Five key challenges for Ukraine in 2024 in the context of resistance to Russian invasion

At the end of 2023, the Russian occupiers continued to conduct offensive operations in a number of areas in the East and South of Ukraine, trying to seize the initiative and with the goal of forcing the Ukrainian Defense Forces to switch to strategic defense along the entire line of combat contact.

The almost continuous pressure on Avdiivka was somewhat reminiscent of the end of 2022, when the idea of ​​the capture of Bakhmut by the Moscow occupiers turned into an obsessive, painful mantra of the Kremlin dictator and began to be transmitted in a chain reaction to groups in Ukraine, to each invader.

In December, Putin’s rhetoric noticeably changed - towards cynical and sardonic statements, he became more confident against the backdrop of the successful mobilization of sentiment in the Russian Federation, the silent readiness to die at the front of the vast majority of those mobilized and, to a certain extent, successful steps to transfer the Russian economy to a war footing.

An analysis of the current situation on the Russian-Ukrainian front, and even more, an analysis of events on the international stage, which has become the main battlefield of the Russian-Ukrainian war, allows us to draw conclusions regarding the key challenges for 2024.

The first vice-president of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, academician Vladimir Gorbulin and the director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Research Valentin Badrak, identified the five most significant challenges, which, in their opinion, are directly related to the fate of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation - they are listed and briefly justified in hierarchical order - from the most dangerous to those aimed at ensuring the future of the state, including during a likely long-term confrontation.

First. Consistency of assistance from Western partners in ensuring the stability of the Ukrainian state.

In fact, from the beginning of October 2023, a political crisis began in the United States, which led to dire consequences at the end of the year.

The US Congress was unable to accept $110.5 billion in foreign aid by the end of 2023, of which $61 billion was provided directly for Ukraine. Both the delay of aid itself and the growing risk of a complete refusal by Congress to provide aid have existential significance for Ukraine and could affect the course of the war. In addition, the EU also had difficulties approving aid for Ukraine - the association did not agree on the allocation of an aid package of 50 billion euros as a result of blocking the decision by the head of the Hungarian government, Orban.

At the end of December 2023, calculations by the Institute of World Economics at Kiel University[1] were published, according to which the amount of new promised Western aid to Ukraine decreased by almost 90% compared to 2022. Already in December, Ukrainian troops faced a shortage of artillery shells and curtailed some military operations due to a lack of foreign aid.

At a time when, in mid-December, Washington had only $1 billion left to help Ukraine, Europe, against the backdrop of the American crisis, began to significantly increase its efforts to compensate. And as of the beginning of December 2023, 29 countries provided more assistance to their financial capabilities than the United States - the total amount of US support was no longer dominant, 55% of all assistance to Ukraine as a whole was provided not from the United States. Some of the European partners have taken very significant steps.

In particular, Germany pledged to increase military assistance from 4 to 8 billion euros in 2024 and, among other things, to supply Ukraine with almost 200 thousand artillery shells - this is a fifth of the ammunition obligations of the entire EU (!). The UK will also not reduce military assistance to Ukraine in 2024, but on the contrary, will transfer it to a multi-year basis

Likewise, a number of relatively small countries have made strong contributions. For example, the Netherlands confirmed plans to transfer the first 18 fighters of the promised F-16 fighters to Ukraine at the beginning of 2024 (direct transfer was considered even before the end of 2023). In addition, the Netherlands is preparing assistance worth 2 billion euros for 2024. Similar steps were taken by other countries, for example, Finland announced the allocation of assistance in the amount of 1.6 billion euros.

And yet, the big question is whether European countries will be able to fully ensure the timely replenishment of Ukraine’s defense potential in the event of a US refusal. From various statements and assessments it is possible to create a true panorama of what is happening and what may happen.

December 2023 was the month of the highest temperature, when various experts or media calculated how long Ukraine could hold out without Western help. Many publications were addressed to Western politicians as incentives for correct decisions, but the situation really looked very contradictory. Perhaps the most typical material is the conclusion of the CNN editorial team, which referred to unnamed Western officials: Ukraine could lose the war by the summer of 2024 if the United States does not provide additional assistance.

