In the spring of 2022, Presidents Zelensky and Duda said that the Polish-Ukrainian border had become a formality, and over time it would not exist at all.
Polish-Ukrainian catastrophe. What's next?
I believe that, as Vladimir Zelensky prophetically said, there will be no border between Poland and Ukraine in the future... Andrzej Duda (May 3, 2022)
We failed this exam. One of the most important and at the same time, seemingly the easiest exams that appeared before us after February 24, 2022. The easiest ones - after all, after the unprecedented solidarity that the Poles showed towards the Ukrainians and Ukraine in the first months of a full-scale war, the impression was created that now the solution to all our bilateral problems is a self-evident thing.
There are even illusions about the creation of the contours of the Baltic-Black Sea union, which Ukrainian experts and even ex-presidents love to talk about from time to time. And, obviously, this is correct - you don’t have to be a geopolitician, you just need to look at the map and remember history to notice that more or less long-term and stable statehood on our territory was only within the framework of a large unification from the Baltic to the Black Sea - we are talking about Kievan Rus or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
But as soon as civil strife began, we immediately became part of large empires that were alien to us - either from the East or from the West. However, beautiful and historically significant declarations are shattered by the prose of everyday life, which requires compromises, a willingness to listen to another point of view, make concessions, perhaps even lose money and ultimately change.
In the spring of 2022, Presidents Zelensky and Duda said that the Polish-Ukrainian border had become a formality, and subsequently it would not exist at all. In February 2024, the border not only exists, it is blocked, Ukrainian grain is defiantly poured onto the asphalt, and a tractor driver drives by with an appeal to Putin to “restore order.” It’s hard to call it anything other than a disaster.
What led to this disaster and could it have been avoided? The differences between the agricultural markets of Poland and Ukraine, large Ukrainian landowners and small Polish farmers, the transit of grain, which “strangely” began to enter the Polish market - all this has already been talked about a lot in the Ukrainian information space. However, this can be considered the cause of the economic dispute, but not the social and political tension, which has been going on for more than six months.
Agree that not every economic dispute develops into such a long-term crisis. After all, could individual groups of farmers or transporters block the Polish-Ukrainian border, say, in March 2022? In those days, when Poles met Ukrainians en masse at the train stations of their cities, settled them in their apartments and showed, perhaps, the greatest solidarity since the creation of the trade union of the same name in 1980.
It is unlikely that a border blockade would have been possible then. Why is the same society now either silent or taking the position “not everything is so simple” regarding the border blockade? This means that the reason is deeper and more global than just a clash of economic interests. Ukraine has lost the trust and favor of Polish society - and this is what has made it possible that the border blockade has become an element of the internal Polish political game, and the Polish governments (both Morawiecki and Tusk) remain surprisingly passive regarding this problem.
How did this happen? How, in two years, did we go from unprecedented solidarity between Poles and Ukrainians to such a level of mistrust that makes a border blockade possible during the war? To try to understand this, it is worth walking through the trajectory of Polish-Ukrainian relations over the past two years. A trajectory that, unfortunately, became a spiral of disaster.
Period one. Positive
The full-scale Russian invasion temporarily neutralized all the long-standing disputes between Poland and Ukraine. In the face of existential catastrophe, it is simply inappropriate to continue arguing about the different visions of individual historical characters. Therefore, this topic then disappeared from the bilateral agenda.
But a huge volunteer movement has emerged to support Ukrainians who fled to Poland from the war. Recently I had to attend a student conference that had nothing thematically related to Ukraine.
And one of the lecturers asked the audience - young Poles from different regions of the country - which of them were involved in helping the Ukrainians two years ago. Everyone raised their hands. And this is a wonderful (and most importantly, quite typical) illustration of the scale of volunteer activity among Poles in the spring of 2022. Some call this “the second miracle of Polish solidarity” (the first was the 1980s and the events associated with the Solidarity trade union).
On March 15, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, together with Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa and Czech Prime Minister Peter Fiala, became the first top-level European politicians to visit Kiev after the start of the full-scale invasion.
At the same time, Kaczynski became the first and only Western politician who proposed introducing a NATO peacekeeping mission into Ukraine. In April, Andrzej Duda, together with the presidents of the Baltic countries, became the first president to come to Kyiv after February 24, 2022.
And Duda’s visit to Kiev on May 22, when he spoke in the Verkhovna Rada with a proposal for a new good neighborly agreement and financing the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine using frozen Russian money, was described by the Polish press as historic, and many experts called it a long-awaited positive turn in Polish-Ukrainian relations.
That period was an excellent window of opportunity to once and for all close all historical disputes dividing Poles and Ukrainians. In part, the Poles were waiting for a certain gesture from the Ukrainian side on July 11, the day of remembrance of the victims of the Volyn tragedy.
