The special status of Polish farmers and how the Kremlin is trying to use it to create a split

The political weight of farmers in Poland is based on several factors: their legal status, the support system for farmers and the sheer size of this social group. Their manipulative statements regarding Ukrainian grain are repeated even by adequate politicians and the mainstream media.

Journalists from the publication “Texts” studied in detail the status, privileges and political influence of Polish farmers. Their manipulative statements regarding Ukrainian grain are repeated even by adequate politicians and the mainstream media. Let's find out why.

For almost two months, a protest by farmers has been ongoing in Poland, demanding that the government and EU authorities abandon plans to tighten requirements for agricultural producers as part of the EU’s green policy, as well as establish restrictions, if not a complete blockade, on agricultural imports from Ukraine.

As part of the protest, farmers have actually “taken hostage” checkpoints on the border with Ukraine and are dealing a serious blow to the Ukrainian economy. Unlike the rest of Poland, where blocking actions occur once every 10-14 days, the border with Ukraine is blocked around the clock and without interruption. In their actions, farmers rely on their special status in Polish society and their extreme attractiveness as an electoral group.

The political weight of farmers in Poland is based on several factors: their legal status, the support system for farmers and the sheer size of this social group.

A cohesive and active group of voters

At first glance, farmers are not the largest social group in the structure of Polish society. According to recent estimates by sociologists, they make up approximately 10% of the rural population and about 4% of the Polish population. According to the General Statistical Office of Poland, in the fourth quarter of 2023, the number of farm workers in Poland was 1.2 million people.

If we assume that some of the owners or employees of farms have family members who do not work there, but share the views of their loved ones, we are talking about several million voters, that is, a fairly significant group for Polish politics. At the same time, farmers are spoken of as a rather homogeneous group - conservative with common ideas about their rights and social status.

Exclusive rights to land

Unlike Ukraine, in Poland a farmer is not only an occupation or profession, it is also a certain legal status. This status is manifested in several aspects, the most important of which are preferential treatment for the payment of social insurance contributions and privileges for the acquisition of agricultural land.

Polish legislation actually defines farming as a separate social condition. This condition exists due to the peculiarities of the functioning of the agricultural land market and direct mentions of farmers in several fundamental legislative acts for Poland, including the Constitution. Formally, the country has an agricultural land market, but it is very strictly limited and regulated in order to prevent the purchase of agricultural land by foreigners and representatives of large capital.

According to Article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted in 1997, “the basis of the agrarian structure of the state is the family economy.” This provision was developed by the law on the formation of an agrarian system adopted in 2003, on the eve of Poland’s accession to the EU.

The preamble of the law explicitly states that its purpose is to counteract the concentration of agricultural real estate. The law introduced a rule according to which the tenants had the first right to purchase land, defined family farming and introduced land ownership boundaries of up to 300 hectares.

And fears of foreign capital and buyers from abroad were so great that Polish negotiators achieved permission for a moratorium that prohibited the purchase of agricultural land in Poland by foreigners until 2016. In 2016, when the moratorium was coming to an end, legislators tightened the rules for purchasing land, introducing a mechanism whereby only a farmer – a resident of the community in which it was located – could actually buy a plot, with an obligation to cultivate it for at least five years.

These standards were somewhat weakened in 2023, increasing the area of ​​land that non-farmers were allowed to buy to 1 hectare.

So, according to the law, only an individual farmer can purchase agricultural land in Poland with an area of ​​more than 1 hectare. Of course, there are certain exceptions, mainly for situations where land is purchased by state-owned enterprises or when it is necessary to acquire land for the construction of strategic infrastructure, such as energy or transport facilities. Land can also be inherited from a family member who was a farmer.

This is where the concept of farmer as a legal status arises. By law, a farmer is a person who owns and manages a farm. Also, the status of a farmer can be obtained (and purchased agricultural land) by a person who has received education in the relevant field or has completed an official paid internship or training in farming. There is also a legal requirement that the new owner must farm the land for at least five years from the date of purchase.

