Literally on the same day, on Wednesday, March 20, three rather sensitive events for Ukraine became known.
Firstly, the Ukrainian authorities, after requests from partner countries, decided to close the website with a list of “international war sponsors.”
Secondly, the Court of Justice of the European Union overturned EU sanctions against Russian race car driver Nikita Mazepin, the son of Putin's Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin.
Thirdly, the EU Court lifted sanctions from the Belarusian state-owned enterprise Belshina. What is the reason for such decisions, is there a corruption component here, and are such decisions a trial balloon for Ukraine’s European partners for the full lifting of sanctions?
Mazepin and Belshina acquitted
On March 20, the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg overturned EU sanctions against Russian racing driver Nikita Mazepin. It was blacklisted by the EU in March 2022 in response to the start of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The sanctions led to the freezing of his assets in the European Union and a ban on entry into the EU.
Nikita Mazepin is the son of the founder of the Uralchem group of Russian enterprises, Dmitry Mazepin. The EU's decision to include Nikita in the sanctions list was based on the race car driver's connections with his father, who works in sectors of the Russian economy that provide a significant source of income for the Russian authorities. According to the EU Council, Dmitry Mazepin, through companies associated with him, was a key sponsor of his son’s activities as a driver in the Haas Formula 1 team. A few days after the start of the full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the Haas team terminated the contract with Nikita Mazepin.
The EU Council extended sanctions against Mazepin Jr. three times (in September 2022, March and September 2023). The European Court of Justice suspended their action, noting that restrictive measures should not affect the professional activities of a Russian as a racer. However, the EU Council ignored these decisions.
Nikita Mazepin appealed the sanctions to the EU court, which canceled them. The court justified its decision by the fact that the athlete’s family connection with his father is not a sufficient basis to consider him bound by common interests.
Mazepin Sr. had previously appealed the sanctions against himself, but the EU Court refused to do so. In making its decision, the court recalled that on the first day of a full-scale war, Dmitry Mazepin, along with other businessmen, attended a meeting with Vladimir Putin and other members of the Russian government, at which the consequences of Western sanctions for the Russian economy were discussed.
According to the court, the fact that Mazepin Sr. was invited to this meeting “shows that he is part of Putin’s inner circle and supports or implements actions that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”
Also on March 20, the Court of the European Union annulled the decision on sanctions against the Belarusian state-owned enterprise Belshina. True, they were not directly related to the war in Ukraine. The reason for their introduction was the massive repression of the Lukashenko regime against Belarusians who were dissatisfied with the falsification of the 2020 presidential elections. According to the court, the EU Council failed to prove that, as one of the leading state-owned enterprises in Belarus, Belshina represents a significant source of income for the Lukashenko regime, and that the Belarusian state directly benefits from the enterprise's income. Thus, Belshina, referring to financial documents, argued that before being included in the sanctions list it was an unprofitable enterprise that did not make a profit. The court also found insufficient evidence of Belshina’s participation in repressions against civil society.
In this regard, questions arise: how to evaluate such decisions?
“The EU Court is absolutely independent, and will not accept manipulation, much less any corrupt actions,” political strategist, director of the Situation Modeling Agency Vitaly Bala tells Apostrophe, “besides, I am confident in the correctness of the court’s decision regarding Mazepin . The younger Mazepin is not one of Putin’s close friends and, moreover, does not influence Putin’s decision-making.”
Mikhail Pashkov, co-head of the security program at the Razumkov Center, agrees with him.
“The EU Court of Justice is a collegial body and is unlikely to be subject to corruption from Russians or pressure from the EU. His decision can be completely trusted,” he noted in a comment to Apostrophe.
“The examples that I know of lifting sanctions against Russians are based on minimum standards of fairness. Public opinion in the West is guided by principles,” Mikhail Savva, an expert at the Center for Civil Liberties and human rights activist, explains to Apostrophe. “Let’s take the case of race car driver Mazepin. “A son is not responsible for his father,” a familiar phrase? Who's willing to bet? I am not ready. His father, a Russian billionaire, was not exempted from sanctions. And the elder Mazepin was included in the list of sanctions because he was at one of the meetings with Putin. Consequently, the criteria for applying sanctions are very strict and it is simply impossible to talk about corruption and any bias of the court.”
