The Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security smells of Russian traces

The Verkhovna Rada is the body that has access to security information. And first of all, the Committee on National Security and Defense, which must be especially protected from agents of the aggressor state. But even there they expose them

Since February 24, 2022, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security and Defense has become one of the key ones among all parliamentary committees. This is a committee that receives information on the state of affairs at the front and international assistance, analyzes government procurement, and also has significant influence on decisions in parliament concerning security and defense.

So who knows state secrets in the committee and in the Verkhovna Rada as a whole? How this is regulated and whether security measures have been strengthened since the beginning of the great war - further in the material of Radio Liberty.

Russian intelligence services, of course, do not ignore such sensitive information and are trying in various ways to secure access to it.

For example, in July 2022, the SBU detained an assistant to one of the committee members, who had been collaborating with the FSB since 2017. And already this year it became known that an employee of the Verkhovna Rada secretariat, who worked with the chairman of the committee, has a Russian passport and repeatedly visited Crimea after the Russian occupation.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the security service as a whole has denied access to state secrets to more than 500 employees of various government agencies for one reason or another.

Who in the Verkhovna Rada has access to state secrets?

Types of state secrets:

• "for official use"
• "secret"
• "top secret"
• "of special importance"

People's deputies by default have access to documents “for official use” and classified as “secret” and “top secret”.

After being elected to the Rada, people's deputies are checked by the Security Service and are automatically granted this access. And they only receive access to documents classified as “special importance” upon a separate request. Although deputies usually do not even have carte blanche to any information they want to receive.

“You can, of course, gain access to state secrets to a certain extent. This is not all the information that is available in the country, that is, they must understand that deputies cannot get acquainted with our agents, which work, for example, somewhere in Pakistan. Of course, friends, goodbye, you won't see this. Or some secret developments, satellite communications, they won’t see that either,” said former SBU officer Ivan Stupak.

While numerous assistants to deputies, employees of the apparatus and secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, or others, must each time submit a request for access to state secrets and undergo a certain check, says retired Major General of the Security Service of Ukraine, former deputy chairman of the SBU, Viktor Yagun.

“The vast majority of those people who have access to information, even for “official use,” especially during war, must undergo special verification. Our special check is carried out in accordance with the law on state secrets by the Security Service, namely the department for the protection of state secrets. It is being carried out, if I am not mistaken, within about three months. If everything is fine, then all the inspection materials are then destroyed,” Viktor Yagun told Radio Liberty.

FSB agent in the National Security Committee

In July 2022, employees of the Security Service of Ukraine detained the assistant to the deputy from the Servant of the People, Yuri Zdebsky, Igor Garmashov. Two years later, in February 2024, the court found him guilty of treason.

According to the investigation, Garmashov was recruited by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in February 2014 in Moscow, he collected information about the defense capability and state security of Ukraine, and received money for this.

In 2017, Garmashov gave written consent to cooperate with the FSB, received a call sign and a mobile phone for transmitting information. In September 2019, he became an assistant consultant to Zdebski, who is a member of the defense committee. Garmashov received at least $71,000 from the Russian intelligence service, the investigation found.

Deputy Yuriy Zdebsky, who hired Garmashov to work in the Verkhovna Rada, said that he hired him because he was a good specialist in the field of the State Border Guard Service. He noted that Garmashov did not have access to state secrets; he appeared in the committee when he was invited.

Russian passport and travel to temporarily occupied Crimea

Another story with a risk for the information to which the Committee on National Security and Defense has access - a Russian passport is held by another employee, either the secretary of the committee chairman Alexander Zavitnevich, a deputy from the Servant of the People, or a consultant to the secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - versions about her position vary .

One way or another, the apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada fired this woman, according to deputy Maryana Bezugla, in the summer of this year. She, as the people’s deputy says, allegedly had a Russian passport and repeatedly visited the temporarily occupied Crimea after 2014.

Radio Liberty talked to Alexander Zavitnevich to understand whether this person had access to state secrets, because given the conditions, if there was access, there was also a risk of information leakage.

Correspondence:

– She was not my secretary or assistant. All employees of the secretariat are civil servants, and they are hired or dismissed from work by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and not by the chairman of the committee. I hire or fire only my assistants, like any other NDU.

All correspondence regarding civil servants occurs between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the authorities who are interested in it. Of course, they all undergo various checks in accordance with current legislation. I recommend that you submit a written request to the Verkhovna Rada Office.

And according to my passport, I learned about this, like everyone else, in the process of dismissing the above-mentioned employee. The Verkhovna Rada Office informed me about this.

