The world of early 2024 has become more fragile and vulnerable, primarily due to indecision and delay in making decisions important for global security. “The era of peace is over. We have moved on to the pre-war world.” This is the main quote from the speech of the British Secretary of Defense Grant Shapps on January 16th.
It is likely that Ukraine will find itself completely without Washington’s help in 2024. And assistance from the European Union will be only slightly inferior to the level of assistance from the United States and the EU in 2022 and 2023. That is, if in 2022 we received $32.7 billion from the United States and the EU, and about $37.3 billion in 2023, then in 2024 potential assistance exclusively from the EU will amount to $31 billion.
Therefore, even in the absence of American assistance, the situation for Ukraine in 2024 would not seem critical. This shifts the prospects to the formation of layered defense and accumulation of resources for 2025. But if the United States helps, the power of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can increase significantly - primarily due to parity in ammunition and artillery.
“Smart”, programmable ammunition and high-precision artillery, as well as missiles, can become advantages that will not only offset the large number of personnel and equipment in the Russian Federation, but will also become a prerequisite for victory. However, everything should be viewed through the prism of our war, which is actually an intermediate version between the wars of the past and the future.
NEW WEAPONS AND MILITARY ACCOUNTING
The call of the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny, was quite appropriate to compensate for the military challenges and threats of Moscow and all related negative risks for Ukraine with technological advantages.
General Zaluzhny’s article is noteworthy in that it was not a scientist, not an industrialist, but a military man who spoke about the exceptional role of new, cheap, modern technologies. And the point is not that powerful and expensive missiles or other combat platforms are less important for Ukraine, but that it is much more difficult for Ukraine to “reach out” for their creation and scaling in the current conditions. Without partners this will not be possible.
By the way, from the first days of leading the army, the former commander-in-chief paid most attention to automating the control of troops and weapons. He is the co-author of a significant analytical work on the prospects of robotic systems in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Zaluzhny rightly believed that, according to the conditions of modern warfare, perhaps the main option for gaining an advantage is to master the entire arsenal of relatively cheap, new and extremely effective means that are rapidly developing. In fact, these are words about the development of the “mosquito strategy,” the ideas of which we have also tirelessly supported since September 2019, when a dozen cheap drones from a paramilitary group had a powerful impact on the entire oil refining industry of Saudi Arabia.
That “historical episode” with the massive use of cheap technologies had another important dimension, which the Ukrainian commander-in-chief probably examined and from which conclusions were drawn. We are talking about the ability of cheap technologies to “overload” and sometimes outperform extremely valuable systems. Already in February 2024, during the World Defense Show in Riyadh, the command of the Royal Saudi Air Force unexpectedly announced that in 2019, one of their batteries of Patriot air defense systems was able to shoot down six ballistic missiles with which the Yemeni Houthis were trying to hit critical infrastructure in 48 seconds. countries, the other four missiles reached their targets.
Indeed, at first glance, we have an amazing example of repelling a massive missile attack in a tiny period of time, but this episode also demonstrates the level of load on the air defense system, as well as the possibility of deliberately “overloading” them with relatively cheap short-range ballistic missiles.
Experts believe that at least 12 missiles to the Patriot missile defense system had to be used to intercept the Yemeni Houthi missiles. And these are the costs of repelling an attack costing tens of millions of dollars. But rich countries will continue to act in this way - spending enormous resources proactively to install catastrophe fuses. And as evidence of this, it was on the sidelines of the weapons show that Saudi Arabia ordered 10 batteries of new Cheongung 2 missile systems from South Korea to improve its own missile and air defense capabilities in the amount of $3.2 billion.
You can also recall that to intercept a ballistic missile from the Yemeni Houthis in February 2024, the US military used a new Standard Missile 6 over-the-horizon anti-aircraft missile worth more than $5 million.
The Ukrainian Air Force also successfully operated American Patriot anti-missile systems, and even thanks to the flawless shooting down of Russian Kinzhal missiles, they destroyed the myth of an invincible miracle weapon. The reaction this caused in the Kremlin, by the way, can be seen from reports about the unprecedented number of convicted physicists involved in the creation of hypersonic weapons in the Russian Federation.
But it should be remembered that effective missile defense systems were provided to Ukraine by allies in the form of assistance, and the cost of PAC-3 interceptor missiles of the Patriot complex can reach from 2 to 4 million dollars apiece.
