The enemy is trying to pass off wishful thinking. However, we should not downplay the threat posed by the resource federation of Muscovy
As always, the devil is in the details. Therefore, let’s try to sort out the current so-called “pain points” of the occupation-terrorist continent of the Russian Federation.
Last week, Western experts published an analysis that created a lot of noise in the information space. After all, it was about Russia’s intention to fight with Ukraine for another 10 years - until the complete destruction of our statehood
However, as people say, wanting does not mean doing. Before considering this issue more deeply, we note: experts began to draw such conclusions after a statement by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Medvedev
It is surprising that in the 3rd year of a full-scale war, Western analysts continue to pay attention to the words of such a character, given his absurdity and inadequacy. On the other hand, in parallel with this, material appeared on the pages of The Economist, which described in a fairly concise form what The Russian Federation will already experience an acute shortage of equipment in 2025, since the enemy’s warehouses and storage centers are empty
A very important nuance - the Russian occupation forces are already experiencing a shortage, and in 2025 it will become critical and will radically affect the degree of supply of mechanized components to the troops. Thus, we have 2 mutually exclusive materials from Western analysts
- one predicts that the Russian Federation is ready to fight for at least another 10 years
- another is that its resource will be radically depleted next year
To understand who is right, we need to consider the potential of the Russian military-industrial complex and the possibility of replenishing the Russian army with both human resources and equipment necessary to continue the war. So, let's begin.
Human resource
When they talk about human resources in relation to Russia, they often claim that they are infinite, but this is not so, since nothing is infinite. Although it must be admitted that the potential is very large compared to most countries in the world; in addition, the mobilization potential of the Russian Federation is influenced by its repressive system
And how did the rate of losses among the Russian occupation forces and the area of capture of Ukrainian territory change during 2022-2024? Let us recall these indicators below
- 2022 Personnel - 92,920 (34,550 in the first six months of the war) 63.9 thousand km² captured
- 2023 Personnel - 253,290 (122,150 from January 1 to June 30 - an increase of 3.5 times) Total losses during the year increased by 2.7 times Captured 683 km²
- 2024 (from January 1 to June 30) Personnel - 183,800 (5.3 times increase) 752 km² captured In fact, now the enemy’s offensive is estimated at the loss of one occupier on 2.5-4 m² of Ukrainian territory
According to the dynamics of the growth of losses, the year 2024 for the occupation forces may end (provided that the current intensity of hostilities remains unchanged) within 400 thousand personnel. That is, the average rate of Russian losses per month will consistently exceed 30-35 thousand occupiers
This trend already this year is forcing the Russian Federation to mobilize from 35 to 40 thousand monthly for the war in Ukraine. In turn, the limit of Russia’s mobilization system is 60-70 thousand per month, and anything higher overloads it
A striking example is the partial mobilization of 2022, when 100 thousand per month were herded into the occupation-terrorist contingent. So, even if we take the approximate average loss per year - 300 thousand, then in 10 years in the Russian Federation 3 million should be mobilized only to compensate for losses
There are currently 530 thousand occupiers involved in the fighting in Ukraine, which must not only be replenished, but also rotated and increased in number. For example, from 2022 to 2024, the composition of the occupation forces increased from 180 thousand to 530 thousand, or three times
It is possible that the process of increasing personnel will continue and every year another 100-150 thousand Russians will be mobilized to increase the group of occupiers and rotations. That is, taking into account the average rate of compensation for losses and other needs, mobilization per year in the Russian Federation should produce at least 450 thousand personnel or 37-38 thousand mobilized per month
Is Russia able to afford such indicators? Completely, but there is a nuance: the fact is that the rate of personnel losses directly depends on the degree of training and equipment of the units
Under such conditions of mobilization, the level of training will be critically low, and the level of equipment will only decrease with each... no, not year, but month, therefore, the average figure of 300 thousand losses will inevitably increase while maintaining the current intensity of hostilities
