Ukraine, everything that is currently produced goes straight from the assembly line to the front. It turns out that our defense industry alone is doing much more than France. But this is still incomparably less than needed.
Can drones replace artillery at the front?
Could drones be an alternative to artillery or even replace it, as you hear about?
No way. This is the same as the Kalashnikov assault rifle is not an alternative to artillery. Each weapon has its own niche that it covers.
It is especially often said that FPV guns are an alternative to artillery. No way. Let's start with the range: FPV - usually 7-8 km. Arta usually operates at 40 km, and MLRS at 70 km.
Even with the lack of shells and the extremely successful work of our drone operators, more than 80% of the destruction of personnel was artillery. Although more than half of the destroyed equipment is drones.
Why a transition to defense is an undesirable war option for Ukraine
To what extent is a transition to defense, forced due to a lack of shells, a good option for the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
This is completely decided by the US Congress. Here we have two completely different scenarios. If supplies of ammunition are resumed to us at least from April, we should under no circumstances be on the defensive. On the contrary, we need to move on, attack and destroy the horde as much as possible.
Why, if, say, to destroy the enemy it is more effective to stand on the defensive?
It's really more effective, you're right. But for how long? Don't think about one day, think a little longer. If we put ourselves on the defensive, then we allow the same orcs to calmly carry out several more waves of mobilization.
During this time, their defense industry will produce shells and tanks. Their defense industry is now making 20 new vehicles a month and they are able to reactivate about 50. That is, in total, 70 vehicles arrive at the front. And during this time, according to independent observers, we are burning from 100 to 150 tanks, on average 120. That is, 70 arrived, 120 burned. This difference is 50 tanks, it accumulates monthly.
Now imagine that instead, on the contrary, every month, plus 70 new tanks are accumulated, which are standing somewhere and waiting. That is, by the end of the year we have plus 800 cars.
It is absolutely unprofitable for us to give them a break. And if you remember, there were a lot of signals from them: let’s freeze it. So you understand that they gave these signals for a reason.
Are we ready for a bad scenario with US help and a full transition to defense? Are our fortification lines ready?
In fact, this could have started back in 2015. We had eight years to calmly prepare fortifications everywhere. And then the beginning of even this war would have looked fundamentally different.
But it seems that we had to smash our foreheads against the Surovikin line so that our military leaders would understand that we needed to dig in.
Better late than never: at the end of 23, the teams finally went to dig. Now these lines are absolutely not ready yet.
What should Ukraine do if there is no more help from the United States?
Now $61 billion for Ukraine is blocked due to disputes between Republicans and Democrats over the border. What can we do if this assistance is not provided until, say, the November US presidential election?
A very sad option for us. Firstly, then we definitely go on the defensive, which we under no circumstances do, in case the BC moves again.
Next, we are sequestering the budget, that is, we are cutting money from everything we can, looking for it, and believe me, there is still a lot somewhere. We take everything that is now used for tiles, fountains, bridges, and so on. We are creating a unified Defense Fund. We will raise the military tax and excise taxes by several percent, that is, we will at least compensate for the financial dimension. Next, we give the command to our intelligence services in all third world countries to look for everything, even very illegal procurement and supply schemes. So, in the meantime, we are pouring, pouring, pouring into our defense industry.
Moreover, we don’t just buy finished products from manufacturers, but the state asks them about their problems with technology, equipment, supplies and tries to solve them, and demands accurate results for replacement.
How to solve the issue of mobilization in Ukraine
First of all, why do we need to mobilize exactly 500 thousand people?
In fact, here you don’t need to be Zaluzhny and have access to General Staff materials, it’s enough just to see how many orcs mobilize. And then understand that technologically we are on the same level with them.
Of course, you can fight with significantly smaller forces than the enemy if he is literally cosmically superior in technology. But it’s clear that this is not the case with the orcs, we are in the same weight category.
How can the current conditions of mobilization be improved?
Recruiting is especially helpful in conditions of mass mobilization because it gives a choice.
The ability to choose a specialization removes the fear of not knowing what you will do in the army.
Taking into account civilian skills allows you to select a position based on your capabilities.
What are the main problems of the second version of the updated Mobilization Law?
The second version of the mobilization bill seems to have been created so as not to in any way irritate draft dodgers.
Now a person is faced with a very wrong choice: either fulfill his constitutional duty, wear a pixel and perhaps not return, because there is no service life limit, or pay a 1,700 UAH fine.
In my opinion, the new bill should clearly say: friend, you now have to give 36 months of your life to the state. And you have a choice: 36 months in the pixel with good pay, with respect from society and return as a hero, or for exactly 36 months you sit in prison. This choice is much easier to make.
Importantly, the bill finally proposes a 36-month service limit instead of the current “one-way ticket” situation. But the people who prescribed this still believe that 36 months in the Lviv TCC and 36 months in Avdiivka are the same three years of service. In fact, this provision of the bill can be made correct with just one line, that a day at zero is counted as three.
Only by overcoming these two main problems - the service limit and punishment for evading military registration - can normal mobilization be built.
