"Guarantees" without guarantees. Can new security agreements stop the war?

On February 16, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky signed security cooperation agreements with two key EU members - Germany and France. About a month ago, the same agreement was signed with Great Britain. Europeans are becoming less and less oriented toward Washington on this issue.

The Security Cooperation Agreements are framework agreements that follow up on the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, approved by the Group of Seven on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023.

According to KBF experts, these agreements should be considered as important political documents of intent. As is known, the entry into force of these documents does not provide for ratification in parliaments, which is reminiscent of the nature of the Budapest Memorandum.

These documents do not contain the security guarantees that would determine collective resistance to the enemy. In the event of a new aggression against Ukraine, the partners undertake to hold consultations within 24 hours to determine further steps. Among such steps is the provision of quick and long-term security assistance to Ukraine, modern military equipment in accordance with needs, economic assistance, and the imposition of economic expenses on the Russian Federation. In short, future support is planned to be provided in the current way.

One of the reasons for the lack of security guarantees in the proper sense of the word is that all three states are members of NATO, and decisions that could potentially drag the Alliance into war must be made unanimously by the allies.

There are no fundamentally new elements that would strengthen the security of Ukraine at a qualitatively new level, in particular in matters of providing military assistance in the war with Russia, in the post-war restoration of the state, in its accession to the EU and NATO, in holding Russia accountable, incl. h. financial, agreements are not brought.

Although the documents are designed for 10 years and their goal is to support and strengthen Ukraine’s military potential to restore the territorial integrity of the state and counter possible new attacks, questions regarding financing are limited only to 2024. There are no guarantees that they will be implemented at least at the same level by the next governments of the signatory countries.

But to call the agreements foreign policy failures or abstract declarations, according to KBF experts, would be incorrect and incorrect.

In the face of uncertainty about the prospects for Ukraine’s entry into NATO before the end of the war, given the trends towards strengthening right-wing radical and populist forces in Europe and the United States, even such documents on long-term military, political and economic support for Ukraine are important.

It is also important to define the purpose of the agreements - the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders of 1991. This emphasis testifies to the unchanged position of our partners and the lack of intentions to achieve peace in exchange for Ukraine’s abandonment of temporarily occupied territories.

The level of detail and specific content of various aspects of the agreements differ. Their nature primarily corresponds to the current areas of support for Ukraine by the mentioned states and does not go beyond the framework of existing realities and plans. Moreover, in some cases the agreements are quite general and conservative and do not take into account recent discussions about the possibility of allocating new types of weapons. For example, in the case of France - airplanes, Germany - long-range weapons.

At the same time, as KBF experts note, some warnings regarding the provision of weapons are not entirely justified or clear. In particular, cooperation with France in the military sphere is planned to be carried out “without compromising its position in the context of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.” What is surprising in the German agreement is the provision on the use of weapons with restrictions established by separate agreements with Germany and the latter's legislation, and Germany will create a mechanism to control the use of weapons by Ukraine. Although this possibility is provided for in contracts and does not raise objections.

The documents do not contain clear figures on the specific volumes of military-technical and financial assistance (with the exception of individual figures of assistance already allocated in recent years and for 2024). Therefore, their practical implementation will depend both on the needs of Ukraine in a particular period, and on the political and economic situation in the mentioned states.

Evidence of this is, in particular, the fact that France, almost simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, blocked the allocation of EU funds for the purchase of ammunition urgently needed by Ukraine outside the European Union. According to Paris, such a possibility can only be considered if the EU is unable to provide the promised million ammunition by March. The fact that this is already practically obvious, and any delay costs the lives of Ukrainian soldiers, does not outweigh the interests of the French military-industrial complex.

The documents provide clear political and legal assessments of Russia’s aggressive actions, include provisions on sanctions against Moscow and on bringing Russia to international legal responsibility. But the relevant provisions do not go beyond the consensus already reached in the West. For example, the agreements do not establish the goals of Russia's military defeat or its disarmament after the war.

All agreements include provisions to support, in one form or another, Ukraine's course towards Ukraine's membership in the EU. However, as far as NATO is concerned, the difference is striking. While the UK and France confirm that Ukraine's future accession to NATO will make a useful contribution to peace and stability in Europe, and promise to coordinate and strengthen joint efforts to support Ukraine's accession to NATO, Germany limits itself to mentioning that the agreement does not prevent Ukraine's path to future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.

An important aspect is support for bringing Russia to international legal responsibility for aggression against Ukraine, for military and other international crimes and for causing damage. In this context, the most extensive is the corresponding section of the agreement with Germany, which provides, incl. establishing a tribunal to ensure effective accountability.

The agreements also provide for compensation for losses caused on the territory of Ukraine. To this end, it is stated that Russian sovereign assets must remain frozen until the Russian Federation pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine. At the same time, readiness is expressed to continue to work out, together with partners, all legal ways of using Russian assets to support Ukraine.

The agreements recognize the value of sanctions in limiting Russia's access to finance, goods, technologies and services that it uses for aggression and in reducing its sources of income. The need to work to combat all forms of sanctions circumvention is also noted.

Provisions on promoting investment, cooperation in the military-industrial complex, protection of critical infrastructure, in the field of information and cyber security, in the fight against dangerous Russian-inspired organized crime, in mine clearance, medical support, education and training in the security sector are also spelled out in quite detail.

However, despite the diversity and presence of positive aspects, the absence in the agreements of real security guarantees comparable to Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, once again confirms the opinion long voiced by experts of the Kyiv Security Forum that the mentioned and all subsequent similar documents signed with Western partners are in no way capable of replacing the need for Ukraine to continue its course towards joining NATO