She did not have access to classified information.

– Was she your consultant?

- No! Secretariat Consultant. I have committee assistants and advisors for this.

Correspondence under the heading is brought by other employees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, called Department 1.

– And the SBU didn’t warn you about her Russian passport?

– I wrote above that I learned about this from the Verkhovna Rada Office.

At this point, Radio Liberty’s correspondence with the chairman of the Committee of National Security and Defense ended, since Alexander Zavitnevich stopped responding to messages, so the editors did not receive answers to the remaining questions.

However, member of the parliamentary committee Maryana Bezuglaya denies the words of Alexander Zavitnevich that the dismissed employee was not his secretary and tells what duties she performed.

“She kept all the documentation, including SEDO and DSP. In particular, there was information that we needed help with. She made him coffee and tea, received and processed all his visitors who came to his office, which is a secure one. Well, that is, this is a concrete fact, absolutely everyone in the committee secretariat knows it, all colleagues know it, no one has a question. And he tells you that this is actually some person out there somewhere... Specifically, he was sitting in the waiting room for four years. At the same time, it is not a fact that she worked for Russia, but it is a risk,” MP Maryana Bezuglaya told Radio Liberty.

Who is responsible for identifying agents or probable agents of the Russian Federation?

Radio Liberty found out that inspections of Verkhovna Rada employees, for example, for access to state secrets, are carried out by employees of the SBU. Former Security Service employee Ivan Stupak participated in such checks and said that the procedure is as follows: the Verkhovna Rada turns to the SBU with a request for access to information for a specific person. Next, the employee’s personal data is checked; the Security Service looks for inconsistencies that may become grounds for denial of access to state secrets.

“These biographical and personal data are checked so that they are all clear. Then the presence of compromising materials in general is checked. Previously, he or she was somewhere in the databases, information about him or her is available, not available - in what sense, if he or she is involved in violating traffic rules, then it is clear that this is not a basis for refusal.

But if, for example, it took place somewhere in a criminal proceeding for leaking state secrets... Oh, this could be a certain basis for cancellation if such access had already been granted, or for non-issuance of this access,” added former SBU officer Ivan Stupak.

However, he emphasized that despite thorough checks, there are risks of allowing sensitive information to people who could pass it on to the aggressor. According to him, SBU employees often risk getting sued when they refuse access to state secrets, therefore, they do not always refuse, even when there are grounds for this.

“The security service is afraid to get involved in lawsuits to deny or cancel access to state secrets. I have seen this many times, when we understand that a person’s personal data comes in, he is checked, we understand that he is related to a bad country. We understand, but they ask me, what evidence do you have? Well, there is information there... How is it confirmed? Do you have a certificate or a stamp? “No, no,” added Ivan Stupak.

In this case, the expert says, they write a letter of recommendation addressed to the manager of such a person and inform about their suspicions. But this appeal has no legal force and the manager can remove the person from sensitive information, or may not respond - at his own discretion.

“The Security Service of Ukraine is sending this letter, and there are two big scenarios here. It is necessary to remove him from his position if the first scenario is here - the manager has normal human relations with this subordinate, or I don’t know, they go to the sauna, or get drunk, or are just godfathers. Then: how does the service interfere in activities? Go through the forest, we won't do anything! What do you allow yourself? This is parliamentarism. This is one scenario. Set aside.

Another scenario: a manager receives such information regarding a person with whom he simply is not friends, in general he hates him. And he is looking for a reason to fire him. Oh great! And he starts running around with this letter, shouting, the whole service, the whole service has written, let’s quickly, otherwise there will be problems. That is, everyone uses this letter as they need,” said Ivan Stupak.

The Security Service of Ukraine, in response to a request from Radio Liberty, reported that there are civil servants who by default have access to state secrets, and this category includes people’s deputies. The letter from the SBU states that from the moment of the full-scale invasion to this day, this department has denied access to classified information to more than 500 civil servants, for what reasons and to which particular institutions or persons - they did not specify for security reasons.

Also, if the Security Service has concrete evidence of cooperation with the aggressor country or evidence of other violations, they find out the details, and then act in accordance with the situation, says retired SBU Major General Viktor Yagun.

“This is a counterintelligence case, within the framework of which, if information is confirmed that he has stable contacts with the enemies of Ukraine, then it is clear that development is underway, then these contacts are documented and a decision is made on implementation. Implementation may vary. Either he starts working for Ukraine during a certain special operation, or he is simply detained while he is performing his tasks,” added Viktor Yagun.