Such a gesture really happened - it was on this day that Vladimir Zelensky signed a law expanding the rights of Polish citizens in Ukraine (this law reflected the previously adopted Polish law regarding citizens of Ukraine). However, this was not a gesture that could completely close the topic of Volyn, only a half-hint of desire.
The Ukrainian authorities decided to remain silent about the Volyn tragedy directly. And the adoption of this law became more of a diplomatic formality than real support, because how many Poles really wanted to obtain a residence permit in Ukraine in 2022?
Fracture
The turning point, when trust in Ukraine began to decrease among the Polish elites and society, is often called the incident with the fall of the rocket in Przewoduwa (in particular, journalist Zbigniew Parafianovich writes about this, citing sources close to the then Polish government, in the book “Poland at War” ). More precisely, not the incident itself, but the reaction of the Ukrainian authorities to it.
The categorical denial of the very possibility that it was a Ukrainian air defense missile not only contradicted the official position of Poland, but also made it impossible to form a definite common Polish-Ukrainian position on this incident. After all, the then Minister of Defense of Poland Mariusz Blaszczak, taking into account this incident, put forward a proposal that the German Patriot air defense systems offered to Poland at that time should be transferred to Ukraine and placed along the Polish-Ukrainian border.
If the Ukrainian side had supported this proposal then, it would have been possible to form a common Eastern European (there is no doubt that the same Baltic countries would have joined such a Polish-Ukrainian initiative) diplomatic voice, which would have been a powerful tool for putting pressure on Western governments to speed up arms supplies to Ukraine . But Kyiv entered into a confrontation with Warsaw, from which no one benefited. The Polish prosecutor's office suspended the investigation into the rocket crash in Przewodów in January 2024. The official statement said that the investigation was suspended due to... lack of cooperation with the Ukrainian side.
Inappropriate symbolism
The Przewodów incident marked the beginning of a change in the trend in bilateral relations, but it was still a long way from today's catastrophic lack of trust. During 2023, several extremely inappropriate steps in terms of symbolism and media publicity occurred that significantly accelerated this trend.
In May, the then representative of the Polish Foreign Ministry Lukasz Yasina, in an interview, answered the journalist’s question “Should Zelensky apologize for Volyn?” (let me remind you that in 2023 the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the Volyn tragedy fell) replied that “President Zelensky must take great responsibility.”
And it is unlikely that anyone would have paid serious attention to this interview if not for the disproportionately harsh reaction of the Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland Vasily Zvarich, who the next day not only accused Yasina of trying to impose on the President of Ukraine what he should do, but also emphasized that there was no alternative the formula “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” (which is actually not Polish-Ukrainian, but German-Polish and appeared in a completely different context) in the question Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation.
It came to a media scandal, most Polish media published the statement of the Ukrainian ambassador, and on the eve of the round anniversary an atmosphere was created that was certainly not conducive to final reconciliation.
Later there was a good and promising speech in the Seimas by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk, who spoke about the need to fill the above-mentioned formula with real meaning, and then... nothing. On July 11, celebrations took place in Lutsk with the participation of Duda and Zelensky, but no new formula for reconciliation or anything that could put an end to the bilateral disputes over history was proposed. Moreover, in Duda’s social networks it was said after the fact that in Lutsk they were honoring the memory of “lost Poles”, and in Zelensky’s social networks - “victims of Volyn”.
Soon it came to another media scandal, which almost repeated the Yasina-Zvarich scandal in May. This time we were talking about farmers' protests. In an interview, the then head of the international policy office of the Office of the President of Poland, Martin Przydacz, said that “it would be worth it for Ukraine to begin to appreciate the role that Poland has played for it over the past months.”
Again, this particular interview would hardly have gained publicity if the Polish Ambassador had not been summoned to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry the next day to explain these words. The same ambassador, Bartosz Cichocki, who was the only ambassador of an EU country who did not leave Ukraine before February 24, 2022.
Moreover, the call of the Polish Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry took place on August 1, the day of remembrance of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. On the day when mass patriotic actions traditionally take place in Warsaw. Is it worth mentioning how this influenced public opinion about Ukraine in Poland? And how much speculation there was on social networks that Ukraine “congratulated” the people of Warsaw on their anniversary...
Further, mutual public attempts to “bite” each other became regular. On the Polish side, this can be explained by the campaign on the eve of the Sejm elections. PiS tried to mobilize the conservative-nationalist electorate, and it was important for them to show that Polish interests were more important to them than the “Ukrainian issue.”