Historical background

Most current Polish farmers or their ancestors received land as a result of two major agrarian reforms that took place in Poland in the 20th century.

As part of the first reform, from 1920 to 1939, the government bought land from large landowners (farms whose area exceeded 180 hectares were subject to reduction), and also requisitioned the lands of institutions associated with empires, to which Polish lands belonged before 1918, and created mechanisms its discounted purchase and giveaway programs.

The second agrarian reform, which was generally carried out between 1944 and 1950, consisted of a further redistribution of agricultural land, which was already seized free of charge from large landowners (persons who owned up to 50 hectares of land were allowed to leave land in private ownership), as well as in the distribution of land to territories annexed by Poland as a result of World War II.

About 6.1 million hectares of land were confiscated, of which 3.7 million were in territories annexed to Poland as a result of World War II. About half of them became state property (in particular, Polish collective farms or state agricultural enterprises were created on them). And the rest were distributed among the poor peasants. Hundreds of thousands of new farms have appeared up to the “state norm” of 5 hectares. In total, 1.1 million peasant families received land.

Although the area of ​​farms in the new territories of Poland was larger than in the old ones (about 7.5 hectares), it is the number 5 that is still key for Polish agriculture. According to the General Agricultural Census conducted by the Polish General Office of Statistics in 2020, 52% of farms in the country cultivate land up to 5 hectares.

Among Polish farmers there are also those who cultivate more visible fields, but the already mentioned limitation of 300 hectares per farm cannot be circumvented. At the same time, the average size of land per farm differs quite noticeably from voivodeship to voivodeship.

They are the smallest in the Lesser Poland Voivodeship - on average 4.31 hectares, and the largest in the former “Poniemskie”: West Pomeranian - 32.9 hectares, Warmian-Masurian - 23.88 hectares, Lubusz - 23.18 hectares. In addition to the large plots that were distributed to peasants in socialist Poland, the privatization of state agricultural enterprises in the 1990s also played a role, which brought additional land to the market.

Economic and social consequences

The area of ​​cultivated land directly determines the economic viability of a farm, and is also an indicator of the prospects for its development. According to the results of the 2023 sample survey “Polish Village”, only 1.7% of owners of farms with an area of ​​up to 5 hectares said that the income they receive from them is enough for them. Another 23.9% said that they would rather be able to survive thanks to their household.

Among farms with an area from 5 hectares to 10 hectares there were 6.5% and 36.4%. And these two categories together make up more than 70% of all farms in Poland. At the same time, in 2023, 23% of farm owners said they also work outside of their farm. This indicator is uneven for different age groups of farmers. Most of these were in the youngest age group, up to 34 years old. Among young farmers, 33% had additional work.

Small farm owners also often have poorer education or skills, preventing them from taking advantage of additional sources of finance. According to the authors of the report “Polish Village. Report on the state of the village” for 2020, it was representatives of large farms who were able to receive additional funds (except for direct additional payments per cultivated hectare of land) from various EU programs to support agriculture.

We are talking about preferential loans or grants for the construction of additional outbuildings, the purchase of additional equipment, and the like. Most of these farms are in western Poland. In the western voivodeships of West Pomerania, Warmia-Masuria, Lubusz, Pomerania, Opole and Lower Silesia, the majority of agricultural land is concentrated in farms with an area of ​​more than 50 hectares.

Thus, Polish legislation contributes to the “conservation” of the farmer's fortune. Since land is difficult to acquire, farming is highly hereditary. In addition, farm sizes remain very small, keeping the number of farmers at a fairly high level.

Separate social protection

In addition to the rights to purchase land, the status of a Polish farmer is complemented by the presence of a separate social insurance system. Social protection and pension provision for farmers in Poland is handled by a separate structure - the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS).

Social and pension insurance rates for farmers are lower than for individual entrepreneurs or employees. As of 2024, the farmer pays 180 zlotys per quarter as part of social insurance and 429 zlotys as part of the pension, together 203 zlotys per month.