The experts with whom Radio Liberty discussed the situation agreed that there is a problem when, for example, political activity in favor of the aggressor country is not taken into account when considering the issue of admitting a person to state secrets, as well as the problem of the non-subjectivity of the SBU in cases where there are suspicions of treason. But the only tool to remove a person from sensitive information is a letter of recommendation to the head of a government agency. Because, conditionally, when the SBU has evidence, by that time the probable agent can already transfer information to the enemy.

At the same time, and in the conditions that exist now, Maryana Bezuglaya, a member of the Committee on National Security and Defense, believes that in order to avoid the risk of information leakage, the SBU must do more than it is doing now.

“I believe that the Security Service does not do enough work on the counterintelligence protection of Parliament, and this is actually a very, very fertile environment for passing information to the other side. And, accordingly, this would have to be worked out in various ways,” the people’s deputy shared.

Radio Liberty also approached other members of the relevant committee with a request for comment, but they refused to talk on this topic.

Have additional checks been introduced for Verkhovna Rada employees and people's deputies since 2022?

Radio Liberty sent a request to the Verkhovna Rada and the SBU with a number of questions, in particular, it was interested in whether security measures had been strengthened in the relevant parliamentary committee and in the Verkhovna Rada as a whole, taking into account the situation and risks faced by the main legislative body of the country during a full-scale war.

However, the parliamentary staff responded to our request:

“...taking into account the nature of the issues raised in your letter related to the implementation of the competence of the Security Service of Ukraine, the specified letter was sent to the Security Service of Ukraine for consideration and providing you with a response,” said employees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and refused to communicate with Radio Liberty on this topic.

In the SBU’s response to our request, they said that they had strengthened counterintelligence activities after the full-scale invasion, but did not detail whether this specifically concerns the Verkhovna Rada and how exactly, again for security reasons.

“During the legal regime of martial law, the Security Service of Ukraine maximally strengthened counterintelligence activities,” SBU employees noted in response to an information request from Radio Liberty.

At the same time, we asked a former SBU employee, who in the past, in particular, participated in checking individuals for access to state secrets, Ivan Stupak, how it could happen that before the full-scale invasion, for example, there were people’s deputies in parliament who worked for Russia, such as: Viktor Medvedchuk, Ilya Kiva, Alexey Kovalev and others who were suspected of treason and did not hide their activities after the full-scale invasion. Also, these people's deputies, accordingly, had access to state secrets. However, this question has many aspects and requires wider research, so it is difficult to answer unequivocally, the expert says.

But it is obvious that it is the Committee on National Security and Defense that is of particular interest to the Russian intelligence services.

“The Russian Federation is actively looking for people for recruitment, for communication in this environment. That is, they are interested in this committee. Not the Committee on Freedom of Speech, for example, or on Religion. Yes, this is interesting, but during the war the National Security Committee is interested. Plans, reports, what can be seen, what can be analyzed, what trends generally exist in Ukraine, what trends are correct for Ukraine, whether they are needed or not, how the Russian Federation can play after receiving this information. And so the Russians are looking for these people, looking for people on the basis of who is more loyal to the Russian Federation,” says former SBU officer Ivan Stupak.

What can be changed to better protect classified information?

Radio Liberty asked experts how the system could be changed to reduce the risk of leaking classified information.

“We need to clearly introduce into the law such an understanding as coordination. For example, the intelligence services of the Baltic countries coordinate appointments down to teachers in schools. And if they do not agree, without explaining why they did not agree, this person is not appointed to this or that position, which provides for some ideological things in government structures,” said retired Major General of the Security Service of Ukraine Viktor Yagun.

The expert also believes that state secrets and access to them should be handled by a separate body, and not a department of the Security Service, as is the case now.

“We need to remove from the Security Service system what is called the Department for the Protection of State Secrets, make it some kind of separate body that would be responsible for the entire array, would carry out checks not within the framework of operational investigative activities, but actually according to those databases by everything that is. And if they receive any information that worries them, they simply transfer the information to the Security Service,” said Victor Yagun.

Viktor Yagun also believes that the SBU should not be a law enforcement agency, then there will be no need to “report to lawyers and prosecutors” - and accordingly, the problem will be solved that in the absence of clear evidence, the SBU does not risk refusing access to state secrets due to reluctance get sued later.

At the same time, former SBU employee Ivan Stupak believes that it is still difficult to secure sensitive information from a people’s deputy if he turns out to be an agent of an aggressor state. And it is difficult to improve this process in the current realities, because any interference in the activities of a people’s deputy or certain political forces can be regarded as a threat to parliamentarism.