On November 20, NABU and SAPO exposed an organized group consisting of the leadership of the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (Gosspetsvyaz), which stole from the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian Armed Forces only a proven amount in the equivalent of about 1.7 million US dollars.
Yesterday, the Cabinet of Ministers announced the dismissal of the head of the State Special Communications Service Yuri Shchigol and his deputy Viktor Zhora. Half an hour after the announcement of dismissal, SAPO and NABU reported suspicions to the head of the State Special Communications Service Yuriy Shchigol and his deputy Viktor Zhora of misappropriation of more than 62 million UAH.
The investigation established that during 2020-2022, an unnamed entrepreneur, in collusion with the leadership of the State Service for Special Communications, carried out a scheme to embezzle money from the budget, and therefore from the pockets of Ukrainians allocated for the purchase of equipment and software to resist Russian invaders. To do this, they attracted two controlled companies, and kept the purchase secret in order to avoid open bidding and ensure their victory.
Now six people are suspected under Part 5 of Art. 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
- Chairman of the State Service for Special Communications and his deputy;
- general director and employee of a state-owned enterprise;
- the owner of a group of companies (the organizer of the scheme) and one of his employees.
Yuriy Shchigol was appointed chairman of the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine on July 8, 2020. Over the course of 3 years, he was able to not only steal money from the budget, but also completely compromise an already unpopular department.
Victor Zhora was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Special Communications on issues of digital development, digital transformation and digitalization on January 15, 2021. He stated that he strives to ensure the transformation of internal business processes of the State Special Communications Service and improve the level of provision of services to external consumers and help strengthen the protection of state information resources. Now it’s clear what this “improvement” looks like
Former Deputy Minister of Defense for Digital Development, founder of the “Come Back Alive” foundation, Vitaly Deinega, on his Facebook page told some details behind the scenes of this corruption scandal.
A few words about corruption on drones and “protected” computers worth millions for the army. A few personal value judgments
The head of the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (on the right in the photo) Yuriy Shchigol and some of his subordinates received suspicions in the case of embezzlement of funds. A case for which searches took place six months ago. If it had been discovered faster, the army would have been much more digitalized, the Russians would have had less of an advantage in drones, we would have received significantly more international IT assistance for the army, and I would most likely have kept my job. But it’s good that at least it’s like that.
Now I'll try to explain what I mean.
I understand that for most of you the names of the various Central Executive Committees and the State Enterprise “Gospetskorrupmontazh” will mean little, but in the political life of the state everything is very different. State Special Communications (abbreviated as GSSSZI) is corruption (in my opinion).
This structure was created precisely for this purpose long before the Maidan. It does not bear much responsibility, but it can put a spoke in the wheels and prevent digitalization. It's like a cybernetic sanitary and epidemiological station. This is one of the few structures that has practically not been reformed since then.
Moreover, with the outbreak of a full-scale war, they managed to greatly increase their influence and powers, actually taking over the entire topic of cyber defense (military and civil) as well as drones and actually becoming the “wallet and hands” of the Ministry of Digital Development in many issues. Yes, yes, you didn’t think so. Tens of billions of hryvnias from the state budget for the “Army of Drones” this and next year, as well as 13 billion from the military tax, which was taken from local budgets, also went or will soon go here. What was purchased and prices are restricted information. But, according to my information, there is something to investigate there. And the volumes there are much larger.
In addition, the State Special Communications Service, its orders and norms, which should increase the security of information in government agencies, lead to a cosmic rise in costs, technical wretchedness of decisions and corruption, corruption and once again corruption. Their regulations have the greatest impact on systems that process information with limited access.
In fact, because of this, it is impossible to digitalize the army, because you can measure radiation in a basement in Bakhmut or Avdiivka, buy Ukrainian-made encryption equipment there (and for all the money), install computers there in an iron “radiation-protected” case (also for hundreds of thousands, and sometimes millions of hryvnias), install Windows 7 or 10 on them (because Windows 11 was not certified by the State Service for Special Communications), and get This is all a certificate of conformity from one of the companies, which the State Special Communications Service will friendly advise you - this is a very rough description of the problem, the consequence of which is a purely paper-based secret and chipboard document flow in government agencies and, more importantly, in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This is the main reason why the “numbers” in the troops are almost entirely volunteer and completely illegal. Because for some reason it doesn’t work out legally and without corruption (google here about the Kolokol system)
I saw what GSSSZI was before the Maidan. I can say that after ten years practically nothing has changed. This structure, in my opinion, was and still is about papers. On some papers their cyber-grandfathers sign that your system is protected, other papers go in bags or cryptocurrency in the opposite direction.
Today, SSSSZI has become an octopus that has filled all the cracks with the power vacuum that it could.
Below are a few more of my very subjective and extremely value judgments: SSSSZI has its own lobby in parliament and, in particular, but not only, deputy Alexander Fedienko in the National Security Committee, who pushed for laws that were beneficial to them, even when the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine were against it.
They have a lobby in the government in the form of many deputies of the Ministry of Digital Development. They have a fairly strong situational alliance with the SBU. They have a lobby in the Office of the President in the form of Mikhail Fedorov. And, if it weren't for the Ramstein IT Coalition, they would have a monopoly on international IT and cyber defense assistance.
But this is just the tip of the iceberg. It is important to understand that the head of this service, in my opinion, is just a “pound” who can easily be replaced by another. I think that you did not even know about its existence before reading this text. And that's bad news. But there is also a good thing - there is reason to think that this is not the last suspicion. There is also a feeling that after some time suspicions await some of the others present in the photo above. But that will have to wait.
But this is the punitive part. It gives a feeling of justice, but does not solve the problem. And to prevent this from happening in the future, we need things that I talked about from the first day in office:
1. Complete independence of the Ministry of Defense in the field of cyber defense from the State Security Service. And the transfer of the IT sector of the Ministry of Defense of the right to determine the requirements for cyber protection of the Armed Forces of Ukraine systems.
2. Transfer of drones to relevant ministries (Ministry of Strategic Industry and Ministry of Defense)
3. A complete restart of the SSSZZI, and not just the replacement of several people whose guilt they could prove.
4. Creation of a system of anti-corruption public supervision over the State Social Insurance Fund
5. Removal once and for all from the second reading of bill No. 8087, which I fought from the first to the last day in office and which was written under the leadership of the people who were handed suspicions today.
6. Deep and thorough audit of procurement for the “Army of Drones”
But it was for this position that I lost my position. Based on my subjective judgments and unverified information. But I’m glad that at least they couldn’t hush up this matter.
.png)