For an individual entrepreneur (analogous to a sole proprietor), contribution rates depend on the level of income and amount to at least one thousand zlotys per month. And for an employee, the pension insurance rate is 9.76% of salary, which will be paid by both the employee and the employer. In addition, the employee will pay 9% of income for health insurance. And he and the employer will pay slightly smaller contributions to the unemployment fund or insurance in case of temporary disability.

To pay contributions to KRUS instead of the national social insurance system ZUS, a person must have the status of a farmer or farmer's assistant. A farmer is a person who is the owner or co-owner of a farm that cultivates at least 1 hectare of land. Farmer's assistant is a person hired by a farmer to perform auxiliary functions on the farm (for example, help in harvesting vegetables).

At the end of 2023, 1 million 42 thousand people paid contributions to KRUS. At the same time, the status of a farmer and the corresponding insurance through the KRUS system do not exclude the possibility for a person to receive income from hired labor outside of farming, but significantly reduce the costs of social insurance from these additional sources of income.

So, farmers are quite an attractive electoral asset for each political party, but they also have ideas, supported by the government system and legislation, about their special role in society and experience in receiving benefits. Therefore, the struggle for farmers’ votes is always associated with an appeal to their special importance in society. At the same time, recently the circle of parties and politicians interested in the votes of farmers has noticeably increased.

Farmers in current politics

Traditionally, the main representative of farmers in Polish politics was the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). But the Law and Justice party, during its two terms in government, pursued a fairly active policy of luring peasants into its electorate. In addition, other political forces began to join the fight for farmers’ votes.

A certain turning point in the attitude of the main political forces towards farmers was that in the 2023 parliamentary elections, even the Civic Coalition, which traditionally focused on centrist and liberal urban residents, also decided to fight for the votes of farmers.

As a result, farmer activist Michal Kolodziejczak, who, by the way, at one time began political activity as a candidate in local elections from PiS, appeared on the election lists of the Civil Code.

As a result of the elections, Kolodziejczak became Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, and in further recognition of his campaigning value, Donald Tusk began his election campaign for local authorities on February 16 this year with a meeting in the town of Morąg in the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, where he Kolodziejczaka listened to the demands of the farmers and expressed his support to them.

In addition to the general attractiveness of farmers and their families as an electoral group, the behavior of governments and politicians determines public opinion in society as a whole. According to a Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) poll published last week, 52% of Poles strongly support the farmers' protests, while another 29% are somewhat supportive.

At the same time, and no less important, among supporters of Polish parliamentary parties, the level of support for the farmers' protest (unconditional or partial) is at least 60%. Among supporters of the now notorious Confederation party in Ukraine, this support is generally 100%.

Among PiS supporters, the level of support for the farmers’ protest reaches 96%; among supporters of the ruling coalition parties, it ranges from 85% for the “Third Way” association (the “Poland 2050” party of the current speaker Szymon Gołowni and the Peasant Party) to 63% for the Civic Coalition and 60% for Levitsy. Increasing the information background around agricultural imports from Ukraine, which combined emotional appeals with numerous cases of misinformation or distortion, played an important role here.

Emotional Narratives

Discussions surrounding the import of agricultural products from Ukraine spread a number of emotional and often inaccurate narratives. They fall into favorable soil. In Poland, campaigns have been running for several years promoting the purchase of products from local farmers. One of the consistent elements of such campaigns is the narrative of healthy and high-quality Polish products. Therefore, even products from other EU countries may be considered by Polish consumers to be of lower quality. This behavior is especially typical for consumers in the older age group.

In addition to the general narrative about the quality of Polish food, a number of scandals and outright information manipulations on grain imports from Ukraine in 2023-2024 created the impression for the mass consumer that all imports from Ukraine are potentially hazardous to health.

Added to this was the scandal with the import of so-called technical grain from Ukraine. In Polish media publications, Ukrainian grain was often presented as being, by definition, not suitable for consumption, and the situation was described as if industrial grain accounted for the majority of imports from Ukraine.