In addition, it is impossible to talk about assistance to Ukraine without mentioning that Kyiv needs not only help with weapons. 74% of defense spending for 2024 included salaries for personnel and other social expenses - without these allocations it is almost impossible to wage a successful war. The experts were well aware of this. The head of the International Monetary Fund, Kristalina Georgieva, said in December that Ukraine can survive without financial assistance for only a few months; she also called on Ukraine’s allies to unlock tens of billions of dollars for Kyiv as quickly as possible.

So the issue of assistance, as well as its quality (the content of packages that should contain more technologically advanced weapons and ammunition) remains the main factor in the stability of the nation and the deterrence of such a powerful enemy, which remains nuclear Russia.

Second. The ability to mobilize Ukrainian society.

President Zelensky called the topic of mobilization “very sensitive” during his press conference on December 19. Not unreasonably. Without the devotion and patriotism of people, the conscious unity of the entire nation around the fight against a deadly enemy, it is impossible to win a war. According to the president, the military intends to mobilize about 450-500 thousand people into the army, and it is possible that the conscription age will be reduced to 25 years.

This topic is extremely unpleasant for the head of state - unpopular decisions always hit his political rating. This is probably why, during his press conference on December 19, he was forced to talk about mobilization at some length, sending the ball of his rhetoric to the “military” (probably the military command), the “government,” and “society” (when it came to the possibility of a legislative settlement mobilization of women and lowering the age to 25) - looked like a probing of public sentiment, and not as a bitter recognition of the problem by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The intention of the head of state to shift responsibility for difficult decisions to the executive and legislative branches only emphasized the danger of the very challenge to the state. And the topic is so unpleasant that the leadership recommended that deputies from the pro-government Servant of the People faction avoid commenting on the bill introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers to the Verkhovna Rada to improve mobilization and military registration, and all questions should be forwarded to the military command.

This approach forced the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhny, for the first time since his appointment to the post, to hold his own press conference on December 26, during which he clearly outlined the powers of the General Staff in terms of forming decisions on mobilization and on specific numbers of needs: “The military command has not made a single request did it based on some numbers.

The military command continues to perform the function of protecting the state and, accordingly, forms its requests. This is done on an ongoing basis, and we do not carry it out in some separate format, as an event for the Cabinet of Ministers or the Verkhovna Rada. As for this figure, we formed it for next year; it, of course, takes into account the coverage of the current kit, the formation of new military units, as well as forecasting our losses that we may suffer in 2024.

I cannot voice the figures regarding each of these indicators. This is a military secret."[11] The general added that the General Staff is not vested with the right of legislative initiative, so it did not submit any documents to the government. He also announced the ability of the military command to provide training for 10 brigades, which to a certain extent reflects the expectations of the military command regarding the volume of mobilization.

In the last days of the year, the command of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces decided on the categories of citizens for mobilization. But even in the conditions of legislative regulation of all controversial issues of mobilization, achieving this task will not be easy.

On the one hand, the military has already openly reported on the problems with people at the front, or rather, with the number of army personnel. “The volunteers are over,” summarized the authoritative Major General of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Dmitry Marchenko in the last days of December 2023, while “Ukraine needs replenishment at the front, otherwise the country risks losing the war of independence.”

The required number will be recruited during 2024, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Alexey Danilov calmly explained the situation. All these statements, as well as the content of the ROM, indicate a noticeable decrease in motivation and the need for measures to strengthen it. The issue of sensitive regulation of all issues of mobilization - towards more stringent approaches to recruiting and forming troops - has become absolutely fair and necessary.

However, this is far from all. It is necessary to resolve a number of issues, ranging from the preparation of mobilized personnel (and timing, content, and organization of this process) to clearer and stricter management of the use of personnel (personnel). The issue of management is mentioned because of the voluntarism that exists in the troops, when the senior commander transfers some of the people of a unit that is being formed, trained, and is at the stage of developing coherence, to other units.

