North Korean leader Kim Jong-un gathered for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The heads of the two states will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum, which is taking place in Vladivostok. The focus was looking into whether Putin and Kim Jong-un would really discuss the transfer of weapons and what kind of weapons the aggressor would receive for the war against Ukraine as a result.
Kim Jong-un's route in Russia: Pier 33, Vostochny Cosmodrome and possibly Moscow
According to The New York Times - which was eventually confirmed - Kim Jong-un will arrive in Russia from Pyongyang on an armored train. The publication's sources also did not rule out a possible visit to Moscow. They say that the North Korean leader plans to visit Pier 33, the Russian naval base in Vladivostok, where ships of the Pacific Fleet are moored. Also one of Kim's potential stops after Vladivostok is the Vostochny Cosmodrome, a space launch center.
The plans for the visit were not officially confirmed for a long time. On September 5, journalists asked the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov whether the North Korean leader was preparing a visit to Russia, to which he replied: “We have nothing to tell you on this topic.” However, it is likely that an agreement on a future visit was reached during the July visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang, where he arrived with the North Korean leader to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, which resulted in the peninsula being divided into two parts.
What weapons can North Korea transfer to Russia - and under what conditions?
Among the main goals that Kim Jong-un may pursue by going to Russia are military-technical cooperation, as well as the supply of humanitarian and financial assistance to North Korea, whose poorly developed economy has been seriously damaged by the coronavirus pandemic. Due to the closure of borders and a ban on imports (in particular, grain from China, fertilizers and agricultural equipment), the country is experiencing mass hunger, BBC reports. A labor shortage due to a fever epidemic last year led to a massive rice harvest failure. The risk of a humanitarian catastrophe prompted Kim Jong-un to allow regular flights to two countries friendly to the DPRK - China and Russia. The DPRK also needs petroleum products and hard currency.
“Any aid Kim receives for the civilian sector of his economy could free up resources that can be spent on his nuclear weapons program,” Bloomberg notes.
According to Bloomberg, North Korea has significant reserves of ammunition, which can amount to millions of units. These stocks include 122 and 152 mm artillery shells, as well as 122 mm rockets required by the Russian Federation. In addition, North Korea can supply Russia with spare parts for tanks such as the T-54 and T-62, since it has large reserves of Soviet equipment.
Pyongyang's willingness to hand over the ammunition, however, is in doubt. Kim Jong-un and the North Korean elite are paranoidly afraid of an external threat, not only from the United States and South Korea, but also from China. China uses the DPRK as a buffer against the American military contingent stationed in South Korea and maintains the survival of the regime as a necessary evil. However, Pyongyang is wary of the Celestial Empire, remembering how during the Cold War China planned an operation to overthrow Kim Il Sung.
Given the severity of the threat and the fact that North Korea is seriously preparing to repel a potential attack from enemy states, it can hardly be assumed that the DPRK will transfer ammunition to Russia in the required quantity, which will affect the situation on the Ukrainian front. The transfer of weapons, however, is quite possible in exchange for food, humanitarian, and financial assistance. Moreover, most likely, deliveries have already been made, in particular, to the Wagner PMC. There are known cases when Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel found North Korean-made ammunition. This refers to ammunition for cannon artillery and multiple launch rocket systems - weapons that North Korea received back in the 1960s-80s from the Soviet Union and was able to establish its own production.
Visit to Putin as a way to send a signal to the US
It is likely that Kim Jong-un is trying to use his trip to Russia as a trigger for Western countries, primarily for the United States. The North Korean economy is in a deplorable state and in order to improve the situation, Pyongyang needs to ease the sanctions regime. By going to Russia, meeting with Putin, negotiating possible supplies of weapons that could be used on the front against Ukraine, Kim Jong-un is trying to attract attention and encourage Washington to communicate. US President Joe Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan said North Korea would face consequences if it transferred weapons to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine.
“We will continue to urge North Korea to fulfill its obligations and not supply weapons to Russia,” Sullivan assured. Thus, the United States expresses its readiness to resume direct dialogue with the North Korean regime. It is likely that Kim Jong-un will bargain and, in exchange for refusing to supply weapons to Russia, will demand, for example, the easing of sanctions.
Nuclear weapons of a rogue state
Direct dialogue with Washington is also important for North Korea in the context of legitimizing its nuclear status. Nuclear weapons for the DPRK are the only guarantee of safety and security. By developing its nuclear potential quantitatively and qualitatively, the DPRK is thus trying to protect itself from potential external intervention from, for example, the United States and South Korea, the purpose of which could be the deconstruction of the regime. Pyongyang is not ready to give up nuclear weapons, but it is becoming more and more difficult to exist in complete isolation against the backdrop of global crises every year. Therefore, Pyongyang is ready to find a compromise with the United States to ease isolation, subject to maintaining its nuclear arsenal with a limited quantitative reduction.
Of course, Kim Jong-un’s trip to the Russian Federation is important in an ideological and propaganda context - as a tool of influence on the North Korean public and a way to demonstrate that the DPRK is not a rogue country and there are states in the world that are ready to cooperate and share a common ideological base, such as hatred of The West, led by the USA. In addition, this will promote the cult of personality and will be used as evidence that the country's leader, the sun-faced Kim Jong-un, is developing diplomatic relations for the benefit of the people. Moreover, this happens simultaneously with the strengthening of the state’s defense capabilities against the backdrop of the “imperialist” threat.
New chapter: the largest submarine fleet will become nuclear
On September 8, they announced the construction of a “tactical nuclear submarine” as part of efforts to strengthen the DPRK’s naval forces. According to North Korean state news agency KCNA, the new submarine was unveiled Wednesday at a ceremony in the presence of Kim Jong Un, who said the launch of submarine No. 841, named after Hero Kim Kung-ok, marks “a new chapter in strengthening the naval North Korean forces."
According to the North Korean leader, the submarine will become “one of the main underwater offensive weapons of the North Korean Navy.” Kim Jong-un said that North Korea will convert its existing submarines into warships equipped with nuclear weapons. According to the US think tank Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea has between 64 and 86 submarines, one of the largest submarine fleets in the world, but there are doubts about its quality and whether the submarines are truly operational.
What significance will the meeting between Putin and Kim Jong-un have for the Russian Federation and Ukraine?
In Russia, the visit of the DPRK leader will also be used as an irritant for the United States, because the “arms deal” and a potential alliance with the odious North Korean regime cannot but cause concern in the White House. However, such an alliance is unlikely to be able to function effectively, given the successful sanctions policy of Western states against the DPRK and the Russian Federation and the difficult economic situation of North Korea.
For Ukraine, communication between the Russian Federation and the DPRK is not a critical threat due to the dubious prospects of a bilateral alliance - however, it should remain the focus of attention and become a motivation for greater involvement in the regional agenda of the Korean Peninsula. In particular, it is necessary to support South Korea's efforts to contain Pyongyang through diplomatic means and promote the initiative to reformat negotiations to resolve the North Korean problem, in which Ukraine could take part in the future, as a country facing an existential threat from a nuclear power.
