Defending the homeland is the duty of every man according to the constitution. The army requires specialists in various fields, so receiving a summons does not necessarily mean participation in military operations. There are different specializations in the army, and it is possible to be assigned to maintenance work instead of active combat.
Roman Sinitsyn (Balan) – officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Until mobilization in 2023, he was the head of the military direction of the Sergei Pritula Foundation. In 2014, he was one of the founders of the volunteer organization “People's Home Front”. In 2022, he was awarded the “Golden Heart” - a state award established by decree of the President of Ukraine to reward volunteers. Sinitsyn came for an interview in Suspilna Novyny with the cat Syrsky, with whom on November 22 he announced a levy for drones for aerial reconnaissance. About mobilization into the ranks of the Defense Forces, Ukrainian weapons and Russian tactics - in Sinitsyn’s interview for the “Removskaya Interview” project.
About the cat Syrsky
Roman, your cat named Syrsky in November, it seems, became the main cat of Ukrainian Twitter (now social network X). Tell his story.
We were on a combat mission in one of the regions of Ukraine and were looking for cats for a rural house, because there were a lot of mice. This is not our first cat – our third or fourth. And Syrsky - because he loves Sulguni very much. Not in honor of the commander of the Ground Forces.
I didn't think it would become popular. I just posted a photo of him with a sad face and away we go. Only later, when almost Syrsky’s fan clubs appeared, I decided that this story could be monetized in terms of volunteer help. That’s why Syrsky is now assembling a Mini Shark complex. These are drones for aerial reconnaissance. Such aircraft are needed in large numbers and by many units.
Has the commander of the Ground Forces, Alexander Syrsky, already found out about the cat?
Yes, and I treated this situation with humor.
Cat Syrsky assembles five Mini Shark aircraft. This requires UAH 6.5 million. Many say that it has become difficult to raise money. Do you notice this in this collection?
It's not difficult for a cat. He has already collected three million (at the time of recording the interview on November 28 – ed). But, if we compare it with last year, then yes, donations are falling.
Would it have been difficult for the Sergei Pritula Foundation to raise 6.5 million hryvnia a year ago?
We would have collected them faster. It would also be necessary to do promotional campaigns and activities. Drawings, memes. But perhaps they could have assembled it in two or three days. And if it had been in February-March 2022, they would have assembled it in two hours.
People are tired. There are a lot of fees, needs, volunteers, funds. Somewhere people have run out of money, somewhere else they have a desire to donate. Somewhere, perhaps, the realization ended that the war continues, it is intense and terrible.
In 2015-16 there was a similar situation. Then - Donetsk airport, and again the help began to grow. Before that there were Ilovaisk, Debaltsevo. Peak moments at the front contributed to people mobilizing. There will still be bursts of activity, but they will most likely be associated with not very good events - rocket attacks, our losses.
Do corruption scandals and stories about the arrest of bribe-takers affect people’s motivation?
I rejoice when bribe-takers are detained. Or imprisonment of corrupt officials. And they are now more or less happening. Does this demotivate people? To some extent, yes. Because on the one hand, you are collecting for two “Maviks”, for which they want 100 thousand hryvnia, and on the other hand, someone is “cutting” the budget with tens of millions of hryvnia. But this is not a reason to give up. We are at war, Russia has not disappeared anywhere, we have not won yet.
About mobilization
You have mobilized into the army. Why did you decide that you would be more useful as a soldier than as a volunteer?
There are no “healthier” or “not healthier” categories. There is a duty. I am a person liable for military service, a reserve officer. I was mobilized.
Have you received a summons?
Yes. I mobilized and don’t regret it one bit. Moreover, somewhere internally I wanted this. Because if you don’t take part in such a historical moment, you will regret it later.
Now many people are giving arguments why they won’t serve, or why they avoided being summoned. Do you understand why the topic of mobilization is so controversial?