In this way, the current work of commanders is leveled out, the psychological atmosphere is disrupted, and planning is destroyed. This creates conditions of a certain mistrust, as was previously the case in the Territorial Defense Forces, some of whose fighters could easily be “snatched” from the unit and transferred to others - as assigned personnel. There is also the issue of commanders’ responsibility for assigned units or provided personnel (the latter should be eradicated from the practice of command and control).

Despite the fact that from December 30, 2022, Ukrainians abroad were required to register for military service with diplomatic institutions, there were no significant positive changes during the year. The authorities quite reasonably began to resort to more decisive steps, including looking for people to mobilize in gyms and restaurants.

Due to the worsening situation around the mobilization, Vadim Ivchenko, a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, said that Ukrainians abroad who have not registered for military service may have their consular and banking services limited. According to him, all men must receive, say, a military registration card and must undergo “re-identification in the TCC” - either this is a people’s deputy, or this is an official, or this is any other “armored” person.

In addition to these intentions, it would be extremely important for the authorities not to forget about the Ukrainian rich from the so-called “Monaco battalion” - in the sense of attracting them and their resources, with the corresponding legislative definition of measures in relation to them, from blocking financial assets to confiscations in favor of war.

Due to the worsening situation around the mobilization, Vadim Ivchenko, a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, said that Ukrainians abroad who have not registered for military service may have their consular and banking services limited. According to him, all men must receive, say, a military registration card and must undergo “re-identification in the TCC” - either this is a people’s deputy, or this is an official, or this is any other “armored” person.

In addition to these intentions, it would be extremely important for the authorities not to forget about the Ukrainian rich from the so-called “Monaco battalion” - in the sense of attracting them and their resources, with the corresponding legislative definition of measures in relation to them, from blocking financial assets to confiscations in favor of war.

It seems that the LPA in this form will not turn into law, but all the conditions have been created for the designated dialogue, which forms the framework for fair mobilization. Because, on the one hand, due to the difficult situation at the front, one cannot delay in replenishing the army personnel, and on the other hand, one cannot allow the situation that occurred earlier.

In particular, so that some people would die in heavy battles, while the other part would at the same time relax carefree in expensive restaurants. It is impossible to allow the absence of government representatives among the mobilized children and relatives - such a imbalance in the implementation of the decision will certainly lead to sharply negative sentiments in society in relation to harsh mobilization measures.

At this time, the authorities simply need to demonstrate that the issue of mobilization concerns the entire society. Even more than rest in the middle of war, society and the expert community are concerned about the interference of politicians and officials in the work of the military command. Irresponsible statements about the expected results of the offensive, and then even more destructive assessments of the offensive itself, contribute to the division of society and create a precedent for reducing trust in the authorities.

The enemy’s information and propaganda structures are trying to take advantage of the latter by conducting large-scale IPSO. That is why, even more than the law, an honest and frank discussion between the authorities and the people is needed - with an end to the division of society into the “untouchable caste” and everyone else. It should be recognized that the ruling party “Servant of the People” and the entourage of the head of state significantly compromised themselves during the global war of 2022-2023 (this has already provoked numerous publications and broadcasts), which is why there is a significant drop in President Zelensky’s rating.

But the question is not at all about ratings, but about the direct and real attitude of the domestic politician to the mobilization, motivation and unity of society in extremely difficult times for the country. To win a war, you need, above all, people who are competent and motivated. In this context, it becomes obvious that without a reboot of power, without changes in the attitude of the head of state towards his environment, it is difficult to imagine significant positive changes in society, and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of mobilization. Since the level of tension in society can be assessed at the end of 2023 as very high.

Third. Ukraine’s ability to transfer the economy to a military footing and shift the center of gravity in rearmament inside the country.

Of course, we are not talking about direct competition with Russia in matters of building up defense potential - the capabilities of the two states are not comparable. However, a sharp increase in production of at least a few of the most sensitive positions - missiles, various drones (BAC, NRK, MRK), electronic warfare - can ensure the country’s survival for some time, as well as demonstrate to partners in the West an example of the nation’s exceptional resilience.