In general, the Polish political elites during the pre-election period showed themselves to be Europeans - in the worst sense of the word. When British, French or German politicians use the topic of the war in Ukraine in their own internal political struggle, although this is cynical, it is understandable. War is far from them, and for their societies it is more of an abstraction from television. But when representatives of the Polish political establishment were unable to raise the issue of war and support for Ukraine above political divisions, this raises questions.
On a rhetorical level, everyone (except perhaps the far-right Confederation) recognizes the existential importance of Ukraine’s victory for the future of Poland. But when it comes to specific matters, it turns out that support for Ukraine in this war can be put “in a long line” before the fight for one or another part of the electorate. This behavior became noticeable during the election campaign and even more obvious during the border blockade, but more on that later.
On the Ukrainian side... it is difficult to explain some of the actions of domestic officials. Let's say, why did Ukraine's trade representative Taras Kachka on September 18 (the day Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Poland with the WTO) publish a post on Twitter in Polish: “I care about your and our agriculture”?
This reference to the phrase “For our freedom and yours” (which appeared during the November Uprising of 1831) was perceived simply as a disregard for Polish history and an attempt to laugh at the Poles. And the very next day, President Zelensky from the UN rostrum almost accused Poland of working for the Russian Federation. Andrzej Duda responds with an equally inappropriate comparison of Ukraine with a drowned man (remember the height of the election campaign in Poland). Even then it could be said that not a trace remained of the solidarity of the first months of a full-scale war.
Subsequently, another scandal was caused by the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (INR), which in December froze the investigation into the Vistula action with the absurd explanation that it was a “preventive” measure that did not have a repressive nature. It is likely that this “extravagant” (in fact, scandalous and neither historically nor politically justified) decision was an attempt by the current conservative leadership of the IPP to loudly “slam the door” (and at the same time play along with PiS voters) against the background of rumors about the intention of the new government to prematurely change the leadership or even liquidate the IPP.
And again, the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue became a victim of internal political processes in Poland. If earlier it could be argued that, despite all the problems with the Volyn tragedy, the issue of the “Vistula” action in bilateral relations was finally closed (after all, the Polish Senate condemned it as a crime of the communist regime of the People’s Republic of Poland back in 1990), then with this decision the Polish INP again created a problem - literally out of the blue.
Border
In parallel with all the scandals mentioned above, the grain crisis and the protest of carriers developed. The border blockade began in the fall, when the atmosphere in bilateral relations and mutual trust (both at the political and public levels) had already been undermined. In addition, a process of power transition was taking place in Poland, on which many Ukrainian publicists and observers placed special hopes.
“Pro-European” Donald Tusk, in their opinion, should have taken a tough position against carriers and quickly unblocked the border. This did not happen. The border blockade became an element of the internal political struggle in Poland.
PiS is trying to use the situation on the border to further destabilize the situation in the country and lead to elections, and the coalition government (with the Polish Peasant Party in its composition) is trying to gain favor from the relevant electorate, which supports the demands of the protesters. Polish society, disappointed with Ukraine, remains rather passive, especially since farmers and transporters are partly right, so even those who condemn their methods recognize precisely the right to protest.
Ukraine protects Poland?
The last and seemingly concrete argument used by Ukrainian publicists and politicians on this topic is that Ukraine, at the cost of a heroic struggle, is protecting Poland from the Russian invasion. And in this situation, blocking the border is simply immoral, regardless of any economic interests. But, unfortunately, this argument has less and less effect on the Polish government and society.
Firstly, there is an awareness that the security of Poland today depends to a much greater extent on the unity and defense capacity of NATO and the Western world as a whole than on the success of the defense of Ukraine.
Secondly, a society of almost 40 million cannot maintain for two years the same enthusiasm and fervor in supporting Ukraine as in the first few months of a full-scale war. A long war requires strategic and systemic thinking, including in diplomatic relations with neighbors.
Ukrainian diplomacy is reactionary. Ukrainian officials react to certain events after the fact, when they have already occurred. They often react too emotionally and inappropriately, trying not to reach a compromise, but to stick to their line without taking into account the possible consequences.
At the same time, in the situation with Poland over the past two years, the specifics of Polish political culture, the expectations of Polish society, and sensitive topics for this country have not been taken into account at all. It seems that in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President’s Office, the Polish direction is dealt with by people who either openly do not like this country, or have never been to Poland and have never spoken to a living Pole. It was the lack of a sense of Poland, combined with the lack of a Ukrainian strategy towards Poland, that led to the fact that Polish society ceased to be sensitive to the Ukrainian war.
In addition, the tactic of not recognizing the protesters’ right to negotiate with the Ukrainian side turned out to be ineffective. If Ukrainian diplomats have appeared at the border in recent months, it has been only to communicate with the police or Ukrainian drivers who are stuck in queues.