I don’t think that we are an exception and we should “flagellate ourselves” for the fact that we have such a phenomenon as “deviators”. There is a certain layer of society that does not want to. That's all. I wouldn't make a huge problem out of this.
Don't you think that the voices on this topic have become louder now?
There is an even greater share of Russian propaganda here, which is inflating this topic. They fight not only with tanks, but also with information. It is beneficial for them that this topic be on the information agenda - for example, about the “lawlessness” of military registration and enlistment offices. When I mobilized, I didn’t see any “lawlessness.”
But on the other hand, there are real videos of the “work” of TCC representatives.
Some are real, some are edited. Of course there is a problem. But we cannot “crash” or allow the enemy to influence us with information campaigns.
Defending the homeland is a man’s constitutional duty. The army needs specialists in many fields. If you were given a summons, this does not mean that the day after tomorrow you will storm the landing in Avdeevka. Perhaps you will be in a rebate. Perhaps, as an IT specialist, you will help with digitalization. Or do aerial reconnaissance. Perhaps you will be in the logistics services.
I tried to mobilize into the military unit I wanted and I succeeded. However, the TCC offered me a choice of several more military units with specific positions, according to my military specialty.
Would you advise those who could potentially be mobilized to do this?
Certainly. It is worth trying to mobilize into a military unit where you have friends who effectively perform combat missions, and where you know what you will or want to do, and you have the appropriate “skills” in this direction. But if they are not there, it’s not a problem - they teach you a lot in the army. I have taken courses, and now I will take more – this is a constant process of improvement.
Moreover, the Defense Forces are constantly receiving new equipment and equipment. And the personnel are actively trained.
I can imagine that some commentators will write to us under this interview: Roman Sinitsyn is not an ordinary citizen of Ukraine, so he could choose.
The Armed Forces post vacancies on work.ua. There is a website called LobbyX, where dozens of departments are looking for specialists. You can fill out a form, pass the selection process and get accepted.
This system is a little crooked, but I know dozens of cases where people ended up where they wanted. And they do things where they have expertise, experience and professionalism.
I have highlighted several key arguments against mobilization that I have recently encountered in my interviews. In particular, this: first of all, police officers, officials, judges, prosecutors, and border guards from the western border should go to fight. How would you respond to this?
The border guards are fighting now. We crossed paths with them in Bakhmut. The police are also fighting – the same “Rage” brigade, the Patrol Police are fighting. This narrative, they say, let the deputy go first, or the president’s son, is “game.” Our country must function – the economy, services, industry. To manipulate the fact that the “cops” don’t fight, but why should I – well, excuse me. A large number of police are really fighting. There are entire units at the battalion and brigade level. NABU detectives are fighting, SAP prosecutors.
Perhaps this means that if deputies were more present at the front as military personnel, or ministers, or their children, this would solve some of the problems relating to the supply of troops, general organization, and so on.
Deputies must engage in legislative activities. This, among other things, helps that the troops have everything they need. There are things that they can “fix” with one vote. For example, the wounded were taken out of state with monetary support of 300 or 700 UAH. A group of people's deputies developed bills and voted. And now the wounded receive more decent wages.
Also arguments: “I will not fight for Zelensky”, “I would rather leave the country than go to fight for the houses and businesses of the authorities.”
I’m also not fighting for Zelensky. Here is the story that we as a nation may not exist. We've already been through this. Then there will be famines, concentration camps, resettlement of peoples, and in the end the Ukrainians, as part of some new Russian reincarnation, the “worker insurgent red army,” will take Warsaw or Bratislava.
Perhaps the fact that people say that they will not go to war “for power” is partly the responsibility of the authorities themselves?
Power is responsible for many things. But the fact that such things are driven into people’s heads is, to a large extent, an effective Russian IPSO. Split, divide - they know how to do that. Nobody is fighting “for Zelensky.” Everyone is fighting for Ukraine. Today Zelensky, tomorrow someone else. We, thank God, have a tradition of changing power, and in a democratic way - unlike those with whom we are at war.