Certain statements and significant decisions have already appeared, which, first of all, indicate the authorities’ full understanding of this challenge and readiness to act. However, the need of the hour is to act urgently, systematically and continuously. And most importantly, pushing aside everything that does not relate to war and confrontation with the enemy - various construction projects, expensive and dubious TV series, impressive personal enrichment and investments of representatives of the current government in valuable estates.

Technological, industrial and resource mobilization is very important. For example, the military has already decided that FPV drones will partially cover the likely shortage of artillery shells in 2024. In this context, President Zelensky’s announcement of his intention to produce one million FPV drones by 2024 is not only timely, but also necessary to maintain the life of the army.

However, for this, Ukraine needs to increase the production of FPV drones by almost 67% - this cannot be achieved with the wave of a magic wand. In addition to identifying executing companies, huge financial resources are needed. Experts have already made rough calculations: if we take the conditional price of the FPV drone itself (without taking into account ammunition or, for example, night cameras) at $500, then $500 million will be needed for 1 million.

At the same time, the state budget for 2024 provides 43 billion hryvnia for the purchase of all types of drones (Minister for Strategic Industry of Ukraine Kamyshin supplemented the head of state with the following message: in 2024, in addition to FPV drones, Ukraine is going to produce more than 10 thousand medium-range attack drones, as well as more than one thousand drones with a range of 1000 km; Ukraine also has more than 50 public and private ones; companies involved in the production of ammunition for drones). Therefore, such a “drone” task requires more funds than planned. And, in addition to drones, there are also issues of developing missiles, electronic warfare equipment and other things.

Where to find resources is an extraordinary and extremely pressing question. In addition to direct assistance, which has stalled, there may be other sources. Thus, the United States has already begun urgent negotiations on the use of frozen Russian money. In the West, the frozen funds of the Russian central bank are estimated at a tidy sum - more than $300 billion. However, obtaining such funds is a lot of painstaking work, the results of which will definitely not be immediate.

The need to audit all other expenses is quite obvious. Economists indicate that in 2022 Ukraine spent approximately 20% of GDP on the war; in 2023, spending increased by approximately 30% of GDP. Let's say Russia has planned expenditures of about 40% of GDP for 2024. But during the Second World War, the spending pattern was somewhat different: in 1942-43, Great Britain spent 52 - 55% of GDP, Germany - 64 - 70% of GDP, the USSR - more than 60% of GDP. So, it is quite clear that we are not yet close to peak war spending. By the way, experts insist that it is impossible to finance a war only by increasing taxes; at the same time, it is necessary to limit consumption and stop the illegal flight of capital.

The Ukrainian government favors external borrowing, while economists point to Britain's experience of domestic borrowing during the war, when the budget deficit more than doubled spending, as an interesting example. At the same time, the main source of covering the deficit—up to 70%—was long-term loans. In total, during the war years, Britain's long-term loans exceeded 10 billion pounds sterling, of which only about three billion as of 1945 were external, the rest internal.

That is, the main financial source of the war for Britain became the wealthy British themselves. They remember two important factors: the state persistently convinced the population of the need to save - against the backdrop of real restrictions on spending. In other words, it would be impossible for British judges and parliamentarians, like Ukrainian ones, to carry out valuable purchases, invest in real estate and valuable “movable” property.

In this context, it would be interesting to know whether the richest Ukrainians (for example, Rinat Akhmetov, Petro Poroshenko or Victor Pinchuk) are ready to lend the state part of their own funds for military expenses? What about the deputies and representatives of President Zelensky’s “golden” entourage?

By the way, this question is not only for the rich, because the fact that the population of Ukraine purchased $10 billion worth of foreign currency in 2022 is not indicative, and in 2023 this figure may increase very significantly. Financiers cite data from academician Danylyshyn - that the population had $115 billion in their hands as of mid-2023. According to the mentioned economists, the loan from Ukrainians could increase from $700 million at the end of 2023 to $20-40 billion.

Unfortunately, Ukraine actually ignored another powerful source - Lend-Lease, hoping for help that would not need to be returned (although much of Lend-Lease, in particular equipment lost during the fighting, would also hardly need to be returned - this is the subject of legal approaches when preparing an agreement).