In addition, after the start of the farmers’ protests, videos appeared on the profiles of activists associated with the Confederation party that showed wagons with rotten grain, with a comment that this was grain that they were trying to import into Poland as early as 2024.

In fact, the video was of grain in wagons that were stuck at the Polish border after the Polish government imposed an embargo on imports from Ukraine from today to tomorrow in April 2023. The grain intended for the Polish market could not be cleared through customs due to the embargo, no one brought it back either, and several dozen wagons have been standing on the side lines in the border regions of Poland for almost a year, and have recently served as props for new videos.

In addition, the argument about strict requirements for agricultural products in the EU compared to those that exist in Ukraine is often used. And if it is true that some pesticides that are allowed in Ukraine are prohibited in the EU, then among the arguments against food products from Ukraine there may be statements that supposedly more pesticides and other products are used in Ukraine than in Poland.

Even Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk repeated this thesis in one of his comments. Meanwhile, official statistics from the UN Food Program denies this. According to the UN, as of 2021, Polish farmers used three times more pesticides than Ukrainian ones (although Polish producers are far from the leaders in this indicator in the EU; they are significantly ahead of most EU countries).

In addition, according to EU export rules, Ukrainian grain is checked at the border for compliance with European standards, and what does not comply with the standards does not pass the border.

Another popular narrative is that agriculture in Ukraine is dominated by oligarchs and multinational corporations. Even in conversations with representatives of major media, sometimes it is necessary to remind that in Ukraine there are more than 100 thousand small farmers, and there are also medium and small agricultural firms.

By promoting the narrative that the entire agricultural sector in Ukraine belongs to a small group of people or corporations, politicians create the impression that the blockade is morally right. Competition with Ukrainian agricultural imports is presented as a struggle between David and Goliath. This narrative, as can be understood by looking at statistical data on Polish farms, is based on the manipulation of real facts.

Polish farms are small even compared to individual or small farms in Ukraine, which can cultivate tens, if not hundreds of hectares of land.

Translation of the leaflet: FARMERS STRIKE

Why are we protesting

1. Green agreement and Fit For 55 package AT SMYTNYK

Now the EU orders us to withdraw 4% of our fields from cultivation; in 2030 this share should already be 10%. Various restrictions are introduced on the production of plant and animal products. This policy hits every sector of the economy! Your rights will be limited by the ban on cars with internal combustion engines, forced thermal insulation of houses, and huge electricity bills!

2. Stop products from outside the EU!

Millions of tons of grain, rapeseed, sugar and other consumer goods that are produced WITHOUT compliance with EU standards end up in Poland. This is destroying production in our homeland. They use pesticides PROHIBITED in the EU! Opening borders supports agro-millionaires, not Ukrainian peasants!

In addition to concerns about the quality of imports from Ukraine and fear of Ukrainian agricultural giants, among the arguments in favor of the border blockade there is the thesis that, despite the ban of the Polish government, grain imports from Ukraine do not seem to stop.

It seems that trucks, which according to documents are heading to Lithuania or Latvia, turn around en masse immediately beyond the Polish-Lithuanian border and go back to Poland. These beliefs are still common today. Vice Minister Michal Kolodziejczak also repeated them, despite the fact that, according to his own statements, documentary or other evidence of these theses has not yet been found.

Taking into account the results of the polls and the distribution of pre-election sympathies in general, it can be argued: even if the protests of farmers include elements of “expanding” the boundaries of legality, such as blocking the entry into Poland of trucks with agricultural products, even if they should be in transit to third countries, as is happening at the Grebenne checkpoint, the current government will be inclined to turn a blind eye to unauthorized checks of drivers' documents carried out by border blockers, at least until the end of the election marathon.

And most Polish voters will not know about this, because the Polish national press reports little about the details of the blockade on the border, unlike the protests in the rest of the country. Two big votes will take place in Poland in the near future. Local government elections are scheduled for April 7, and European Parliament elections will take place on June 9.