The cost of one 155-mm artillery ammunition at the end of 2023 was about 5.5 thousand dollars, and in February 2024 - 8 thousand dollars. This means that from 2021, 155mm artillery ammunition has risen in price tenfold.
Since the start of serial production in the 2000s, the Pentagon has bought each American M982 Excalibur projectile for an incredible 100-150 thousand dollars, with a cost of about 40 thousand. Later its price decreased slightly. But, as of November 2013, the US military had fired only 700 live rounds of Excalibur projectiles. Is such intensity possible during the Russian-Ukrainian war, when the enemy sometimes fired 10 thousand shells every day?
For comparison, the cost of an attack drone is $500-600. And the cost of the SDB aerial bomb, on the basis of which a ground-based high-precision version of the GLSDB for HIMARS was created using a rocket engine from long-decommissioned M26 missiles, was about 40 thousand dollars at the time of release. But this is also much less than the cost of modern “smart” ammunition for artillery.
Therefore, General Zaluzhny deliberately did not speak about valuable missile, missile-bomb or intelligent artillery systems for the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a main priority for today.
HOW DO WE DEFEAT RUSSIA
To understand what means and instruments can ensure our victory, it is appropriate to turn to the experience of another demonstrative armed confrontation that broke out at the beginning of 2024. We are talking about military actions launched by the United States and Great Britain with the support of a coalition of regional states with the Yemeni Houthis. This example shows how important the moment of joining forces is.
To destroy the criminal Moscow regime, an anti-Putin coalition is still needed - a group of states that will openly proclaim (maybe not at the official level, but confirmation of such a course will be a fundamentally new approach to the provision and joint production of weapons) the need, if not a change in the political system in the Russian Federation , then curbing the current regime with a trail of war crimes. This is necessary to maintain safety on the planet.
Such a decision may be openly declared or remain non-public. Its main consequence is the provision of Ukraine with all types of weapons that it needs to liberate its territories. Including the purchase of necessary weapons from third countries. Because if the Houthis - not even a country, but a paramilitary group operating in Yemen and recognized by the United States as a terrorist organization since January 2021 - have a huge amount of long-range weapons, then isn’t this a disgrace to the whole world, and to Ukraine itself?
In terms of the length of its “rocket arm,” this group is almost an order of magnitude larger than Ukraine! Let us only remember that, in addition to the Ghadr-F ballistic missiles with a range of 2000 km, the Houthis have a significant number of Iranian clones. For example, a version of the Iranian Rezvan with a range of 1400 km, a solid-fuel Khaybar Shekan missile with a range of 1450 km as a development of the Iranian Fateh-110, as well as Iranian Zolfaqar with a range of up to 700 km. In addition to ballistic missiles, their arsenal also includes cruise missiles of the Quds line, which are defined as versions of the Iranian Soumar - Quds-3 and Quds-4 have a range of 2000 km. The Houthis also have in their arsenal the Shahed-136, known to Ukrainians, with a range of 2,500 km.
Of course, Ukraine does not exist in isolation from the world, and the list of identified challenges is fair - from decreasing military support from key allies to the scaling up of conflicts and wars in other regions of the world. Ukraine has an additional challenge - unequal human resources from hostile Russia. And the inability of the West to develop a system of technological containment of Russia. And the ex-chief is still right when he says that the design and philosophy of war have changed. That is, traditional and understandable goals, such as achieving absolute air superiority, must be achieved by modern means.
The extreme intensity of the war and Ukraine’s previous unpreparedness for it - that is, the lack of long-term preparation for it - do not allow us to count on a large arsenal of modern means for a new generation of war and force us to compensate for this insane deficit hastily, sometimes with homemade means. War is increasingly becoming combined in the use of weapons, and this symbiosis of the use of new high-tech, expensive and relatively cheap, rapidly scalable weapons - selectively and en masse, respectively - deepens with the intensity of the war itself.
Even modified, somewhat outdated weapons with elements of modern solutions - the GLSDB light small-diameter bombs, which the Defense Forces received in February 2024 - are a clear example of this symbiosis. Not to mention the “extreme selectivity” of using such ammunition, because the first batch consisted of only 24 GLSDB bombs, or only four high-precision salvoes.
Even the 750 thousand ammunition promised in the future are not capable of turning the tide of the war. To transform it into a new generation of war, it would be necessary for half the world to work only for the war, supplying all types of missiles and bombs, and secondarily, artillery or tank ammunition. These are the realities. And fully aware of the shortcomings in the accuracy and range of its means, Russia imposes pressure with numbers.