All this creates conditions for a certain revision and improvement of the policy for obtaining the use of financial resources.

Fourth. Ukraine’s ability to make the most successful use of military-technical cooperation opportunities for rearmament, including within the framework of bilateral agreements on security guarantees.

We have already spoken a lot about the potential of military-technical cooperation, including mentioning the implementation and prospects of specific projects with foreign states or global companies. Among other things, this issue also has a hidden effect - in particular, the arrival of specific “military businesses” in Ukraine will not only open up access to new technologies and stimulate the construction of “protected” enterprises (this has been worked out before, for example, in Dnepr, the Dneprovsky Machine-Building Plant was built “several floors down,” underground), but it can also attract global companies to the Ukrainian market.

This has been done for a long time in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. And if, say, there is a lot of talk about Poland in the information space, then not everyone knows about Hungary. Against the backdrop of the stubbornness of the Orban government and its blocking of Ukraine’s interests (practically in favor of the Russian Federation), Western European business does not neglect such opportunities.

Examples will be useful for Ukraine. In mid-December, the German defense concern Rheinmetall, as part of the European air and missile defense program SkyShield, signed a contract with Hungary for the conceptual development of a new air defense system worth 30 million euros - we are talking about creating a modification of the Skyranger 30 turret air defense system for integration into combat vehicles Lynx family infantry.

A little earlier, the Hungarian government signed a contract with Rheinmetall for the development of a main battle tank based on the latest prototype Panther KF51 EVO for the amount (development and completion of serial production) of 288 million euros.

These examples were chosen to prove that the path outlined by Ukraine has been or is being passed by those countries that actually do not have their own defense industry, or are significantly inferior to Ukraine. But Ukraine is a unique country! And powerful science, and a strong defense industry, and a powerful presence on the world arms market, and the large-scale war itself, which made the country a powerful market. The very arrival of businesses is already becoming part of the security guarantees, as steps are being taken to protect it.

The main points as of the beginning of 2024 are the beginning of the implementation of military-technical cooperation projects (which indicates that things have moved from statements of intentions towards the practical plane) and the readiness of a certain number of countries to include issues of military-technical cooperation and technological exchange in the relevant documents, which have already received the code name - "security guarantees".

In 2023, Ukraine was already on the verge of implementing two powerful projects with the United States - the joint production on Ukrainian territory of 155-mm shells and the project for the production of FrankenSAM air defense systems (which will allow the combination of modern surface-to-air missiles with Soviet-era launchers) .

Significant shifts occurred in 2023 with Britain and Germany. It is planned to conclude a 10-year security pact (memorandum) with Britain, within the framework of which Ukraine’s naval capabilities can be significantly strengthened, including the ability to control the Black Sea to a certain extent. The British defense giant BAE Systems and AMS Integrated Solutions Ltd have already signed an agreement for the maintenance of British-developed artillery systems, namely the M777, M119/L119 howitzers, as well as the L-131 (AS-90) self-propelled artillery systems, as well as for the maintenance and repair of equipment other countries.

Ukrainian specialists will work at the enterprise in Ukraine, which will be the first step towards the integration of the defense industry into the Western industrial space. Back in October 2023, Rheinmetall and the Ukrainian Defense Industry created a joint venture, so starting in 2024, the military-technical cooperation will be filled with content - after mastering the maintenance and repair of vehicles, the stage of manufacturing Fuchs armored transport vehicles should begin.

The same projects to the previously mentioned agreements are starting with Sweden (an agreement was concluded with the Swedish defense giant Saab, which produces Gripen aircraft and NLAW ATGMs, Carl Gustaf grenade launchers, Giraffe radar), France (Antonov State Enterprise and the French company Turgis&Gaillard signed an agreement on joint production combat drone Aarok MALE), Estonia (with the company Milrem Robotics they will jointly produce robotic vehicles THeMIS Combat) and others.

The main thing is to realize that the Western world is determined to promote step-by-step projects, from simple to highly complex and high-tech. For example, this is clearly seen from the messages of the German company Rheinmetall, which announces the joint production of light armored vehicles of a not very new modification, like the Fuchs armored personnel carrier. Then, obviously, the company will offer joint production of the tank (although an agreement has already been concluded on the joint production of a new tank with Hungary). And only then will we be able to move on to the latest systems, like the Skynex air defense system.