Echo in the Ukrainian information space

It is interesting that theses are being spread in the Ukrainian information space that echo those disseminated by the “Confederation”, for example, that unknown hucksters bought grain at a low price and sold it in Poland with cosmic profits.

With the help of Semantic force, we determined who started the message and how it was distributed. It was first published by a Facebook account that positions itself as a critic of the current government. Here is the first post. Then he went into promotion. We paid attention to him because he often caught our eye.

The peaks on the graph coincide with events around the blockade of the Ukrainian border and the grain problem. On September 18, 2023, when the post appeared, Zelensky was supposed to meet with Polish President Duda in New York (the meeting did not take place). The end of December - the blockade at the Doroguisk checkpoint was lifted and renewed; local authorities there revoked permission for the carriers to protest, but then the court allowed it again. The last peak is the beginning of a large-scale blockade by Polish farmers of roads in Poland and the Ukrainian border.

That is, we see how someone is conducting an information campaign in the Ukrainian information space. And this campaign is tied to events in Poland. Since the blockade is beneficial to Russia and only it has the ability to conduct such coordinated information campaigns, then in this case suspicion falls on it.

And this is a reason to think and explore to what extent the Russian disinformation machine can influence internal Polish discourse. Much has been written about the pro-Russian nature of the “Confederation”. But we see that theses favorable to Russia are being disseminated by adequate politicians and influential media.

Kremlin propaganda is aimed at using entire discourses existing in the country for its own purposes, presenting certain arguments in a light favorable to Russia. “Good” misinformation is the kind that exploits existing biases and is the kind of misinformation that is worth sharing. It seems that in this case, the Russians found a vulnerable link in a generally anti-Russian Poland - farmers - and began to implant their interpretations into their usual theses and play on their fears of Ukrainian competition.

Upcoming elections

Local government elections play an important role. Traditionally, control over the local budget by parties of a certain ideology is of practical importance for the population. For example, more liberal cities may subsidize reproductive health programs for their residents. In addition, voivodeship sejmiks (analogous to the regional council in Ukraine) play an important role in the distribution of funds from EU funds. They decide on the distribution of subsidies.

But this year, local elections have acquired additional weight in Poland. For the Confederation party, which “underfulfilled” its plan for the number of seats in parliament, gaining just over 7% of the vote instead of the predicted 15%, this is a chance for revenge and increasing its prestige thanks to high results in certain regions.

This party has the highest level of support in the regions bordering Ukraine. For the Civic Coalition and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, local elections are a way to confirm that the days of PiS rule are finally over, and to consolidate their electoral success in 2023. For the “name” party “Poland 2050” of Szymon Gołowni, this is a way to expand its presence in Polish politics.

The Poland 2050 party was registered in 2021, and its participation in the 2023 parliamentary elections is its first step into national government. And now the party is seeking to gain a presence in local government. In addition, the results of the current elections could become a springboard for its leader Shimon Golovnya to participate in the 2025 presidential campaign. Golovnya was already a candidate in the presidential race in 2020, but did not make it to the second round. Political observers are convinced that he would like to try to compete for the presidency again.

Taking into account all of the above, as well as the important role of the European Parliament in approving EU policies, elections to it will be no less important. Since farmers, in addition to imports from Ukraine, also protest against the EU’s green policies, all the main players will want to “channel” their sentiments into votes in the elections. This gives reason to believe that the border blockade will last at least until the European Parliament elections, which are scheduled for early June 2024.

But even after the elections, the possibilities of importing Ukrainian agricultural products to Poland will be limited. As of today, the European Commission is discussing a package of restrictions (in fact, the return of import duties) on sensitive products imported from Ukraine (those for which Ukrainian producers compete most with European and, in particular, Polish ones). In addition, the agricultural issue will become one of the most difficult in the process of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. But the task that needs to be completed in the near future is to achieve the unblocking of the Ukrainian-Polish border and the introduction of mechanisms that would prevent the recurrence of such blockades.