Thursday, December 26, 2024
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"Pushkin" nuclear power engineer

The Ministry of Energy is pushing a bill on the purchase of Russian second-hand nuclear equipment for the completion of nuclear units in the Khmelnitsky region. Experts are sounding the alarm

The government plans to build two nuclear power units on the structures of the Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant built in the last century and install old Russian reactors there. Bulgaria is ready to sell them to Ukraine. It bought Russian equipment for its Belene nuclear power plant, but later abandoned the project. Energy Minister German Galushchenko assures that the deal with the Bulgarians is profitable. Galushchenko has repeatedly stated his intention to begin large-scale construction this year. That is, in the midst of a war, when the Khmelnitsky region regularly suffers from enemy air attacks.

Critics of the project have many arguments, and all of them are weighty. First of all, political ones. Of course, it is not a good idea to deal even indirectly with an aggressor country, especially in sensitive matters related to national security. In addition, Russia owns the design documentation for the units, and reactor plants of this type, VVER-1000 - a modification of the second generation reactor, have long been banned in Europe.

Reputable industry experts subject the very concept of the idea proposed by the minister to devastating, reasoned criticism. However, the Ministry of Energy continues to lobby for its bill “On the placement, design and construction of power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Khmelnytsky Nuclear Power Plant” and has already achieved some success. The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Energy and Housing and Communal Services at a meeting on June 17 expressed its warnings about this document, but despite everything, recommended that the parliament accept it as a basis in the first reading.

A consistent critic of the bill, MP Andrei Zhupanin generally questions Energoatom’s ability to build power units due to the company’s colossal financial problems. “Overall, this is a dangerous precedent. We ask Europe to impose sanctions on Russian natural and liquefied gas, and we ourselves want to buy Russian nuclear reactors,” says Zhupanin. “When I told Energy Minister German Galushchenko about this to his face, he replied: this is a Bulgarian reactor. This is a distorted logic, because then European partners, who do not like us very much, will start buying Russian gas from Bulgaria and claiming that it is Bulgarian. Or buy Russian oil in India.”

The implementation of this project, according to experts, will become one of the symbolic victories of the “Russian world” in the Ukrainian nuclear energy industry.

We ask Europe to impose sanctions on Russian natural and liquefied gas, and we ourselves want to buy Russian nuclear reactors in Bulgaria

“Opaque and without justification”

So, at a meeting on June 17, the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada considered the draft law “On the placement, design and construction of power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Khmelnytsky Nuclear Power Plant” submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers. Despite the fact that the document was approved, the committee’s conclusions, posted on the Verkhovna Rada website, contain a number of significant reservations. The committee’s verdict also contains a reference to the critical comments of the Main Scientific and Expert Directorate of the Verkhovna Rada, which in the explanatory note to the project, although tolerant, points out the shortcomings: “The bill requires a more detailed feasibility study, in particular, updating for 2024 indicators of the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated July 26, 2018 No. 579-r. “On approval of the feasibility study “Construction of power units No. 3, 4 of the Khmelnitsky NPP”, transparency of the use of funds during the completion of power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Khmelnytsky NPP, as well as the cost characteristics of auxiliary equipment and its delivery to the site to ensure the construction of power units.”

So, officials did not even bother to develop a feasibility study, but used old documentation prepared by Energoatom back in 2018.

Andrei Zhupanin told “Commander-in-Chief” that at a meeting of the parliamentary committee he tried to find out from Minister German Galushchenko and Energoatom President Pyotr Kotin how much money they plan to implement the project for? After all, the company does not have “free funds”; moreover, in recent years it has been suffering losses.

The deputy cited impressive figures from the information sheet prepared by the Ministry of Finance for the said meeting. So, based on the results of operations in 2022, Energoatom received losses of UAH 6.75 billion, and for 2023 - by UAH 8.9 billion. “As of January 1, 2024, the uncovered loss of NNEGC Energoatom is UAH 200.8 billion, and the debt on loans is UAH 42.5 billion; to the Guaranteed Buyer State Enterprise for the service of ensuring the availability of electricity for household consumers is about UAH 20 billion . Consequently, there are risks regarding the financial support of construction,” the Ministry of Finance document says.