Another argument: “Many men under 30 already have a career, a life, and it’s psychologically scary to go into the unknown, where you can also die because of the stupidity of the person who commands you. Perhaps it’s worth articulating that the work is being done, and you shouldn’t be afraid to entrust your life to an officer unknown to you.”
You will have to trust your life to an unknown officer. You won’t go into an open field to fight the Russians yourself.
Of course it's scary. If a person is not afraid in war, apparently there is something wrong in his head. But we need to realize what exactly we are doing and why I ended up here. Muscovites attacked us. There was already Bucha, Mariupol, deportations of children, rape, atrocities. They want to kill everyone who has something Ukrainian. These are imperial scum. They can't do it any other way.
Perhaps the state initially did not have a completely honest conversation about what this war really is and that it could affect many more people than it seemed at the beginning?
But it seems to me that it was obvious that we were at war with a huge country. They laughed about the “second army of the world,” but still. They are technically well equipped, they have a lot of military equipment, albeit old. Unlimited human potential.
There were quite high media expectations for the counter-offensive in 2023 and, to a certain extent, they were not justified. Why did it happen?
What were your expectations? That we will reach Crimea? Shall we reach the borders of 1991? War is dynamic. The enemy is strong. Different scenarios are possible. Maybe we will come out - not this year, then next year.
It is moving - and with the help of Western partners, and our military-industrial complex is getting involved. It is worth understanding that this rain will last for a long time. I don’t know why certain people expressed certain messages. Perhaps these are elements of IPSO to confuse the enemy.
About the drone war
What military needs for drones does Ukraine currently cover?
At a basic level. But there are never enough drones. In some places it is a consumable item, in others – in the case of FPV drones – it is disposable ammunition. Somewhere they quickly get lost – if we talk about reconnaissance aircraft or the same “Maviks”.
It’s good that we have enterprises – both public and private – that produce them. And international partners give them to us. But in any case this is not enough. And this, by the way, is not just about things that fly - it’s also about ground-based drones, remote means of mine clearance, platforms that can transport ammunition or transport the wounded. This is about both underwater drones and surface ones.
Veteran and volunteer Maria Berlinskaya said that “we are not currently provided with drones even to 10% of the needs.”
It seems to me that Maria is a little mistaken. What I see is that at the basic level, mechanized brigades, airborne assault brigades, and “offensive brigades” are provided with drones. In our foundation, of course, there have been cases when some battalion commander calls and says: “The last thermal imaging Mavik has fallen, there will be nothing to look at at night, bring at least something.” But 10% is too pessimistic a figure. Again, no one will give you specific numbers and it’s not a fact that they exist.
But drones are still not enough. For one assault or one reflection of an assault, the same FPVs can be used by 20, 30, 50 units on a small section of the front. The cost of one is plus or minus $500.
What is the balance of power when we talk about drones between the Ukrainian side and the Russians?
Depending on what kind of drones. There are reconnaissance, strike, multi-rotor, FPV. In some places we have a huge advantage, and in others we lose. For example, with analogues of the Russian “Lancets”. They cause great damage to our artillery and other types of troops. They are trying to combat this problem – in some cases effectively, in others not. We have adequate answers, but they are not widespread yet.
There are some stories where we have a big advantage. Let's say multi-rotor drones that bomb their equipment at night.
In terms of FPV, it seems that there is plus or minus parity here, although we had an advantage before. But the situation is changing quickly. What worked effectively a week ago may no longer work today. Because it’s all a big ecosystem: communications, jamming, electronic reconnaissance. All this is changing very dynamically.
Why should you and Syrsky and the Pritula Foundation buy a Mini Shark, but the state cannot do this?
Maybe. I hope that next year the state will buy these or similar complexes. It is already buying them. “Aist-100”, or the regular Shark, is in service. And the unit receives these aircraft under a state defense order, or through another mechanism - the “Drone Army” and the like. However, they are lost, there are not enough of them, hence the fees.