And this means that the need for mobilization will also grow - gradually but surely approaching the maximum figure of 60-70 thousand per month, without consolidating at any stable level. Although human resource is not everything on which the ability of Russians to fight depends; don't forget about technology
Military equipment
The stocks of Soviet tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery in warehouses and storage centers of the Russian Federation are practically depleted. The situation is worst with MBTs and armored fighting vehicles, somewhat better with cannon artillery
Russia has about a year left in reserves of main battle tanks to compensate for losses, but there are fewer and fewer repairable tanks. And repair processes now take much more time and energy resources than in 2022 and 2023
Actually, every month the Russian Federation has the opportunity to transfer fewer and fewer restored tanks to the troops, which in turn reduces the rate of compensation for losses per month
At the beginning of 2024, there remained in the Russian Federation
- T-90A and T90S - up to 100 tanks, with existing production an average of 50 tanks per year
- T-72 - about 1,500 tanks of varying degrees of maintainability, with no production
- T-80 - about 800 units of varying degrees of maintainability, with no production
- T-62 - up to 600 units, with no production
- T-54/55 - up to 600 tanks of varying degrees of maintainability, with no production
Thus, the total number of tanks stored in relatively and conditionally repairable condition was 3,600 units six months ago. Now, of course, there are much fewer of them
The situation is similar with armored fighting vehicles. Although things are better with the production of new tanks than with the production of tanks, the need for these vehicles is almost three times higher; Soviet artillery reserves in Russia in the categories “commissioned” and “in storage” were approximately at the beginning of 2024
- D-20 (152 mm) - about 100 (about 1000 in storage)
- D-30 (122 mm) - about 450 (about 4000 in storage)
- Msta-B (152 mm) - about 450 (about 550 in storage)
- Giatsint-B (152 mm) - about 100 (about 1000 in storage)
- Self-propelled gun Gvozdika 2S1 (122 mm) - about 400 (about 1200 in storage)
- Self-propelled gun Akatsiya 2S3 (152 mm) - about 700 (about 800 in storage)
- Self-propelled gun Giatsint 2S5 (152 mm) - about 150 (about 500 in storage)
- Self-propelled gun Msta-S 2S19 (152 mm) - about 400 (about 150 in storage)
- Self-propelled gun Pion 2S7 (203 mm) - about 100 (about 100 in storage)
- SAMU Nona-S 2S9 (120 mm) - about 300 (about 500 in storage)
- SAMU Nona-SVK 2S23 (120 mm) - about 30 (0 in storage)
- SAMU Tulip 2S4 (240 mm) - about 30 (150 in storage)
This list did not include 120-mm 2B11 type mortars, 82-mm BM-37, 100-mm MT-12 “Rapier” anti-tank gun, 85-mm D-44 divisional gun and others. In the “in storage” category, the number was indicated , which is approximately suitable for restoration and can be brought to a combat-ready state
All these figures indicate that the potential for restoration and compensation of losses in the MBT and AFV categories does not exceed the potential for six months or even less. In the artillery category, this figure can exceed a year to a year and a half
In no case does any of these indicators confirm that Russia has a 10-year war potential - it will dry up, depending on the category, before the end of 2024 and during 2025. This will lead to a decrease in the ability to compensate for losses and, as a result, deterioration situations with the staffing of units, which will entail an increase in losses
conclusions
Let us emphasize that it is important that the Russian Federation can really fight for 10 years, but it has such an opportunity only in the category of human resources. Although, as we know from history, it does not solve offensive problems without mechanized support
The most mechanized component that the Russian military-industrial complex can operate is becoming less and less every month. And while maintaining the current intensity of hostilities and the level of losses of equipment of the occupiers, the remaining reserves will not be enough for 10 years of the Russian Federation
If Russia really plans to fight for such a long period of time, it can only do this with the help of human resources, which will not solve its global problems. Moreover, it is already clear how the potential of its offensive campaigns in 2023-2024 is sagging and negatively differs from the indicators of 2022
Therefore, it is obvious that the process of exhaustion in 2024 will radically affect the capabilities of the invaders in 2025 - not only in matters of offensive, but also defense. Therefore, we need not only to mobilize, but also to arm ourselves qualitatively and quantitatively in order to turn an enemy offensive into an enemy flight