Zhupanin recalled that Energoatom plans to purchase two reactors from Bulgaria “supposedly for only 650 million euros,” but “we do not know the final price at which these reactors can be sold to us; it is likely that the seller will begin to raise the price.” No one can really know the cost of the deal with the Bulgarians, the deputy emphasizes.

In general, the declared cost of the entire project is UAH 72 billion. But this estimate... was compiled in 2018. That's right. After all, this amount is indicated in the same “old” feasibility study for 2018, which officials submitted to parliament along with the bill in April of this year.

Andrey Zhupanin insists: taking into account inflationary processes, 72 billion in 2018 turned into approximately 135 billion UAH in 2024. “I took into account inflation over the past six years and came up with a figure of UAH 135 billion. But where can you get that kind of money? At Energoatom they answer: don’t worry, we are already reaching an agreement there. But how can one trust that some foreign bank or syndicate of banks will give Ukraine a loan in times of war? - the MP asks rhetorically. — We do not have any documentary evidence of any agreements. And how is it even possible to start a five-year contract for 135 billion UAH at a time when a full-scale war of attrition has been going on in Ukraine for the third year!”

It should be said that the bill is mercilessly criticized by authoritative experts, in particular, Nikolai Steinberg, who at one time was the chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine on Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy. Yuriy Kostenko, ex-Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine, also spoke in the Glavkom with a sharply critical article.

Rosatom junk? Experts' arguments

Almost 20 years have passed since the government adopted the first decree “On preparatory measures for the construction of new KhNPP power units” in 2005. Since then, the financial wheel has started spinning - hundreds of millions of hryvnias were spent annually on preparatory work, but the result was zero. “Why so long? Why to no avail? Has anyone analyzed why everything failed?” - asks Nikolai Steinberg in a note on Facebook - It is necessary to clarify some points that people’s deputies should take into account so that the project prepared by the government becomes an effective law, and not a piece of paper sent to the archive, because this is not the first law on the construction of blocks No. 3 and No. 4 at KhNPP."

The expert considers it unacceptable to build nuclear power units using VVER-1000, a pressurized water power reactor that was designed in the late 60s of the last century. “This reactor installation belongs to the second generation of nuclear power reactors. Today, generation 3+ nuclear installations are being implemented all over the world... Modern units use more advanced reactor installations, equipped with fundamentally new safety systems, which also take into account the experience of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The cycle of technology renewal today is measured in years, not decades and, especially, not centuries,” Steinberg emphasizes.

“Glavkom” asked German Galushchenko why he chose the old Russian-made VVER-1000 reactors, and received quite the answer.

“VVER technology, which is used in the construction of power units, is not a purely Russian technology, since it was developed during the existence of the USSR. A large number of Ukrainian scientists and nuclear scientists were involved in its development. Taking this into account, our state is capable of not only independently operating the relevant power units, but also building them,” the minister responded to the Commander-in-Chief’s request.

Industry experts consider the position of the head of the Ministry of Energy unconvincing. They argue: without the participation of Rosatom, it is almost impossible to complete the construction of nuclear power units in Ukraine - only the Russian monopolist has all the design documentation. In particular, the former first vice-president of Energoatom, laureate of the State Prize in the field of science and technology, Alexander Shavlakov, recently spoke about this in an interview with the Commander-in-Chief.

Let us recall that after the annexation of Crimea, the 2012 law on the completion of power units at the Khmelnitsky NPP using Russian nuclear units, as well as the corresponding intergovernmental agreement with Russia, was annulled by the Verkhovna Rada.

In addition, it turned out that the structures built more than 30 years ago at the Khmelnitsky NPP for the construction of power units No. 3 and No. 4 were not designed for the modification of the reactor that Galushchenko now plans to buy in Bulgaria.