There is a story with Maviks, which, as far as I understand, the state does not buy, because it is impossible to buy something from the Chinese. That's why ordinary people buy. And you see dozens of these fees.
In general, could it be strategically foreseen that drones like the Mavika or some other type could “shoot” at some point?
No. No one could have foreseen that this particular remedy would be so effective. At the beginning of the war, for example, no one knew much about FPV. They were used in isolated versions. Or discharges from Maviks. I knew only a few crews of enthusiasts who, back in Irpen, knew how to throw grenades on someone’s head. And now this is a massive story.
About Ukrainian weapons
The EU is behind on plans to provide Ukraine with a million shells by March 2024. In parallel, we have the political situation in the United States, which is also unclear what it means for Ukraine in terms of future military assistance. Aren't you afraid that next year there won't be anything to fight with?
I'm sure there will be something. This is the responsibility of the military-political leadership of the country, and I think they realize this - precisely in the context of domestic producers and the development of our own defense industry. We need to convey, including to international partners, that we need to arm ourselves as quickly and efficiently as possible. And produce some of the weapons in collaboration, possibly with Western manufacturers.
Such examples already exist in Ukraine. This includes ammunition for artillery systems, mortar ammunition, small arms, drones, and tanks. You can actually walk to the planes.
Is Ukraine capable of producing a significant amount of ammunition so as not to depend on certain periods of crisis in the political life of its partners?
We still have production and a school - both design and development. And there are resources to provide for ourselves at some level. But this requires billions of dollars in investment. And here is a question for diplomats and international partners.
The Ministry of Digital Development and the Ministry of Defense have created a working group on the construction of fortifications. Wasn't it too late to make this decision?
There are many things you can say “is it too late?” Do we need fortifications, including on the line of contact? Certainly. Do we need to cover cities and strategic targets in the Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkov regions, where possible enemy attacks are possible? Certainly. They do something - it’s wonderful. The main thing is that money is not stolen.
Could this news indicate that in 2024 Ukraine is preparing, first of all, for defense, and not for active offensive actions?
We must prepare for any scenario. Plans change, the situation changes, the world changes, the weapons that affect certain sectors of the front also change.
For example, providing us with the Highmars systems and short-range missiles became a game changer at some stage. We were able to deliver precise strikes to a certain operational depth and destroy their command posts and supply channels. And there are many such examples. They got the Lancet, and it became a little more difficult for us. Something else will appear now, they will give us an F-16. This is also not a total game changer, but it will be easier in the air.
About the front
Now the hottest spot is Avdeevka. Why is this city so important for Russians?
Avdiivka is close to Donetsk. They are trying to move our forces and resources away from it, since for them it is a strategic, base city, the capital of the so-called “republic”. But this is my subjective opinion.
The activity of Russians near Avdeevka is compared with what continued around Bakhmut until the Russians occupied this city. Do you see these parallels?
I wasn’t there and I don’t know our defensive plan either. But if parallels can be drawn, it is that they again do not take into account their losses. Every day they send battalion-tactical infantry groups with burning armor to the same Koksokhim. But they don’t care, because new ones are coming and they are trying to shower us with their corpses again.
In Bakhmut this strategy was successful. Is it clear how to prevent this from happening in Avdeevka?
A sufficient amount of modern weapons, trained and motivated personnel and non-standard technical solutions can give us an advantage. We must beat them not quantitatively, but qualitatively.
We are recording this conversation at the end of 2023. Are there any thoughts you'd like to share about life in particular over the next year?
You have to stay in a heap and not let yourself become unbalanced. The Russians could not conquer us by military means, so they will try to create a rift. We must not forget that the enemy is in Moscow. Do everything to help the Defense Forces. And do not forget that the war may last for a long time; many will have to fight. And prepare for it.