In addition, work is underway to develop security guarantees for Ukraine on the part of its partners, the goal of which is to create a reliable system for strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities to ensure its, and therefore pan-European, security. The EU is working on a draft long-term commitment to Ukraine in the security and defense sector - a framework document that, among other things, includes intelligence exchange, cooperation in the defense industry, training of the Ukrainian military, assistance in implementing European integration reforms, etc. This document should complement bilateral Ukraine's agreements on guarantees with individual EU members. In addition, Ukraine is negotiating with representatives of the G7 regarding agreements on military and economic assistance.

But what should security guarantees look like for Ukraine so that they are not a declarative action, but a real, effective tool? A full guarantee of Ukraine's security is its membership in NATO. Since this option is now unrealistic, an initiative has emerged to develop security guarantees for Ukraine in order to ensure its stability and ability to repel aggression until the moment when Ukraine receives the desired membership. The idea of ​​security guarantees should be to transform Ukraine into such a strong state, superior to the enemy, that this would ensure a situation where further aggression against Ukraine is impossible. Their key aspect should be a clear definition by the guarantors of material and technical assistance and the integration of their defense industry with the Ukrainian one.

The model of security guarantees for Israel is indicative in this context. This is exactly the format that would be acceptable for Ukraine. Israel not only received more than $3 billion in aid from the United States annually, but also carried out joint developments with them. The results of such cooperation are used both in Israel and in the United States. A prime example is the Arrow missile defense system. Using such a model, Ukraine would become not only a developer of advanced weapons together with leading countries, but also a participant in supplies. In addition to increasing defense capability, technological development and weapons production would contribute to the economic development of Ukraine. And a strong economy is one of the factors for strengthening security.

Obtaining military technology from partners is a key component of security guarantees for Ukraine. For example, to effectively repel a Russian invasion, Ukraine critically needs long-range missiles, which neither the United States nor Germany agree to transfer. Ukraine is independently developing its missile program and has the production capacity. Obtaining the necessary technologies from partners would allow Ukraine to produce such missiles itself.

Also with technologies for creating powerful drones at the operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels, the latest air defense systems, modern ammunition, etc. In addition to access to technology, military-technical production played an important role in ensuring security for Ukraine - in the form of joint developments and joint production And Ukraine is already implementing joint projects that could become the initial element of guarantors as well. Now we have interim solutions that must be transformed into a systemic solution, enshrined in agreements on security guarantees.

Not only the content, but also the form of security guarantees is important. It is extremely important that they not only contain clearly defined data on the content of assistance, but also be legally formalized with fixed obligations and approved by the parliaments of the guarantor countries, so that in the event of a change of government or political course in a particular country, the provided guarantees continue to be implemented.

For example, an agreement on security guarantees from France could be prepared before the end of the year. However, there are certain nuances that make it unacceptable for Ukraine. First, France does not define clear obligations and does not record any figures for the provision of support. Secondly, the agreement is not going to be approved in parliament, which automatically turns it into a declaration of intent. The example of a change in power in Slovakia and the Netherlands proves how dramatically the policy of providing military aid can change.

Providing security guarantees to Ukraine is beneficial, first of all, to the guarantors themselves. Ukraine has significant experience and material resources for the development and production of weapons. In addition, it operates in the global arms market. Therefore, the joint development of the defense industry would not be just an investment in the development of Ukraine’s capabilities, but a mutually beneficial cooperation.

In addition, Ukraine actually defends the eastern flank of NATO and pays for it with the blood of its people. Therefore, providing security guarantees to Ukraine is, first of all, ensuring European countries’ own security. This is important given Russia's aggressive intentions towards the Baltic countries or Eastern Europe. According to statements by the head of the Polish intelligence service, Russia will be ready to attack NATO countries in three years. We expect such readiness of Russia within two to two and a half years. When we talk about security guarantees, we are not talking about Europeans defending Ukraine with arms in hand. The point is that they provide Ukraine with the opportunity to defend itself, and thus Ukraine will, de facto, defend Europe.