“Based on the basic VVER-1000 design, VVER-1000/V-187 projects were implemented in the former Union and other countries; B302; B338, etc. There is also an unrealized modification of the B-466. It was intended for Bulgaria (Belene NPP). Yes, these are exactly those unbuilt units, the equipment of which Energoatom plans to use for units No. 3 and 4. The question arises: with what reactor installation does Energoatom plan to build new units at KhNPP? In the 2012 law on the construction of power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the KhNPP (law No. 5217-VI dated April 6, 2012), it was stated that each power unit houses a reactor plant of the VVER-1000/V-392 type,” states the former chairman of the State Committee for nuclear and radiation safety.

No less bizarre in the bill is the proposal, or rather, the task for the government: “to ensure the modification of power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Khmelnytsky NPP to enable them to operate using nuclear fuel using American technology.” This narrative caused irony from non-armchair experts. “We haven’t built it yet, but are we already modernizing it? Isn’t it easier and cheaper to take modernization into account in the design process?” suggests Nikolai Steinberg.

This discrepancy was also noticed by specialists of the Main Scientific and Expert Directorate of the Verkhovna Rada, in whose conclusions to the bill we read: “... The approach according to which it is proposed to build power units according to characteristics that require their “modification” in advance, which in this case can be done, is quite debatable. regarded as a modification of existing power units with the appearance of new features and properties.”

“There are also questions about the technical condition of the Bulgarian reactors, which have stood for decades,” says Andrei Zhupanin. “As far as I know, they are incomplete, because there are not enough turbines. And the question also arises about the possibility of putting into operation the constructed power units. This cannot be done unless the licensee who has a license for this technology - and this is a subsidiary of Rosatom - does not come and check, that is, confirm that the technology is working, and give permission for its operation. Again, the minister answers: the main thing is, you vote, we have a lot of specialists, we will sort it out.”

Long way to nowhere

The leadership of the Ministry of Energy, against all odds, hopes that the parliament will pass the bill, but in the response of German Galushchenko, received to the “Commander in Chief” request, it is not specified whether the inconsistencies and contradictory positions mentioned above will be removed from the document.

“The decision to build power units No. 3 and No. 4 of the Khmelnitsky NPP is extremely important, because nuclear generation is the basis of Ukraine’s energy stability... The adoption of the above-mentioned law will allow Ukraine to begin completing the construction of power units, increase generation capacity by 2200 MW... Unit No. 3 is already 80% ready and can to be completed in 2.5-3 years,” the minister assures.

Industry experts are convinced that the deadlines mentioned by Galushchenko are unrealistic. This is the opinion, in particular, of Alexander Shavlakov, who in an interview with Glavkom explained that until now the best example of rapid construction in the world was the power unit at the Fuqing nuclear power plant in China, which was built in six years, “from the first peg to switching on.” to the network." “So there can be no question of any 2.5 years of construction of two units at the Khmelnitsky NPP,” Shavlakov emphasized.

The construction of units No. 3 and 4 at the Khmelnitsky NPP began back in 1985. In 1990, work was stopped due to the announcement by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants. By that time, the construction of all station facilities to ensure the operation of the Khmelnitsky NPP with four power units had been completed. Now the construction readiness of the third block is 75%, the fourth - 28%. The blocks were planned to be built using old designs - they planned to install Russian-made VVER-1000 reactors there - they are usually called Russian-design reactors.

To select performers in 2008, Ukraine announced an international tender. The American company Westinghouse withdrew its proposal for the AR-1000 reactor, because it did not plan to build units on old structures. Apart from the Russians, no one agreed to build units on structures that had stood in the open air for more than two decades and were designed for a second-generation reactor - the VVER-1000/V-320 project (the construction of second-generation reactors has long been prohibited in EU countries).

In 2014, Ukraine refused to cooperate with the Russian company Rosatom.

At KhNPP, where two VVER-1000 power units are currently operating, it is also planned to build two more units from scratch (X-5 and X-6), where Westinghouse nuclear reactors will be installed. That is, in total it is planned to build four new power units.

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Source Glavkom
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