One gets the impression that to work in a strategically important state enterprise or department you need a Russian passport or relatives in the Russian Federation. Interviews with the FSB?
I have already written about Arsen Zhumadilov, general director of the Ministry of Defense procurement agency “State Logistics Operator,” whose wife received a Russian passport during a full-scale war. A little earlier there was a scandal with Dmitry Tishlek, Deputy Chairman of the National Police, with his wife and mother-in-law, who, you won’t believe, also have a Russian passport and also live in the swamps.
Today we are talking about the leadership of the key state gas production company - Ukrgasvydobuvannya. You will probably be surprised, but during the war the company was headed by a native of Belarus and a fan of Russian culture, Oleg Tolmachev.
Until the summer of this year, the personal assistant of someone on special issues was a Russian citizen.
Another leading position in the UGV is occupied by an Azerbaijani with experience working... in Russia.
Someone might object to me: could we be talking about a team of successful managers who, in fact, are not directly connected with the aggressor country? No. They are not successful, and are tied up to their necks with the enemy. Let's look at the amazing results of Ukrgasvydobuvannya management in recent years.
The head of NJSC Neftegaz, Alexey Chernyshev, admitted that during the shelling the enemy damaged 349 energy infrastructure facilities. The loss of gas production capacity is estimated at at least $700 million. Despite regular statements about an alleged increase in domestic gas production, in fact, in the first half of 2023, 400 million m3 less was produced than in the corresponding period of 2020.
And this is one of the reasons that Naftogaz is now actively hatching a plan to increase prices for the population - to the level of industrial consumers. Because NAC, under the wise leadership of Mr. Chernyshev, has huge financial holes that it plans to fill with the money of ordinary Ukrainians. Although, and this is well known, Ukraine has the potential to provide its own gas to the population.
I have a suspicion that this state of Ukrgazvydobuvannya and Naftogaz is not only a corruption component and incompetent management, but also a planned sabotage, the plan of which was developed by the special services of the Russian Federation. Just as the Russians once launched Deripaska in order to destroy the Ukrainian non-ferrous metallurgy due to the purchase of ZALK and MGZ, and the Churkin brothers launched the bus industry due to the purchase of LAZ, so now, it seems, someone has launched individual citizens into the UGV.
It is well known that the so-called “honey trap” is one of the most favorite methods of work of the Russian intelligence services. They have worked like this from the time of the Cheka until now. Suffice it to recall the Russian-American Anna Chapman. It seems very likely that in Ukrgazvydobuvannya the role of “Anna Chapman” was played by a sort of no-name Russian woman, Daria Taranova.
No one knows for what reasons the v.i.o. Director of the UGO Tolmachev made her his assistant. Taranova was born in the city of Kursk, you know what country. She worked as Tolmachev’s personal assistant for a year and a half of the war (from February 24, 2022 to the summer of 2023), and still remains a Russian citizen. Taranova had access to strategically important documentation of a key state gas production company. Due to the scandal and indignation of the company's staff and the entire gas production industry, she was fired.
But the leadership of the UGO continues to protect her. At the official request of “Censor.NET” journalist Tatyana Nikolaenko, the State Internal Affairs Directorate reported that Daria worked legally from 2019 until her dismissal. That is, the state company and its director continue to cover up the Russian woman.
In 2025, Taranova’s passport expires; of course, she will go to the nearest Russian embassy (in Poland or Tolmachev’s native Belarus) and will definitely be interrogated by the FSB as a former employee of the state Main Directorate of Internal Affairs, and will tell everything that she did not have time to do (even if she admits , that I didn’t have time). After all, I emphasize, this is a person who worked in the “first reception” of the UGO and has access to all production, commercial, personnel and financial documentation.
But that's not all. Oleg Tolmachev himself has relatives, including his mother, living in Russia. After the annexation of Crimea, judging by his social networks, he himself visited Russia many times.
I just don't believe it's possible. In the post of head of one of the key state energy companies during a full-scale war with Russia, we have a person who has constant ties with the enemy country and has obvious areas of vulnerability (mother and loved one), through which the Russian intelligence services can effectively influence him: recruit , blackmail, use him in the dark, in short - make him your puppet.
SBU!
And, unfortunately, Tolmachev and Taranova are not the only ones in the state company.
Another leader is Akshin Mehdiyev, a citizen of Azerbaijan, director of drilling and downhole operations. He is a defendant in criminal proceedings for embezzlement of funds on the construction of the Shebelinskaya exploration well No. 888 and a former employee of Schlumberger Services Ukraine LLC, recognized as a sponsor of the war due to work in Russia. Akshin himself worked in Russia in the past. And now it has a registered operating company Wellpath Limited, the Ukrainian branch of which is registered in the name of a Russian citizen.
So again the question. Having access to information about energy facilities critical to national security, would Azerbaijani citizen Mehdiyev exchange this information for a lifelong pension at Gazprom, as we know from the example of Schröder and Merkel - Gazprom “does not abandon its own.”
Another top manager is Mikhail Bratakh. He holds the position of director of the Ukrgasvydobuvannya research institute. During the war, Brothers posted photos and videos of secret energy facilities on social networks and boasted that, unlike ordinary Ukrainians, he could go to the United States “to take a little break from the war.”
In what is happening today with Ukrgasvydobuvannya, I see direct and actually already realized threats to the energy security of Ukraine, including national security in general. The state-owned enterprise is controlled by people directly or indirectly associated with the Russian Federation; there is a possibility that these people are collaborating with hostile intelligence services. The losses suffered by the gas production industry, in my opinion, may be a consequence of the deliberate subversive work of the current management of the state company.
Therefore, I am filing a crime report with the SBU. I urge the security service to check whether the work of the management of Ukrgasvydobuvannya complies with the principles of national security? I ask you to take urgent measures to assess and properly respond to the facts presented.