At the same time, there were attempts to talk with officials in Warsaw. There were no negotiations with the protesters themselves, only hints (or even direct accusations) that their actions supported the Russian Federation, and expectations that the situation would be resolved by the Polish government or EU officials. But the protesters’ claims (both carriers and farmers) directly related to Ukraine.
Moreover, farmer protests are not a narrow bilateral issue, but a pan-European trend. Therefore, whether our diplomats want it or not, we will have to deal with farmers and seek compromises with them. Otherwise, such protests will accompany Ukraine’s entire already difficult road to EU membership.
However, the reluctance to communicate with protesters indicates another symptom characteristic of the Ukrainian (post-Soviet) style of diplomacy - it does not recognize society as a party to the dialogue.
Therefore, Ukrainian diplomats actually do not work with societies of other countries. Hence the numerous problems with unsuccessful statements, the inability to find an acceptable formula for reconciliation on historical issues, inappropriate symbolism, and, ultimately, with protesters on the border. Not everything can be solved through the authorities, especially in democratic countries, where any politician makes every step only taking into account ratings.
Russian trace
Is there a Russian trace in this whole story? Obvious and unconditional. You have to be a very naive person to think that the Russians will not take advantage of such a convenient opportunity to create discord between the Poles and Ukrainians. The ardent support of the blockade by openly anti-Ukrainian political groups may also be a sign of Russian interference, but first of all, the scandalous events of recent weeks testify to the Russian trace.
Protests involving the scattering of grain on the roads do not have any practical meaning for the protesters themselves, but they cause incredible harm to the perception of Poland in Ukraine. This is an outright provocation, the purpose of which is far from protecting the rights of Polish farmers. And it is quite possible to assume that the idea of this provocation did not appear in Poland.
The second, even more crudely executed provocation, was the tractor driver calling on Putin to “establish order” with Ukraine, Brussels and the Polish government. It’s good that the Polish prosecutor’s office has already taken up this matter. The longer the blockade continues, the more such provocations there may be.
However, understanding this, one should avoid the temptation to accuse all protesters of working for the Russian Federation. One of the protest leaders, Michal Kolodziejczak, was first elected to the Sejm from the “Civic Coalition”, and in December (while the blockade continued) he became Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Poland.
Therefore, if we generalize, we will quickly come to the conclusion that Donald Tusk is an agent of the Russian Federation. And this is definitely a road to nowhere. Russian influence exists, but it does not exclude the problem itself, which must be addressed. If there is no problem, there will be no opportunity for the Russian Federation to organize further provocations.
What's next?
First of all, you need to put out the fire. End the blockade. President Zelensky's proposal to hold a summit meeting directly on the border could be a good step in this direction. As well as Prime Minister Tusk’s proposal to recognize the border checkpoint as a critical infrastructure, which will make it impossible at the legislative level to hold protests and blockades there.
However, Tusk rejected Zelensky’s proposal, and here it is worth paying attention to the argumentation. “The Ukrainian side also understands that it is better to conduct these negotiations at a technical level, so that the government meeting does not have a symbolic value - after all, we do not need symbolism in relations.
The whole world sees how determined we are to help Ukraine, and there is no need for further bright gestures of solidarity.” Well, even after a cool (in terms of weather and atmosphere) January visit
Tusk could be noticed, and after these words one can confidently say that the romantic period in Polish-Ukrainian relations has ended, even at the level of political rhetoric. If the Ukrainian side understands this and begins to interpret relations with Poland from the position of pragmatism and negotiability, this could be a plus.
But what was definitely surprising in Tusk’s words was the proposed date for the government meeting in Warsaw—March 28. That is, the Polish prime minister proposes that the problem of the border blockade remain unresolved for more than a month. And this is during a full-scale war.
In response to this statement, Ukrainian officials decided... to come to the border, take a photo and declare that the meeting did not take place because the Poles did not come. For whom and why was this demarche made, and most importantly, what will it do to solve the problem - these are obviously rhetorical questions.
Ukrainian diplomacy needs to grow up. Stop trying to create a show, stop playing cynicism, stop trying to “wring the hands” of partners (especially partners on whom arms supplies largely depend). We must learn to think strategically, be ready for dialogue and compromise, and work not only with elites, but also with societies.
But the main thing is that Ukraine must answer the question for itself: what do we want from Poland? How does Ukraine see Polish-Ukrainian relations in five, ten, twenty years? What strategic vision of the future does Ukraine offer Poland? And build on this.
Predictability is one of the main characteristics required for establishing a successful bilateral partnership. Without a clear strategy, the next crisis, seasoned with short-sighted statements from politicians on both sides, is only a matter of time.