Meanwhile, extraordinary ingenuity and ingenuity on the battlefield helps the Ukrainian Defense Forces to adequately counteract the growing pressure of the enemy. The Ukrainian military was the first to talk about the possibility of partially compensating for the shortage of artillery ammunition with modern, fairly cheap and quite effective drones, which are capable of accurately sending cheaper ammunition into the enemy’s trenches and dugouts, destroying and disabling his valuable equipment.
HOW TO ENSURE MILITARY SUCCESS IN 2024
What are the prospects for 2024 and perhaps 2025? The Biden administration’s strategic mistake in 2023 in the form of too restrained support for Ukraine and a focus on the survival of the attacked country, rather than on the victory of a nation devoted to Western values in the center of Europe, has already led to both a sharp escalation of the Kremlin’s rhetoric regarding NATO and “new winds” ” in the Southeast Asia region.
At the beginning of 2024, the Kremlin has built a dangerous and, most importantly, effective coalition. While the West, on the contrary, has not yet formalized it. Based on the events of January-February 2024, we can talk about a temporary loss of American leadership in NATO. Against the backdrop of the US’s terrible restraint for Kyiv and the chain reaction of other partners, Ukraine for the second time, after the fall of 2022 and the summer-autumn of 2023, lost its window of opportunity and at the beginning of 2024 returned to the position of the end of 2022. But with worse prospects in the form of decreased human potential, an exhausted army and an incompletely resolved problem of mobilization.
Despite the risks, the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhny, took place. Of course, there are no irreplaceable people. Experts have well-founded hopes that the new commander-in-chief, Colonel General Alexander Syrsky, is capable of carrying a “heavy stone” and withstanding enemy blows. He proved his personal potential both during the defense of Kyiv and during the counter-offensive operation in the Kharkov region in 2022. But, since such a rotation was not necessary, Ukrainian society perceived it as a manifestation of the weakness of President Vladimir Zelensky.
It has become vital for Ukraine to focus on getting through the difficult 2024, likely without US help, and building up combat capabilities for targeted attacks on the enemy. The complete isolation of occupied Crimea from logistics, the complete destruction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the powerful defeat of the defense industry and related infrastructure, such as oil refineries and electric power facilities in the European part of the Russian Federation, have become the most significant tasks of 2024, and possibly 2025.
A positive decision by the US Congress to support Ukraine will lead to the fact that American assistance will “catch up” with European assistance. This would no doubt dramatically increase the Defense Force's ability to engage in successful trench warfare. And if they receive at least 400-700 ballistic and cruise missiles of the appropriate range, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could solve these problems.
The implementation of these tasks against the background of proper preparation of a deeply layered defense with powerful fortifications and mine-engineering equipment for the successful implementation of a defensive operation along the entire existing and potential front should ensure the stability of the nation and time for regrouping in solving key internal problems.
February has already given its significant lessons - they must be learned quickly and thoroughly. The loss of Avdiivka is evidence that the enemy’s tactical success is not just an increase in danger, but also the risk of its transformation to an operational scale. This did not happen because the Kremlin also did not have enough reserves. Of course, the withdrawal from Avdiivka is not a disaster, but the consequences of a number of interrelated problems - enemy air dominance, shortage of ammunition, and exhaustion of troops. Only the 110th brigade defended the city for almost two years without rotation.
But there are also problems that we tried not to talk about. Namely, the lack of a sufficient number of trained reserves and the lack of a prepared line behind the troops on the defensive. The first is a consequence of the mobilization problem that has been going on since 2022, and the second is a strange repetition of what happened in Bakhmut. Both problems relate to Ukraine’s unfulfilled “homework.”
Therefore, it is these tasks that have accumulated and created a capacious list for 2024, and perhaps partially for 2025. Because the situation, in the absence of American assistance, may look like this: regroup, find reserves for a powerful strategic defense operation. On the move, with the involvement of the civilian sector and its construction companies, defenses along the entire likely front, including the northern and northeastern border, should be quickly improved.
Intensification of the government's work is needed not only to prepare layered defense, but also to organize maximum physical protection of defense industry enterprises. This is possible with the use of iron and concrete, the actual burying of industries underground, and the formation of a number of duplicate industries scattered throughout the country.
