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Who is robbing the State Property Fund?

A little more than a year has passed since NABU and SAPO reported suspicions to members of the organized crime group of Andrei Gmyrin for embezzling funds from enterprises of the State Property Fund of Ukraine. Political scientist Maryan Oschanovsky writes on his blog

Let me remind you that at the time of the crimes, the then head of the State Property Fund, Dmitry Sennichenko, was part of this organized group.

Suspicions were received by: Sennichenko himself, his ex-deputy Denis Kudin, two directors of the Odessa port plant (Sinitsa and Parsentiev), and several more “watchers”: Prisyazhnyuk, Kolot, Gorbunenko. It would seem that the story has come to an end: all the characters are suspected and on the international wanted list, the schemes have been liquidated, and the State Property Fund itself is earning money - cleanly, honestly and transparently!

But let's take a closer look at what's really happening...

In April of this year, after a long period of inactivity, the SumyKhimProm chemical plant was launched. First, the new director Zakharenko gathered a team of professionals around him and announced a phased plan for the revival of the enterprise. But after some time it became clear that, in fact, without any tender, the plant was given to the tolling scheme of the company TD UKRMINKHIM LLC. This company supplies SumyKhimProm with all production raw materials (sulfur, ammonia, phosphorites, potassium chloride), and then sells complex fertilizers produced by the plant. What's the point? This company does not have its own mines and quarries. This is exactly the scheme! Instead of normal operation, the plant becomes dependent on a private office and incurs losses, supposedly “expensive” raw materials are approximately $20-30 per ton, and the state plant loses approximately $300-400 thousand from each such supply!

“UKRMINKHIM” buys raw materials not directly from manufacturers, but from a network of European shell companies registered in different countries. They are the ones who help to draw inflated prices. According to my information, this entire network is controlled by one person - Vitaly Viktorovich Loginov. Vitaly Loginov also controls the physical delivery and shipment of all cargo from Sumy through his forwarding company.

Here, as an example, is one of the latest contracts for the supply of phosphorites to LLC TD UKRMINHIM from the Slovak gasket Z9 Impex sro on August 1, 2024 - the price for supposedly Egyptian phosphorites is €107 euros per ton. Later, these raw materials will go to Sumy KhimProm. Currently, the real Egyptian supplier of phosphate rocks, Chem Source Egypt, offers the same raw materials for $40-50 per ton.

But that's not all. Look at the bill of lading for another recent supply of supposedly “Egyptian” phosphorites for SumyKhimProm. For some reason it is being loaded in Lebanon, almost on the border with Syria. This happens because phosphorites really are of Syrian origin. It appears that the sanctioned product of Russia's ally is only masquerading as Egyptian with the help of fake certificates of origin. You can also see how “Uzbek” potassium from Georgia is imported to Sumy using the same scheme. But in fact, he may just be Russian.

Having examined other activities of Vitaly Loginov at the enterprises of the State Property Fund, it turns out that he controls all cargo flows of the United Mining and Chemical Corporation (UMCC), transporting hundreds of thousands of tons of ilmenite ore by rail and shipping them through the berths of the Odessa port plant.

From sources close to the titanium industry, it became known that Loginov was allegedly “brought in from above” as an unofficial adviser to the head of the UMCC in 2023. At the central office of the enterprise in Kyiv, he was introduced as “supervising from the Office of the President.” The integration of Loginov into the flow of the enterprise was ensured by the then acting director of the OGKhK Dimitri Kalandadze, who did not have Ukrainian citizenship. In turn, Loginov positioned himself as a person personally close to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Moscow Region, Kirill Budanov, and one of the leaders of the OP. There are a number of witnesses to whom he told that he allegedly participated in special operations of the Main Intelligence Directorate, and his supervisor was “personally Budanov’s deputy.” Somehow he was given a secret office in the central office of the OGKhK - a “glass room”. And then from this “glass”, Loginov’s influence and interests spread to other strategic enterprises of Ukraine (Odessa Port Plant, Sumykhimprom, etc.). In particular, it is known that “war hero Loginov” tried to pull off a scam with state-owned Ukreximbank lending to the OGKhK for further withdrawal of funds “to help launch the OPP” by providing financial assistance from one enterprise to another. And indeed, ilmenite flows go through the cargo berths of the OPP, which are technically not intended for this, so there is clearly some kind of connection there...

A logical question arises: who is the ultimate beneficiary of the shadow activities of the overseer Loginov and the supply of ilmenite? It is known that titanium ilmenite is a basic component in the production of the entire range of Russian weapons, including ballistic missiles. In addition, an interesting fact is that a member of the board of the UMCC, Zakharchenko, was transferred to the position of director of Sumykhimprom shortly after Loginov appeared at the UMCC, which indicates their possible acquaintance. There are many more interesting facts and events, but the most important question is where this character came from and whose tasks he performs.

As for the Odessa port plant, a certain Yuri Kovalsky became the acting director there. And Alexander Muzhel, a shadow representative of the same Gmyrin in Ukraine, nicknamed “The Frenchman,” came to introduce him to the plant staff.

Now Vitaly Loginov is trying to push through the same hidden tolling scheme at the Priportovy Plant as at SumyKhimProm - recently information appeared in several publications about the Kharkov company AGROTORGGROUP, which “won on July 25 a tender for the supply of gas to the OPP, 13 billion UAH! One of the publications wrote that the company is associated with the trade in Russian ammonia. In 2022, Agrotorggroup, through the little-known Pridneprovie-2021 commodity exchange, acquired 10,000 tons of ammonia, which was under the arrest of ARMA. Then People's Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Financial Committee Yaroslav Zheleznyak argued that these auctions had signs of a corruption scheme.

Here and there in telegram channels they wrote that a certain Donetsk bandit from the nineties, Givi Nemsadze, was related to this company. An informed anonymous source said that this is not so, and in fact “Agrotorggroup” is also controlled by Vitaly Loginov.

I quote: “Everyone in the market knows that Vitaly Loginov controls Sumy, OGKhK and Priportovy. He handles all logistics, delivery and sales. He also has two partners - Alexander and Dmitry, who live in France, and the topic of gas supply to the OPP is theirs, and Nemsadze's - this is to confuse the readers of telegram channels. He himself (ed. Vitaliy) introduces himself to all directors of state-owned enterprises, either as an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate or the Security Service of Ukraine, in a word, he resolves the issue as a curator from the Fund...”

It becomes obvious that all SPFU enterprises are once again mired in the web of the institution of “supervisors”. All these are schemes and people of Gmyrin, Alexander “French” Muzhel, and their new frontman Vitaly Loginov, who does not allow state-owned enterprises to work for the state, hiding behind the Main Intelligence Directorate and the Security Service of Ukraine. It is not clear how the Main Intelligence Directorate and the SBU allow “their people” to transport cargo from sanctioned countries to Ukrainian state-owned enterprises. Or is this some kind of “special operation”?

Many details indicate that it is Andrei Gmyrin who is the puppeteer behind this multifaceted scheme. Yes, he is wanted and under suspicion by NABU, and it seems that even while hiding abroad, he managed to reach Ukraine and is still pulling the strings in the SPFU enterprises.

Whether this scheme has patrons at the highest levels of government or is simply a scam by scammers under the guise of war, one can only guess. But the corruption component of these processes directly affects the credibility of the President of Ukraine in the international arena. During the war, it’s like Agatha Christie’s: “Look for who benefits from it...”

legenda

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