Fifth. Ukraine’s ability to mobilize science as much as possible to achieve technological advantages over the enemy.

This challenge, more than others, is aimed at the future. But it carries extraordinary semantic weight, because we are talking about ensuring a long-term confrontation with a hostile Russia, where revanchist sentiments will certainly grow. This challenge retains weight even in such a “bitter” scenario for the nation as the freezing of the conflict. Because, of course, maintaining the criminal Putin regime means only one thing - him. But this means giving the Russian Federation time to restore its military potential.

Ensuring a long-term confrontation with the enemy is possible only if one understands how technological renewal occurs at the front. In this sense, it is extremely important for Ukraine to accelerate the development of weapons based on new physical principles - electronic warfare, electromagnetic and laser weapons, systems for accelerated information processing and data transmission. And there is much more that may not only correspond to the philosophy of making the army “faster, more accurate and more powerful.” But it is also inconspicuous and uses weapons against the enemy, the principles of operation of which he is not able to understand.

It seems appropriate here to give an exact example of how the military themselves at the front see technological change. Here is the opinion of the commander of the 2nd assault battalion of the 3rd Special Brigade Dmitry Kukharchuk: “They began to use unmanned aerial vehicles much more often both for reconnaissance and for fire destruction. They fly in swarms. The war is moving to a new technological phase and has become a drone war. I can make a guess... UAVs are at their peak in use right now.

In the future, I think, it’s just that, both on our side and on their side, the rapid development of electronic warfare will begin, and at a certain point this will either be stopped or will not have such a big meaning - that is, we will return to classical war.” A very clear and relevant vision. Perhaps, with the exception of the last phrase, about “a return to classical warfare,” because technological development is so rapid that something new will definitely appear. And this will be the case all the time: the enemy adapts to changes in our tactics, constantly looking for new techniques and methods of conducting combat operations - we do the same.

Here are some arguments that relate specifically to this challenge. While we are only hoping for joint production with Rheinmetall of the modern Skynex air defense system, in 2023 the company demonstrated the newest version of the now unmanned Ripsaw platform - in the form of a kind of “mini air defense tank”, and even remotely controlled and capable of being combined into a network of air defense systems.

Here is a slightly different vector of technology development. In September 2023, the US Army received its first four advanced DE M-SHORAD short-range directed maneuver energy air defense systems. These latest 50-kilowatt laser weapon systems on Raytheon's Stryker are designed to destroy drones, missiles, artillery shells and aircraft.

Also in September 2023, the British Army began the process of adopting a new laser air defense system from Raytheon UK[30]. The high-energy laser system is designed to destroy drones - it will operate on the basis of the Wolfhound armored vehicle to provide immediate protection to units from such a mass threat.

We have to agree that it looks convincing. So much so that Putin demanded the same weapons. On December 19, 2023, during a speech at the board of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the bloody dictator announced that he was going to arm the occupying army with combat lasers and robots with artificial intelligence. I have already given the corresponding order...

So, to win, we must be proactive. To move ahead, society must unite and rally around the fight against the enemy. The survival of the nation and the fate of Ukraine are being decided right now, and victory over the enemy is in the hands of Ukrainians.

And to conclude the analysis of the challenges, we cannot help but note that the “defeat of Ukraine” is the worst scenario not only for the Ukrainian nation, but for the whole of Europe, and perhaps for the whole world, if viewed through the prism of China’s ambitions. After all, unexpectedly, security observers have already “drawn” a probable model of further events. Namely, if Putin's Kremlin attacks the Baltic states or other NATO members, such as Poland, the bloc will likely send troops. “But as soon as a few hundred Western soldiers die, right-wing parties will demand “peace”—negotiations with Putin.” This conclusion is very similar to reality...

...The truth is that Putin did not win a single victory in 2023. But the risks of 2024 have increased significantly. Much depends on the unity of the West, on the unity of the world’s support for Ukraine. Perhaps peace and prosperity on the continent and in the world.