Are there no more war sponsors?
However, if the story with Mazepin Jr. can still be explained by “standards of justice,” then the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to close the page with the list of “international sponsors of the war” raises big questions. As noted on the Cabinet of Ministers website, the decision was made based on the results of a meeting attended by the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, the NAPC, the National Security and Defense Council, the Prosecutor General, the ambassadors of Italy, Japan, Austria, France, Hungary, Turkey, charge d'affaires of the embassies of the USA, Belgium, Finland , Greece and the EU Delegation in Ukraine, as well as representatives of the embassies of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Germany and China.
It is reported that at the meeting, the Foreign Ministry reported “on numerous appeals from representatives of the diplomatic corps of partner countries regarding the lack of a regulatory framework for the existence of the list and, accordingly, the negative impact of this list on the adoption of important decisions to counter Russian aggression.”
The Ministry of Justice decided to play along, declaring the unacceptability of disseminating such information on behalf of the state without resolving the issues at the legislative level. The National Security and Defense Council stated that there is already a State Register of Sanctions and other tools are not needed. NAPC, as noted in the message, agreed that there was no need for the site, which, by the way, was on their balance sheet.
Thus, it was decided to close the “international war sponsors” page, redirecting it to the State Register of Sanctions. And the information from the site will be transferred to the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Implementation of State Sanctions Policy to prepare further proposals for consideration by the National Security and Defense Council.
However, at the time of writing, the “international war sponsors” page on the NAPC website remained operational.
“The list of “International Sponsors of War” was an emotional reaction of the Ukrainian authorities to covert support for Russian aggression. Its creators initially viewed the list as a reputational tool. If a regulatory framework and transparent and objective criteria for inclusion in it had been created for this list, it would have been preserved and become a working tool for countering the maintenance of aggression. This didn’t work out,” explains Savva.
According to the expert, the rejection of this list is absolutely logical, since the criteria for supporting the war between Ukraine and the “collective West” are very different.
“The register of international sponsors of the war, which was maintained by the NAPC, is a kind of “list of shame.” This is like “Peacemaker”. This list does not have legal force, but it has a reputational impact on Western companies. It’s not for nothing that Hungary and Austria demanded that their banks OTP-Bank and Raiffeisen be excluded from the list,” says Vitaly Bala.
“On the other hand, our government does not have a clear understanding on this matter,” Bala continues. “Look, the French Auchan was on this list, but continued to operate in both Russia and Ukraine. Then what is the list for?
According to the expert, without the adoption of an appropriate law with clearly defined criteria, it is inappropriate to talk about who is included and who is not on this list.
“The NACP list is very sensitive for Western companies and, of course, it needs to be carefully justified, but the RNBO sanctions register, in my opinion, is more effective,” says Mikhail Pashkov.
However, all experts agree that the list of “international war sponsors” was necessary and played a positive role.
Refusal or not refusal
It is possible that it was also decided to close the register of “international war sponsors” in order to attract China to participate in the “global peace summit.” This is indirectly evidenced by a publication in Reuters. According to the publication’s interlocutors, the Ukrainian authorities were forced to take such a step under pressure from Austria, Hungary, China and France.
In addition, on March 20, at a briefing in Kiev after a meeting with US Presidential National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, the head of the Presidential Office Andrei Yermak said that he has “a cautious hope that China will also take part in this (peace formula summit – “Apostrophe”) participation.”
Closing the list of “international war sponsors” and lifting sanctions from some Russian citizens is not a total rejection of the sanctions policy, says Mikhail Savva.
“The simple idea to remember is that guilt must be confirmed. No guilt - no sanctions. Removing people from the list of sanctions, as far as I know, is a correction of mistakes, not a waiver of sanctions. Moreover, new sanctions packages are being prepared against Russian officials and organizations. For example, the Ukrainian human rights organization “Center for Civil Liberties” included in the developed “Strategy for the Release of Civilians” a proposal for a special package of sanctions for those guilty of illegal imprisonment of Ukrainian non-combatants,” concluded Mikhail Savva.