A successful defensive operation itself is needed for the formation and thorough preparation of additional reserves - both on our own and with the assistance of the Alliance countries. This time is also important for the large-scale deployment of our defense industry and ensuring the deployment of the defense industry of the European NATO countries. Europe and Ukraine need just a year to create conditions for an advantage in Russian production. This year can also be used for total control of re-exports – at the company level. Unless companies like Intel and Siemens make it impossible to re-export microelectronics, Russia will experience a surprising drop in missile and aircraft production.
The plan for the current year and effective weapons at the forefront are the two main tasks voiced by President Zelensky during the announcement of the replacement of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in early February. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief mentioned “excessive” numbers at headquarters and the need to improve the quality of training so that only trained soldiers get to the contact line. Which probably involves expanding the network of training centers, probably with an emphasis on training operators of high-tech weapons, in particular various types of unmanned platforms, electronic warfare, radar and reconnaissance equipment, and artillery.
This also follows from the requirement of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to ensure “technological action” at the front and a different approach to front management. But also the main marker for 2024 remained the question of the key emphasis - preparing defense or offensive. Because the loyalty of the new commander-in-chief regarding political interference in military affairs can increase the risks for society - the desire to achieve certain military goals on the battlefield at any cost.
So, using our own scientific and industrial reserves and the possibilities of military-technical cooperation with NATO countries, increasing defense potential and giving Europe access to large-scale, updated capabilities of the defense industry - this may well ensure preparation for the liberation of Ukraine from Putin’s evil spirits. Moreover, if we ensure a technological gap from hostile Russia, then this can become a safeguard against the inevitable revanchism of Moscow regimes in the future.
The war unexpectedly opened the floodgates of not only political support and military-technical assistance, but also the path to obtaining new defense technologies to create modern weapons. This level of military-technical cooperation will have a double meaning: in addition to the direct acquisition of new weapons, the technological gap from the enemy will also increase, and this can be considered another additional type of guarantee.
The exceptional value of technological advantages over the enemy lies in the preservation of human potential - for Ukraine this is most important both today and in the future. Ukraine cannot afford to waste human resources according to the Soviet, “Zhukov” principle, and therefore it is necessary to remove people from the battlefield as much as possible and transfer the load to technology. So that in defense the enemy would be met primarily by robots, and programmed machines would also be the first to go into an offensive attack.
In the fight against an enemy whose human resource is incomparable and remains virtually unlimited - especially in the conditions of degradation of Russian society - the only path to victory remains two types of tactics: precision strikes at long distances and dagger raid attacks by well-trained units. In fact, the entire army of the Ukrainian state becomes in such conditions an army of special forces. But both trump options provide precisely technological advantages - in reconnaissance, control automation, communications, accuracy and range of weapons.
It’s time to look for unconventional solutions, to unite with the renunciation of one’s own selfishness. Let's say, with the beginning of the ammunition famine, the small and brave Czech Republic set a good example. Namely, it found half a million 155 mm shells and another 300 thousand 122 mm shells, which can be purchased for about $2 billion outside the EU. When, due to a conflict of its own interests, France blocked the decision (Paris planned to first load its company Nexter, which is a powerful ammunition manufacturer, but cannot do this instantly), Canada expressed its willingness to contribute to the purchase and delivery.
The same should be done with missiles and airplanes. If, due to Trump’s destructive position, the American Congress blocks the transfer of ATACMS missiles, it is quite possible not only to buy them from other operators, but also to generally focus on purchasing new OTRKs in other countries. For example, purchase Tayfun operational-tactical ballistic missiles with a range of 560 km from Turkey.
Or persuade India, which is increasingly dissociating itself from the Russian Federation, to sell its Pralay tactical missile systems with a range of 500 km to Ukraine. Let's say, in return for promoting Indian interests in the Argentine market - with Tejas aircraft competing there with the Chinese Chengdu JF-17 and used American F-16s from the Danish Air Force. As for aircraft, along with the desired F-16s from the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could also target the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen - with the acquisition of full NATO membership, Sweden will be interested in this approach. And Saab even assured that if the decision was agreed upon with the Swedish government, sending the aircraft to Ukraine would be a fairly quick process.
In general, the point is that views and activity in the European part of NATO have significantly transformed: the vast majority of partners are with Ukraine and are ready to take unprecedented steps. For Kyiv, the speed of decision-making and immediate implementation is becoming extremely important. These decisions are often outside the brackets of the military, purely front-line situation; they cover the entire Ukrainian and European society. 2024 is the time to act today and now.
